

Paul D'Anieri, editor. *Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization Apathy and the State*. Washington, DC, and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. viii, 316 pp. U.S.\$60 cloth.

Orange Revolution and Aftermath is an admirable addition to the small number of book-length studies about Ukraine's Orange Revolution (hereafter OR). Like all collections of articles by various authors, the eleven contributions therein vary in their originality, value, and relevance. Paul D'Anieri opens the proceedings with an excellent introduction. Joshua A. Tucker's essay draws on his earlier article in *Perspectives on Politics*, while the other contributions, particularly in part 1, provide original contributions to the study of the OR. Ioulia Shukan's, Anna Fournier's, Serhiy Kudelia's, and Marc P. Berenson's stand out as the most interesting new contributions to the study of this important event in contemporary Ukrainian history.

In "National Identity and Authoritarianism: Belarus and Ukraine Compared" Lucan A. Way presents one of two theoretical frameworks for explaining the factors leading to democratic revolutions. In it he stresses the importance of Ukrainian nationalism as supportive of democratic revolution in Ukraine and of Soviet nationalism as supportive of authoritarianism in Belarus. However, Way's article "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions" in the *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (2008): 55–69, which he wrote subsequently, does not include nationalism as an additional factor explaining democratic revolutions, despite its overconfident title. Four responses to that article in *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 1 (2009) by Mark R. Beissinger (pp. 74–77), Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (69–73), Charles H. Fairbanks (82–85), and Vitaliy Silitski (86–89) debate his criticism of frameworks to discuss democratic revolutions; but they also ignore nationalism's role. In his "Reply to My Critics" therein, Way does not discuss nationalism as supportive of or opposed to democratic revolutions, but credits mobilization in the OR as having "tapped into widely shared anti-Russian nationalist sentiments dominant in the west of the country." (90–97).

To me it is unclear where Way stands on the role of nationalism in democratic change, especially as he argues forcefully in "National Identity and Authoritarianism" that national identity is a better indicator of why Ukrainians joined the OR than protests against election fraud are. He differentiates between Ukraine, where nationalism has consolidated and united diverse groups against an authoritarian incumbent, and Belarus, where such nationalism is weak and a competing Soviet "nationalism" is stronger and underpins Alyaksandr Lukashenka's authoritarian rule. Way misses this opportunity to describe similar competing nationalisms, unlike Stephen Shulman who differentiated between "ethnic Ukrainian" and "eastern Slavic" nationalisms in his article "National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine" in *Slavic Review* 64, no.1 (2005): 59–87. If we substitute Yushchenko for "ethnic Ukrainian" and Yanukovich for "eastern Slavic," we have a good framework for understanding the 2004 elections in Ukraine. Shulman points to "ethnic Ukrainian" identity as being the more supportive of democracy, which was the case during Yushchenko's presidency, and provides a good framework for discussing divisions in Ukrainian politics and national identity. However, Way is unwilling to draw upon it and, instead, disputes Shulman's survey results and disagrees that "eastern Slavic" identity is less supportive of democracy. Way's argument is undermined by the anti-democratic policies introduced during both Kuchma's and Yanukovich's presidencies. It is not a coincidence that

the only period of democratization in Ukraine occurred when “ethnic Ukrainian” identity controlled the presidency—under Yushchenko.

Way also fails to see the interconnection between Soviet identity in Belarus and Shulman’s “eastern Slavic” identity even though both of them draw on the same Eurasian and Soviet political culture. This has been most vividly seen during Lukashenka’s and Yanukovich’s presidencies. According to a survey that Kyiv’s Razumkov Centre conducted in 2009, most residents of Donetsk and Crimea, two Party of Regions strongholds, have a greater affinity for Soviet (than Russian or Ukrainian) culture. Way is right to criticize Western analysts of Ukraine, such as David Marples, who assume that the majority national identity in Belarus is ethnic Belarusian while ignoring Soviet identity. Way draws on Keith Darden’s writings in explaining that urbanization and the growth of literacy grew in eastern Ukraine and Belarus during the Soviet Union and therefore both regions arrived at modernity through Soviet education, which has led to a strong base for Soviet values to persist.

In her essay, Fournier argues it is wrong to have seen the OR as a radical break with the Soviet past: she argues that Ukrainians have maintained many of the cultural norms of the Soviet era and that the OR should be seen as a restoration of Soviet and Western “order.” Fournier’s originality is in correctly pointing to protestors having both political and economic reasons for being on Kyiv’s Independence Square. This is an explanation—like that of nationalism—that has been ignored by American political scientists who have debated democratic revolutions (e.g., the *Journal of Democracy* debate included no reference to social or economic factors). The political and economic reasons influencing OR protestors, Fournier argues, are “linked partially with economic expectations developed under Soviet rule (p. 111).” These included factors such as demands for social justice, anger at economic inequality, and demands for “order,” understood as a return to normality in the form of honest government, stability, salaries paid on time, respect for the constitution and rule of law, accountability of elites, and non-interference in business affairs. As I pointed out in my article “Populism in Ukraine in Comparative European Context” in *Problems of Post-Communism* 57, no.6 (November–December 2010: 3–18, such demands have traditionally led *all* Ukrainian political forces to be populist during election campaigns (and not just Julia Timoshenko, the Ukrainian politician usually singled out as “populist”).

Prime Minister Tymoshenko’s 2005 government sought to implement the anti-oligarch” policies Yushchenko espoused in the previous year’s election campaign and in his election programme, which Fournier points to, but which he forgot about him after he was elected. “The opposition discourse relied mainly upon the denunciation of injustice and of immorality of the government and its representatives (p.97).” Shukan argues in her essay, quoting Yushchenko’s first campaign speech (July 2004) that attacked oligarchs. She states that the Yushchenko campaign deliberately portrayed him as a “people-s candidate” counterposed against the *bandytska vlada* (p. 97). Fournier points out that OR protestors supported privatization and steps to be taken against oligarchs and that therefore it was little wonder that Tymoshenko replaced Yushchenko as the main standard-bearer of “Orange” values by the 2010 elections. Yushchenko did not understand the reasons why Ukrainians protested, and during his presidency he got into bed with oligarchs. Fournier describes this integration of values as a “double becoming of Western and Soviet modernities” (p.115). OR protestors wanted to be treated as citizens, not slaves (subjects), and the authorities were repeatedly referred to as “bandits” and *bandytska vlada*. None of the authors in *Orange Revolution and Aftermath* grapple with the perplexing question why 44 per cent of Ukraine’s voters chose the *bandytska vlada* (see below). Using Fournier’s framework, was it because Soviet values

remain stronger in eastern Ukraine than in western Ukraine? Surveys of national identity and culture and, even more clearly, the actions, methods, and policies of President Yanukovich's administration indicate that this could be the reason. "What emerged from the double becoming of Soviet and Western European modernities was the articulation of 'the state' through the idioms of morality, responsibility, and care" (p. 126), Fournier writes. She discusses the feelings of OR protestors who demanded a European democratic contract between rulers and citizens, which would narrow the gap that Berenson points to as a major factor undermining trust in state institutions, and a halt to the "bandits'" theft from the people. Fournier also found there was widespread anger about the elites' illegal, unrestrained, and unaccountable plundering.

Berenson explains the origin of the Ukrainian state as a weak democracy and points to how easily Yanukovich was able to roll back democratic gains during his first year in power. He argues that the remaking of citizen-state relations will remain Ukraine's greatest challenge, and that the overhaul of the state's relationship with its citizens is an urgent requirement for democratization—something that was not achieved by Yushchenko and will be not achieved under Yanukovich. Berenson found that Ukraine's citizens have a high rate of distrust of state institutions and that fewer than ten per cent of them feel that the state fulfills its obligations to its citizens. The result is low tax compliance. Trust in Ukrainian state institutions "to do what is right as well as to fulfill its obligations to citizens was so low that it was almost non-existent" (p. 214), Berenson states. It is little wonder that the shadow economy has remained consistently high, accounting for 40–50 per cent of GDP and low levels of trust in the state.

In her contribution, Tammy Lynch analyzes the origins of the 2004 slogan "Bandits to Prison!" in opposition rhetoric during the years 2000–2003, particularly in the Ukraine without Kuchma/Arise Ukraine! movements that were dominated by the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialist Party of Ukraine. Her discussion of the OR is enlightening; at the same time it is disappointing because it fails to analyze sufficiently Yushchenko's multi-vector personality and politics, which became all too apparent during his presidency. However, both she and Shukan do masterful jobs in analyzing the opposition's successful tactics and strategies that led to Yushchenko's electoral success. These included opposition unity, media outreach, massive election monitoring, mobilization, articulation of concrete and achievable goals, divisions of responsibility between youth and political leaders, developing ties to the security forces, and ensuring the *Maidan* was operational 24/7 with speeches, news, and music. Lynch also provides an illuminating analysis of the origins of the anti-Kuchma opposition in 2000–2001 and its evolution into the Ukraine without Kuchma/Arise Ukraine! Movement and the For Truth NGO that became respectively associated with the Tymoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine; of the arrest of Tymoshenko, which transformed her into a radical opposition leader; and, on the same day she was arrested, of the open letter attacking the protestors signed by Yushchenko, Kuchma, and Parliamentary Chairman Ivan Pliushch.

Lynch states that Yushchenko's transformation into an opposition leader "was long in coming and largely the result of the actions of others. Any decision to fight simply went against his nature" (p. 55). She should have analyzed this important point further, for it explains his subsequent failure as president and inability to use the opportunities afforded to him by the OR to become "Ukraine's George Washington." Throughout the period that Lynch reviews (2000–2004), Yushchenko, as later during his presidency, was unable to decide if he should be allied with Tymoshenko or with the Kuchma authorities and (after 2005) with Yanukovich and the Party of Regions. Yushchenko's alliance with Yanukovich was clearly seen in 2010, when he undermined Tymoshenko's presidential election campaign; in return,

he was not arrested and been criminally charged, unlike Tymoshenko. Lynch states that the opposition learned three lessons from the pre-OR protests: the need for a united opposition, for clear and achievable goals, and for the widest circulation of information. But she misses the most important lesson from the March 2001 riots: the need for non-violence (which Kudelia discusses in his essay) because the March 2001 riots discredited the opposition.

Kudelia discusses a little researched part of the OR: the round-table negotiations that arose because neither side had the knock-out capability to win an outright victory. (The other such study is Steven Pifer's "European Mediators and Ukraine's Orange Revolution," in *Problems of Post-Communism* 54, no. 6 [2007]: 28–42.) In November 2004 Ukraine resembled Libya in March 2011 more than it did Tunisia two months earlier, which was more like Georgia's Rose Revolution. (The civil war that nearly erupted in Ukraine did so in Libya.) Kudelia argues that soft-liners in the opposition (Yushchenko, Petro Poroshenko) and the authorities (Kuchma, Parliamentary Chairman Volodymyr Lytvyn, Pliushch) negotiated a pact that sidelined the hard-line opposition (Tymoshenko) and authorities (Presidential Administration head Viktor Medvedchuk, Yanukovich). The authorities were stunned by both the size of the protests, something that continues to haunt Yanukovich, and the defection of the security forces to the opposition or their neutral stance (e.g., the army intervening to halt the Interior Ministry special forces' offensive against the *Maidan* on 28 November 2004). Yushchenko opposed the calls of Tymoshenko and the civic youth organization Pora (It's Time) to storm the building of the Presidential Administration and opted instead for negotiations.

Kudelia's well-researched chapter has two pitfalls. The first is his inclination to favour Yushchenko over Tymoshenko, which has led him to believe that the only option was for a negotiated pact to overcome the crisis. Even if Yushchenko had no choice but to negotiate, Kudelia never asks why he give away so much and why he failed to recognize the reality on the ground, which could have permitted him to dictate terms to the authorities. During the round-table meetings the Yushchenko campaign controlled Kyiv, where millions of Ukrainians were protesting, and he had the loyalty of all the security forces (with the exception of Interior Ministry special units from the Crimea, such as those guarding the Presidential Administration). With such power Yushchenko could have rejected the introduction of constitutional reforms into the negotiations and limited the granting of immunity to Kuchma alone. Kudelia also ignores the likelihood that the November 2004 separatist congress in Severodonetsk was organized with the blessing of Kuchma to put pressure on Yushchenko to capitulate at the round-table meetings.

The second factor flows from the first and is Kudelia's lack of any mention of immunity granted by Yushchenko at those meetings. Sviatoslav Piskun was reappointed prosecutor-general a day after the parliamentary vote on the compromise package as the "guarantor" of the immunity deal. Perhaps granting immunity to Kuchma was the only bloodless way out of the crisis, but was there also a need to provide blanket immunity to all of the Kuchma elites, including Yanukovich, whose election campaign was condemned and whose victory was overturned by the Supreme Court? If Yanukovich had been charged with abuse of office and election fraud in 2005, he would have been barred from standing for office, and the Party of Regions would have chosen a new leader. Without criminal charges, Yanukovich continues to believe that there was no election fraud, that the OR was an "American putsch," and that he was fairly elected in 2004.

Orange Revolution and Aftermath only paints half of the canvas: none of the authors deal with "anti-Orange Ukraine," that is, the 44 per cent of electors who voted for Yanukovich in 2004 or the 48 per cent who won him the 2010 elections. Why so many citizens of Ukraine

are anti-Orange is an area of research that has yet to be undertaken by any Western scholar. That D'Anieri and company missed the opportunity to do so is surprising also because Ukraine's strongest political party, the Party of Regions, won pluralities in the 2006 and 2007 elections. The national minorities in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Serbia supported their countries' democratic breakthroughs, revolutions, and integration with the rest of Europe. But Ukraine's national minorities have supported the anti-Orange camp and voted for the Party of Regions and, until the 2002 elections, the Communist Party. Georgia's national minorities also did not support the 2003 Rose Revolution, but they live outside central-government control in the frozen conflict enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Another research area that has yet to attract the attention of Western scholars is why eastern Ukraine did not support the protests against President Kuchma from November 2000, when the Kuchmagate crisis began, to the 2004 elections. Why did the July 2001 brutal murder of journalist Igor Aleksandrov in Sloviansk, Donetsk oblast, not spark the same protests as the murder of Heorhii Gongadze in the autumn of 2000 (or the likely murder of Kharkiv editor Vasiliï Klimentev in the autumn of 2010)? The Gongadze case is important, because as long as it remains unresolved the Yanukovich administration will use it to blackmail Kuchma and Lytvyn, believed to have been the "organizers" of Gongadze's abduction, to support Yanukovich's regime.

A third area of research also awaiting scholarly interest is the inability of Ukraine's legal system, particularly the prosecutor's office, to complete investigations of high-profile crimes, such as the Gongadze murder and the poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko. Indeed, why was Peru, which had a similar scandal in 2000 surrounding its leaders caught on video giving bribes, able to prosecute and imprison senior officials, including the head of the security service and Alberto Fujimoro, the first ex-president in Latin America to be sentenced and imprisoned? No members of Ukraine's elites have been jailed, except in the United States and Germany, and those criminally charged and imprisoned since 2010 are the victims of Yanukovich's score-settling against the former "Orange" administration.

I recommend that the Woodrow Wilson Center consider sponsoring a "companion" volume about "anti-Orange" Ukraine.

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Sarah D. Phillips. *Women's Social Activism in the New Ukraine: Development of the Politics of Differentiation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. xxii, 206 pp. U.S.\$24.95 paper, U.S.\$65 cloth.

Sarah D. Phillips provides a vivid picture of NGOs in post-Soviet Ukraine. She analyzes "women's social activism in the new Ukraine and the processes of differentiation that have both motivated and resulted from women's NGO activities" (p. 8). Her book is structured around the observation and interviews of four NGO activists—Svetlana, Ivana, Sofiia, and Maryna. Phillips examines why women in post-Soviet Ukraine flock to the non-profit sector and why some of them "were able to rise through the ranks of the state education system and international development foundations finally to launch a career in business" (p. 7), while others remained marginalized. Phillips states that the activists' life stories reflect a process of differentiation in Ukraine. Differentiation is the book's main topic. Phillips points out that "it is mostly women who have been left to pick up the pieces of the disheveled social welfare