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Nation Building in Ukraine and the Former USSR

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Pal Kolsto. *Political Construction Sites: Nation-Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000. xi, 308 pp. U.S.$24.00 paper, U.S.$65.00 cloth.

Jan Germen Janmaat. *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population.* Vol. 268 of Netherlands Geographical Studies. Utrecht and Amsterdam: The Royal Dutch Geographical Society and the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam, 2000. 243 pp. U.S.$23.00 paper. Order from Netherlands Geographical Studies, P.O. Box 80123, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands; fax: +31 30 253 5523; e-mail: knag@geog.uu.nl

Pal Kolsto is a well-known scholar who has written extensively on nation building and national minorities in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Nation building in the post-Soviet states has had to confront the legacies of tsarist and Soviet colonial rule and nationality policies—Russification, large numbers of Russians, Russophones, and Sovietophiles in these countries, and urban centres in which these states' titular languages and cultures do not dominate. Nation builders there ultimately have three major choices—to maintain the legacies (for example, in Belarus), to attempt to remove them partially (for example, in large parts of Ukraine), or to try to erase the Soviet past completely (for example, in the three Baltic states and the western oblasts of Ukraine).

The legacy of Soviet nationality policy is confusing. The fifteen independent states that emerged after the collapse of the USSR are based on the territorial units of the fifteen Union republics. As in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, only these republics, but none of the former or current autonomous republics within them, have become independent states. Each non-Russian republic of the FSU has been portrayed as the "homeland" of a titular nation. The Russian SFSR, on the other hand, was never perceived by the Russians as their "homeland"; instead, they considered it to be the entire USSR. Russian was the de facto state language of the USSR—and the language of Soviet modernization—and the Russian Orthodox Church was the Soviet state church. This ethno-cultural definition of the

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non-Russian republics was balanced against a civic notion of a supra-national Soviet identity. In the aftermath of the disintegration of the USSR, the citizens in the newly independent republics have had a choice in defining their identity. Ukraine's citizens have been able to choose either a Ukrainian identity or one that is both Ukrainian and Soviet/pan–East Slavic. The latter is the domain of the radical Left, particularly the Communists, and it constitutes the basis of the official ideology of President Aliaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus. Soviet/pan–East Slavic nationalism has been largely ignored in discussions of "nationalism" in Ukraine.[1] Yet this nationalism is as much ethnic as the nationalism of the Ukrainian radical Right. Kolsto calls it an "expression of skewed ethnic nationalism" (p. 162).

Kolsto's volume begins with a discussion of the legacies described above and of how nation building can be incorporated into the political-science literature on national and social integration. The most influential postwar theorists in this area of study have been Karl Deutsch, Charles Tilly, and Reinhard Bendix. They have argued that nation building consists of the centre's integration of regions into the larger polity through a consolidation of the nation-state. This takes place at the same time as modernization, urbanization, and the development of communications. The central elites promote cultural and economic unification, and local identity declines in favour of a national allegiance. The process of the dissolution of minority cultures and languages into a "higher" culture is inevitable and beneficial, according to Deutsch.

Since the 1960s other scholars have criticized these views as being too optimistic and for not taking into account the widespread opposition that the central authorities may meet from regional groups. Whether assimilation is "beneficial" or not is obviously debatable. In the case of those Bretons who assimilated into the French culture, for example, or of those Ukrainians who became Russophones, some scholars will argue that this was beneficial because it allowed such individuals to take part in the modernization processes that occurred in France and the USSR respectively. Others might concur with Walker Connor's view that nation building can also be defined as "nation destroying" (e.g., through Russification and de-nationalization) and therefore should be perceived negatively.

In Ukraine's case these debates have serious conclusions. Is the Soviet legacy all bad, partly bad, or not bad at all? Those who argue, like Connor, against assimilation will see the USSR in a completely negative light. This view might be shared by many Ukrainian speakers, inhabitants of Western Ukraine, and members of Ukrainian Centre-Right parties who led the drive to independence (e.g., Rukh). Those who take the middle ground, such as President Leonid Kuchma, are selectively critical of the Soviet legacy. This is not surprising: they are products of the Soviet era, when many adopted Russian as their "mother tongue" (e.g., President Kuchma) and created centrist "parties of power" with close ties to the authorities. Those who laud the Soviet era are primarily members and supporters of left-wing parties.

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1. On Russian nationalism in Ukraine, see Oleksandr Maiboroda, *Rosiiskyi natsionalizm v Ukraini (1991–1998 r.r.)* (Kyiv, 1999). On nationalism in Ukraine in general, see my articles "Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Framework," *Politics* 20, no. 2 (May 2000): 77–86; and "The Nation and Nationalists in Ukraine," in *Nationalism after Independence*, ed. Lowell Barrington (*forthcoming*).

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If, as in Deutsch's model, national integration aims to integrate regions into "higher cultures," how can this be accomplished in a Ukraine where the Ukrainian language and culture were depicted in Soviet times as rural, provincial, and something that was dying out and therefore not part of modernity? Will the predominantly Russian-speaking inhabitants of eastern Ukraine's urban centres integrate into the "higher culture" of Kyiv if that culture is Ukrainian? That is, will they integrate into a culture that they previously despised? Perhaps they will simply have to accept that the Ukrainian language has a right to exist and be used alongside Russian in a bilingual linguistic framework, because an independent Ukraine, the Ukrainian elites believe, requires a state language. The lessons of Belarus, where the situation for the native language is dire and the country's president still harbours a Soviet-style disdain for it, have not been lost on Ukraine's elites. Without Ukrainian as the language of the state, they believe, there will be no independence. Kolsto argues that Kuchma backed the cultural intelligentsia's view that a "separate state must have its own language" (p. 189) and that by 1996 he had come around to the view that there was a link between the "homeland," the titular nation, and the nation-state.

Kolsto describes the republics of the FSU as "construction sites" where nation building and national consolidation are taking place. National identities are being constructed through the integration of culture, national historiography, language, and the economy. The questions of who are the titular nations and who are the indigenes must be resolved. The cultures and languages of the Slavic states of Ukraine and Belarus are similar to the Slavic part of the Russian Federation. In four states—Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and Kirgizia—Russians make up more than a quarter of the population. Only Armenia is ethnically homogenous. In most of the other post-Soviet states the titular nation has not been consolidated, and nation building on the civic level (that is, involving the entire population) is matched by the ethnic consolidation of the titular nation. In Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Belarus the titular nations have been the weakest (p. 125), and this probably explains the Russophile stance of these countries' ruling elites.

Kolsto defines Estonia and Latvia as "ethnic democracies" because of the heavy influence of ethnic nationalism there. Nevertheless, it is not clear how their policies are different from those of many Western "civic" states, such as France, Germany, Greece, and the United States. German citizenship, for example, is not open to non-Germans, and citizenship in the United States and Canada is not granted to immigrants automatically, but only after a three- to five-year probation period and language and history tests. Although Kolsto has an impressive understanding of the theoretical literature on nationalism, he becomes confused when applying theory to the FSU, as do many Western scholars. Contrary to his view, the ninety-one percent of Ukrainians who voted "yes" in the 1 December 1991 referendum on independence did not do so because they watched a film on the 1932–33 artificial famine (p. 39)!

Kolsto discusses the alleged "strong impulse of Ukrainianization" (p. 12), evidence of which is seen when eastern Ukrainians move to Kyiv. At the same time he argues that Ukraine "is one of the Soviet successor states where the ideal of a non-ethnic, civic nation-state has dominated the nation-building discourse" (p. 97). He also supports the view of many Western scholars that during the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk (1991–94)

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Ukraine moved away from a civic to an ethnic definition of the state.[2] This allegedly damaged the credibility of Ukraine as a multi-ethnic civic state.

Having accepted this commonly held misconception of Ukraine under Kravchuk as an ethnic "nationalizing state," Kolsto becomes perplexed. Neither he nor the scholars with whom he agrees are able to understand why "Ukrainianization" has continued under Kuchma.[3] According to their analysis, Kuchma should have dropped these "nationalizing" policies. Kolsto hypothesizes that the elites believe that an independent state needs a culture that provides it with an identity different from Russia's. The main pillar of Ukraine's distinctiveness vis-à-vis Russia is the Ukrainian language (p. 193). Tension in the state is caused by competing views as to how the "we" of Ukraine should be defined—in ethno-national terms (the view of the cultural intelligentsia) or in state-national terms (Kuchma's view). Kolsto concludes that after 1996 Kuchma adopted ethnonationalist terms of reference (p. 189). But he cannot explain why "Ukrainianization" continued after the Galician cultural intelligentsia was removed from power in Kyiv in 1994 and thereby no longer "set the political agenda in the republic" (p. 193). Such a conclusion will be news to many. After all, Kolsto admits that greater concessions to Russophones have been granted in Ukraine than in most of the other countries of the FSU (p. 192). He may have failed to see the forest for the trees because he has too readily accepted a clear-cut distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" states. He himself admits that *both* civic and ethnic states can be "nationalizing" (i.e., assimilating) and that Rogers Brubaker's concept of "nationalizing states" "is one of stages and degrees rather than qualitative differences" (p. 27).

The role of historical symbols, historiography (note that Kolsto misspells Mykhailo Hrushevsky's name as "Khrushevsky"), and myths are aptly discussed by Kolsto, who explains the significance of Ukraine to Russia (e.g., does Ukraine have a greater claim to the legacy of Kyivan Rus' and was the 1654 agreement of Pereiaslav beneficial to Ukraine?). He also criticizes Western historians who have adopted Russophile historiographical frameworks and "brushed these [Ukrainian] objections aside, dismissing them as rather pathetic manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism" (p. 35). Unlike the British scholar Andrew Wilson,[4] Kolsto believes that state symbols and historiography

2. See, for example, Dominique Arel, "Ukraine—The Temptation of the Nationalizing State," in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, N.Y., 1995), 157–88; Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge, 1997); and David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca and London, 1998).

3. Anatol Lieven is similarly puzzled why the "nationalizing" policies adopted during Kravchuk's presidency have been continued by Kuchma. See his *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry* (Washington D.C., 1999).

4. See the latter's "Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine," in *Myths and Nationhood*, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin (London, 1997), 182–97; and idem, "National History and National Identity in Ukraine and Belarus," in *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, ed. Graham Smith et al. (Cambridge, 1998), 23–47.

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have not been divisive in Ukraine (p. 244). He makes the point that Stepan Bandera, a Nationalist leader, could not have collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War because he was a concentration-camp inmate at Auschwitz (p. 52).

Kolsto also points out that the Russian Federation never declared independence from the USSR (p. 46). That is why it celebrates its independence on the day in May when it declared sovereignty in 1990. After one non-Russian republic after another declared independence at that time, the Russian RSFSR was left without the Union and became independent by default. In December 1991 President Boris Yeltsin unsuccessfully pushed for the creation of a confederal Commonwealth of Independent States. As a result, the Russian Federation became the USSR's "continuator state."

Kolsto concludes that the twenty-five million Russians in the FSU outside Russia do not constitute a single diaspora, but fourteen different ones. They have found it difficult to accept being classified as national minorities and often seek territorial autonomy, define the states in which they live as bicultural (not multicultural), and clamour for dual citizenship. These Russophones also do not exhibit a uniform identity: some are similar to Russians, while others are more "Soviet." But "Soviet" identity is declining increasingly as the possibility of resurrecting the USSR or a similar union becomes less and less probable with the passage of time.

Both tsarist Russia and the USSR did not adopt policies to promote Russian nation building. Of the Soviet republics, only the Russian SFSR did not have any republican institutions until 1990, and in 1991 it simply appropriated the Soviet central institutions. Russian identity was therefore tied to the state and empire, not ethnicity (unlike Serbian identity). Russian dissidents never called for the secession of the Russian SFSR from the USSR, and they, like most Russians, can therefore be best defined as imperialists rather than nationalists.[5] Russian ethnic nationalism is as much a "minority faith" as is the Ukrainian.[6] Discussions about the nature of "Russia" and how the "we" there should therefore be defined have been more intense than the similar debates in Ukraine. As Kolsto argues, "Most of the ideas that have been presented define Russia in such a way that the state borders fail to coincide with the borders of the Russian Federation" (p. 204). Russia's definition of itself as a civic state called "Rossiia" is confounded by the fact that the Russian Federation is a mini-version of the USSR, with many autonomous ethnic homelands.

Russian nation building is thus problematic. The symbols of the Russian Federation are from imperial Russia, but have still to be defined constitutionally. It is difficult to accept Kolsto's view that these symbols are not resented by non-Russians in the Russian Federation (p. 245). Is this really the case with the Tatars, the largest minority, or the Chechens, in whose homeland a bloody conflict still rages?

Jan Germen Janmaat's volume is one of a growing number of Ph.D. theses on contemporary Ukraine that have been converted into books. As a volume on nation building, it is mired in the controversy surrounding such misused terms as "nationalism"

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5. For an elaboration of this argument, see David. G. Rowley, "Imperial versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia," *Nations and Nationalism* 6, no. 1 (January 2000): 23–42.

6. See Anatol Lieven, "The Weakness of Russian Nationalism," *Survival* 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 53–70.

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and "nationalizing state." Janmaat argues that western Ukrainians "tend to be more nationalist in outlook than Ukrainians in the rest of Ukraine (p. 13) and that Lviv is "the centre of nationalist western Ukraine" (p. 121). This common misconception is only understood if we accept the Soviet-era view of national consciousness and language use as tantamount to nationalism (then "bourgeois," now "ethnic"). As I have argued elsewhere, it also completely ignores the existence of Soviet and Russian nationalism in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

Like most Western scholars, Janmaat characterizes the eastern Ukrainians as Russophones or Russophiles, but never as nationalists. But Ukrainian nationalism having a "limited appeal" (p. 42) is the case only if it is understood to mean ethnic nationalism, which has a limited appeal throughout Europe. Janmaat's assertion does not tell us anything that we do not already know. He argues that Ukraine is "unlikely to embark on a course of strong state nationalism" (p. 37). In contrast, Kolsto believes that Ukraine has adopted nationalist policies, and he would disagree with Janmaat's view that the Ukrainian ruling elites are not civic or state nationalists. Janmaat accepts the confusing framework laid down by scholars such as Arel, Wilson, Lieven, and others who define nationalism far too narrowly as western Ukrainian, Ukrainophone, and national-democratic rather than as a state ideology common to the ruling elites of all civic states.

How do Ukraine's nation builders define who the "we" are? Janmaat describes Ukraine as a "bi-national state" (p. 18). This is a view also propounded by Russophiles in Ukraine and the FSU; it has led Ukraine's Vladimir Grinev to argue for two titular nations.[7] At the same time Janmaat is reluctant to label Ukraine a "nationalizing state," because this would be a "serious misrepresentation of reality" (p. 176). He disagrees with Arel, Wilson, and Laitin that Ukraine under Kravchuk was a "nationalizing state" dominated by exclusionary nationalism (p. 64). The Ukrainian state adopted an inclusive civic concept of citizenship, and its ethnic minorities are accommodated and accorded equal civil and cultural rights. Janmaat believes that this is because a more radical nationality policy is not possible because of the amorphous nature of Ukrainian national identity (p. 83). In Ukraine, the expansion of Ukrainian language use is being undertaken in an evolutionary manner. Janmaat therefore concludes that Ukraine's nation-building policies are "fairly liberal/permissive with a mild but nonetheless incessant drive to culturally homogenize the country" (p. 177).

It is difficult to accept this assertion, given that nearly half of all mass media in Ukraine are in Russian; that Russian broadcasts still prevail on the private television channels (especially former Channel Three, now called Inter); that publications aimed at the "New Ukrainian" businessmen are in Russian; that pirated computer programs are in Russian; and that Western films are dubbed into Russian instead of Ukrainian. Like Kolsto, Janmaat believes that the Ukrainianization policies were consolidated under Kuchma, and he provides impressive figures to show how the Ukrainianization of all levels of education has continued (p. 112). (Many other scholars had predicted that the pace of Ukrainianization would slow down.) The reasons that Janmaat provides for the continuation of these policies are the same as those that Kolsto proposes: an independent

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7. For details, see my review article in the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 22, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1997): 145–63.

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state needs symbols that differentiate it from Russia, and language is central to constituting "otherness." Janmaat concludes that civic (state) nationalism will continue to dominate within Ukraine's ruling elites, despite arguing to the contrary earlier. It seems that he concurs with Paul D'Anieri's statement that the central elites, whatever their origins, "are likely to back Ukrainianization as long as they want Ukraine to remain an independent state (which, once they are in office, they are almost sure to want). This, in turn, would lead one to believe that Ukrainianization is most probably a permanent feature of central state policy."[8]

Near the end of his book, Janmaat argues more cautiously that because Ukrainian nationalism is only a "minority faith" and there has to be some compromise owing to the large numbers of Russophones in Ukraine, the prospects for Ukrainianization are highly uncertain (p. 189). Like Kolsto, he remains confused as to why Kuchma, "the candidate of the Russian-speaking east and south," has not slowed down the Ukrainianization of education (p. 112). Janmaat concludes that the authorities believe that the percentage of education in Ukrainian should approximate the same percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in the population. What percentage of the population ethnic Ukrainians constitute is in flux, however: it has risen from seventy-two percent (in the 1989 Soviet census) to nearly eighty percent, according to unofficial figures provided to me by Volodymyr Malynkovych, a civic activist and a former Soviet dissident, in Kyiv on 15 August 2000. Since more than thirty percent of marriages in Soviet Ukraine were between persons with different ethnic backgrounds, these persons have become prime candidates for changing their ethnic affiliation from the Russian to the Ukrainian. One Western study predicted that the number of Russians could decline by half in Ukraine.[9] The February 1991 State Program for the Development of the Ukrainian Language, designed to implement the 1989 language law over a ten-year period, states that "Language shapes national consciousness, [and] it is the basis of a nation's spirit."

The major contribution of Janmaat's book is his focus on a surprisingly neglected topic—education. In Ukraine's education system, history and literature have been the backbone of the nation-building program. Russian language and literature are no longer core subjects and are taught only as a foreign language and within the context of world literature. Janmaat argues that every multi-national state promotes national integration and a single identity, defends its territorial integrity, officially fosters the language of the titular group, and remodels national historiography and geography; the mass media, education, and the security forces are used to promote such socialization. In independent Ukraine's Ukrainian- and Russian-language schools, the same textbooks are used (many Western scholars have assumed that Russophones would strongly oppose such a policy). In the Russian-language schools, be they state- or privately run, students are taught three languages—Russian, Ukrainian, and a foreign one. Nation building in education is facilitated, Janmaat believes, by the continued use of the Soviet model in education. The greatest uphill struggle for education in the Ukrainian language is evident in Ukraine's

8. Paul D'Anieri, *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations* (New York, 1999), 78.

9. See Stephen Rapawy, *Ethnic Reidentification in Ukraine,* IPC Staff Paper 90 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, August 1997).

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east and south, where such education experienced a dramatic decline during the Soviet era; parents there lost their theoretical right to choose in which language their children should be taught (p. 111). The three factors that have shaped the degree of Russification in a region have been the duration of the region's incorporation into the USSR, the proportion of ethnic Ukrainian inhabitants there, and the urban-rural population ratio. In regions where ethnic Ukrainians comprise less than sixty percent of the population, such as the Donbas and Crimea, Ukrainianization has proceeded slowly.

During the 1990s education in the Ukrainian language increased beyond the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in western and central Ukraine. It also made tremendous gains in much of the rest of Ukraine, except the Donbas and Crimea. In Kyiv there are now proportionately fewer Russian-language schools (4.25 per cent of all schools) than in Lviv (4.63 percent). Since the summer of 1997, even Crimea has been brought into the Ukrainian education system, and students there are using the same history and language textbooks as elsewhere in Ukraine. Janmaat points out that the gains of Ukrainian-language education have differed regionally and have often been dependent on the attitude of local personnel, the extent of local law-abiding traditions, and the availability or shortage of textbooks and teachers. All students in Ukraine, be they ethnic Ukrainians, Russians, or members of other ethnic minorities, are taught Ukrainian history.

Janmaat's discussion of Ukrainian historiography is a weak point in his otherwise commendable study. He argues that Ukrainians do not suffer from "lost pride syndrome" (p. 80), that they cannot look back on earlier periods of independence interrupted by Soviet rule, and that they possess few "heroic" periods in history. Hence he concludes that feelings of pride "appear to be few and far between" (p. 86). Janmaat argues, in a manner similar to many other Western scholars, that a "radical Ukrainian-nationalist version of history" (p. 86) will not be acceptable in eastern and southern Ukraine. But he never outlines the differences between a "nationalist" version of history and a "national historiography." Ukrainian nation builders, he himself admits, have not used Russian/Soviet historiography, because it denies the very existence of a separate Ukrainian nation and undermines the country's territorial integrity. Yet Janmaat does not define this historiography as nationalist. Neither do most Western scholars; on the contrary, as Kolsto points out, they have accepted it as "objective." Janmaat expresses astonishment in discovering that the same history textbooks are being used throughout Ukraine, even in Crimea. In other words, a "national historiography" is being taught to Ukrainophones and Russophones. Like other Western scholars, he believes that this might lead to Russophone opposition because it is "strongly nationalizing in content and misses no opportunity to criticize aspects of Soviet society" (p. 107). Since no evidence of opposition to these texts can be found, is it not time for these scholars to change their analytical frameworks?

Janmaat also expresses surprise that Russophones in eastern and southern Ukraine are not opposed to Hrushevsky's historical teachings (p. 180). From his study of a limited number of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian-language textbooks, he concludes that the latter are more balanced and more critical, present a variety of viewpoints, and stress Ukrainian national identity, Ukrainian statehood traditions, and the centrality of language. The post-Soviet textbooks discuss the suppression of the Ukrainian language, treat Russian and Polish as foreign languages, play down any striving for unity with Russia, and stress Ukraine's distinctiveness vis-à-vis Russia. They define Kyivan Rus' as a Ukrainian proto-nation, and the Ukrainians as either the only or the main inheritors of its legacy.

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They discuss Hetman Ivan Mazepa and his failed uprising against Russia in 1709, the destruction of the Hetmanate, and the growing dissatisfaction with tsarist rule. They point out that the Bolsheviks had little support in Ukraine during the revolutionary war years of 1917–21, and they present the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in a positive light.

The answer to why—to Janmaat's surprise—there has been no Russophone opposition to Ukraine's nation-building policies may be found in his book. He has found that the identity of Ukraine's Russians and Russophones is not distinct, that their mobilization on cultural issues has therefore been "amateurish" (p. 167), and that Russian organizations are continually at loggerheads with each other and are poorly financed and organized. These organizations are best organized in Lviv, where eight societies with close Communist ties are active. Janmaat concludes that the Russians in the other cities he studied (Kyiv, Donetsk, Odesa) did not organize themselves because their language and culture were not under threat.

Another reason why the mobilization of "Russians" in Ukraine has proven to be difficult is that they are not a distinct ethnic group. Many of those who defined themselves as Russian in the 1989 Soviet census were of ethnically mixed heritage, and by today they may have redefined themselves as Ukrainian or Soviet. Because the USSR was the "homeland" of all Russians, it did not develop nation-building policies for them, and the designation of "Russian" in the Soviet census and passports was less an ethnic one than one that allowed for a range of possible post-Soviet identities. Russophone Ukrainians, Janmaat points out, could still define themselves as Ukrainians, albeit ones with an amorphous identity, and families with one parent who was Ukrainian and one who was Russian have been more prone to become linguistically and culturally Ukrainian, especially in two of the four cities he studied, Kyiv and Lviv. In contrast, in the east and south Janmaat sees less likelihood of a change in language use from Russian to Ukrainian unless there is a sustained policy of Ukrainianization (p. 189). For this to happen, the Ukrainian language would have to have a high status and be urban-based. Janmaat argues that there is no precedent for the introduction of Ukrainian, a former language of low esteem, into an urban environment where the dominant language has been Russian, which previously had a higher status. How then, one wonders, did Prague's and Bratislava's inhabitants manage to switch from using German to Czech and from Hungarian to Slovak respectively in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?

Kolsto and Janmaat both deal with complex, multifaceted aspects of nation building in Ukraine and the other countries of the FSU. Kolsto's volume is intended to be a textbook for new students in the field, and it will be useful at the undergraduate and general levels. Janmaat's volume is a solid contribution to the study of nation building in contemporary Ukraine; it is obviously directed at the advanced reader. Its drawbacks are increasingly common in the field where Ph.D. dissertations on Ukraine are undertaken without any command of the Ukrainian language. Most Western students of post-Soviet Ukraine know Russian and assume that this is sufficient for their research needs. This is an anomaly. After all, would a student writing a dissertation on nation building in Poland be allowed to do so without any knowledge of Polish? Today all Ukrainian government publications, which are growing in number as state building progresses, are in Ukrainian, the state language. It is no longer possible to study contemporary Ukraine fully without utilizing these Ukrainian-language primary sources.

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