‘Nationalising states’ or nation-building? a critical review of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence*

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ABSTRACT. This article critically surveys the concept of nationalising states first coined by Rogers Brubaker when referring to the policies implemented by post-communist states. The concept of nationalising states is placed within the context of the traditional literature on nationalism, which divides Europe into a ‘civic West’ and an ‘ethnic East’. The article discusses the concept of nationalising states and questions if it is really any different to nation building which took place from the late eighteenth century onwards in the ‘civic West’. Polyethnic rights are ignored on both sides of the classic ‘West:East’ divide. All civic states are composed of both civic and ethnic factors and the proportional relationship between them depends upon how much progress there has been in democratisation. The article concludes by arguing that the concept of nationalising states has little theoretical value unless it is equated with nation building and no longer selectively applied to only former communist countries. The traditional division of Europe into a ‘civic West’ versus an ‘ethnic East’ requires revision in the light of recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe.

Many of the scholars working on post-communist Europe have wholeheartedly taken on board Brubaker’s definition of them as ‘nationalising states’. This article seeks to test this definition by asking two questions. First, can post-communist European states be defined as ‘nationalising states”? Secondly, how different are these ‘nationalising’ policies in post-communist Europe to nation-building policies undertaken at earlier periods of history and currently in the established liberal democracies of the ‘West’.

The article is divided into three sections. The first section reviews the theoretical literature on ‘nationalising states’ and critically surveys its application to post-communist Europe. The second surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on nation-building in established Western liberal

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democracies and post-communist Europe. The final section investigates if there is any difference between nation-building and ‘nationalising states’ and thereby gauges the usefulness of the concept of ‘nationalising states’. It then draws up an alternative five-fold division of post-communist European states that defines all civic states as non-nationalising and only those which have authoritarian, ethnic polities as ‘nationalising’ states. Ethnic, ‘nationalising’ states can be either exclusive or inclusive; in Europe the two states defined as ethnic ‘nationalising’ states – Belarus and Yugoslavia – are inclusive.

Brubaker’s division of states into three types – civic, nationalising and bi-ethnic – is theoretically confusing for scholars writing on nationalism, nation and state building. In contrast, this article argues that all civic states have ethno-cultural cores. Nationalism and liberal democracy have had an uneasy existence since the late eighteenth century and democratisation and nationalism have usually gone hand in hand (Snyder 2000). ‘Nationalisation of the political community’ has traditionally been accompanied by modernisation and nation building (Yack 1999: 105).

To argue, as does Brubaker, that there is a difference between civic and ‘nationalising’ states implies that purely civic states exist in practice. Of Brubaker’s three models of nation-building, ethnicity allegedly plays no role in his ‘civic’ state, a proposition that implies that pure civic states can exist empirically and not just theoretically. Scholars such as Habermas (1996) have attempted to construct pure civic states based on ‘constitutional patriotism’. But these scholars have been unable to point to any pure civic state that has no ethno-cultural core(s), although Habermas has strangely looked to the USA as his archetypal example. ‘From the outset, however, American nationality combined both civic and ethnic definitions . . . For most of our history, American citizenship has been defined by blood as well as by political allegiances’ (Foner 1998: 38. See also Rodgers M. Smith 1997: 14).

The central thesis of this article is four-fold. First, that if all civic states have ethno-cultural cores then there is no theoretical use for the concept of ‘nationalising states’. If we accept that civic states have ethno-cultural cores they cannot be wholly neutral when deciding such questions as historical myths, state languages, anniversaries, symbols and flags. All civic states are therefore de facto ‘nationalising’ to varying degrees and there is no theoretical or empirical difference between nation-building or nationalising within civic states. Secondly, Brubaker disagrees with the traditional Western civic: Eastern ethnic division of Europe as ‘both normatively and analytically problematic’ (Brubaker 1998: 274). Nevertheless, he only applies his new term of ‘nationalising’ states to inter-war and post-communist Eastern Europe and not to the West (Brubaker 1998: 277 and 299). This has encouraged scholars to follow in the Kohn (1955) tradition of dividing nationalism into a ‘good, civic Western’ and ‘bad, ethnic, Eastern’ nationalism. If Brubaker had applied his term to all states, regardless of their geographic location, scholars would not have assumed he was building on the Kohn model. Brubaker may have encouraged this by arguing that the newly independent states of Eastern
Europe would all be nationalisers ‘to some degree and in some form’ (Brubaker 1996a: 433). The number of Breton speakers has declined from one million in 1900 to a quarter of a million today, yet France only escapes being defined as a ‘nationalising’ state presumably because it is not in the East.

Thirdly, scholars have tended to utilise Brubaker’s concept to make value judgements about policies they disagree with and thereby selectively choose to which countries they attach the label ‘nationalising’. As I point out later, the Russian Federation, for example, has for unknown reasons escaped being labelled as a ‘nationalising’ state by scholars who have been quick to label other states in such a manner. Finally, Brubaker’s theoretical framework is far too broad when applied to twenty-seven post-communist countries (see Lynch 2000). It lumps together as ‘nationalising’ states those that adopt civic nation-building policies, provide affirmative action towards previously repressed cultures and languages and adopt positive policies on national minorities (e.g. Ukraine), on the one hand, together with those states that are authoritarian and ethnically discriminatory (e.g. former Yugoslavia), on the other.

‘Nationalising states’ in theory and practice

‘Nationalising states’: a theoretical overview

The term ‘nationalising states’ was brought into popular use by Brubaker in his celebrated article (Brubaker, 1995). Brubaker’s paradigm focused upon the alleged inter-relationship between three factors:

- **domestic ‘nationalising state’** defined as essentially ‘ethnically heterogeneous yet conceived as nation-states, whose dominant elite’s promote (to varying degrees) the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation’ (Brubaker 1995: 109);
- **national minorities**, which are organised and self-conscious, demanding autonomy while resisting assimilation;
- **external ‘homelands’**, which seek to protect the minorities from assimilation because there is a sense of shared nationhood across political boundaries.

Brubaker focused on how ‘nationalising’ policies in the host state were inevitably not conducted in isolation from the other two fields (national minorities and national homelands). This relationship was not fixed, ‘but variably configured and continuously contested political fields’ (Brubaker, 1995: 111–12). Even within national minorities there is a dynamic division between those who advocate protection from abroad, secession (‘exit’) and local autonomy. Meanwhile, the ruling elites of the ‘nationalising state’ often accuse the national minorities of ‘disloyalty’. The policies of the ‘nationalising state’ create an image (real or perceived) within the national minorities and external homeland of an ‘oppressive’ state that is attempting to homogenise...
the country and eradicate regional identities. National minorities mobilise against the ‘oppressive’ host state with the help of the external homeland.

Brubaker stresses that the question of ‘perception’ is important. ‘Nationalising states’ do not necessarily have to adopt such policies; nevertheless, the rhetoric emanating from the mobilised titular nation may be perceived as such by national minorities. Hence, a ‘formally liberal and ethnically neutral definition of statehood and citizenship may, in an ethnically heterogeneous state in which the state-bearing majority and a minority of, or minorities understand themselves as belonging to, distinct ethno-cultural nations, mask a substantively ethnocratic organization of public life’ (Brubaker 1994: 69).

In subsequent articles Brubaker has elaborated upon this triadic thesis by presenting three models of nation-building:

- ‘Civic state’ (all are granted citizenship regardless of ethnicity). In these states ethnicity is not a factor in state policies because the state is defined in terms of liberal democratic, individual rights.
- ‘Bi-national’ or ‘multi-national’ states where there are two or more ethno-cultural core nations. Here ethnicity plays an important role in state policies.
- ‘Nationalising states’.

Brubaker believes that in post-communist Europe, ‘Almost all of the new states . . . will be nationalising states to some degree and in some form’ (Brubaker, 1996a: 433). The key question is therefore not whether they will – or will not – be ‘nationalisers’ but to what degree and how? Brubaker believes that post-communist Europe will follow in the ‘nationalising’ footsteps of inter-war Central–Eastern Europe which he also defined as ‘nationalisers’ (see Kohn 1955; Kuzio 2000a; Miller 1995: 8–9; Shulman 2000; Anthony D. Smith 1996: 76–83).

Brubaker also believes that post-communist Europe will follow in the footsteps of inter-war Eastern Europe because it will undertake ‘remedial political action’ to remedy the national legacies it inherited from the communist era. These polities are felt to be lacking in content because they lack a national base. They inherited mismatched cultural and political boundaries, they are ‘ethnically heterogeneous yet conceived as nation-states’ (Brubaker 1996b: 57; Brubaker 1998: 277). National minorities resist such ‘nationalising’ policies and demand that the state recognise, at a minimum, their cultural rights and, at a maximum, agitate for autonomy (e.g. southern Slovakia, Transylvania, Narva, Northern Kazakhstan and the Crimea) or even secession (e.g. Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the Trans-Dniester region).

Brubaker also points out that within both the titular nation and national minorities there is no unified stance on the policies to adopt, or the reactions to take, against them. Within the ‘nationalising state’ there are also unlikely to be one set of policies because the titular nation is itself divided and in the process of nation-building. Instead, there is a ‘dynamically changing field
of differentiating and competitive position or stances adopted by different organisations, parties, movements, or individual figures within and around the state’. These differing stances seek ‘to inflect state policies in a particular direction, and seeking, in various and often mutually antagonistic ways, to make the state a “real” nation-state, the state of and for a particular nation’ (Brubaker 1996b: 66).

Brubaker’s designation of post-communist Europe as ‘nationalising states’ has been uncritically accepted by many scholars. With the exception of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, though, there have been few attempts to expand on the theoretical basis of Brubaker’s theory. Indeed, no scholars have attempted to differentiate between ‘nationalising states’ and ‘civic’ states. If we accept that all civic states have ethno-cultural cores then all civic states are also ‘nationalisers’ and the term loses any theoretical meaning. Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally attempted to homogenise (‘nationalise’) their populations.

Linz and Stepan broaden Brubaker’s definition of ‘nationalising states’ by defining them as states where elites attempt to homogenise multicultural societies. They believe that these policies will harm democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996: 35–37). As with many scholars, therefore, a state is implicitly defined as ‘non-nationalising’ if it adopts multicultural policies. Unfortunately, such a narrow definition of ‘civiness’ would exclude the majority of liberal democracies, which are commonly grouped within the ‘civic West’.

This narrow definition of ‘civic’ states is clearly reflected in Linz and Stepan’s definition of ‘nationalising’ policies, which can be summarised as:

- restrictions are placed on the non-official (state) languages in civil society, education and the mass media;
- citizenship laws are exclusive, leading to the over-domination of the titular nation in political office;
- members of the non-titular nation are gradually forced out of the state bureaucracy due to the expansion in usage of the official language;
- ethnic factors are influential in the economy;
- the legal system privileges the customs, practices and institutions of the titular nation.

‘Nationalising states’ in post-communist Europe

Scholars working in the field of post-communist studies have enthusiastically – but selectively – applied the concept of ‘nationalising states’ to some of the states they have studied. Charles King and Neil Melvin discuss the tension inherent in post-Soviet states between defining their communities as inclusive or ethnic. Following Linz and Stepan’s definition above, those states which define themselves by the core nation’s dominant language and culture are allegedly exclusive and ‘nationalisers’ (King and Melvin 1998: 5, 19 and 226).
Scholars have been particularly quick to apply Brubaker’s concept to two Soviet successor states, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Arel 1995; Laitin 1998: 102). Sally Cummings has pointed to the tension in Kazakhstan between ‘civic state identity’ and ‘ethnic organisation’ (Cummings 1998: 133–4). Andrew Wilson is a strong supporter of Brubaker’s theory. He has argued on a number of occasions that Ukraine’s declaration of intent to build a ‘multi-ethnic “civic” state’ are at odds with its ‘ethnic’ policies in favour of one state language, one titular nation and Ukrainian national historiography (Wilson 1997: 112, 116 and 148 and 1998a: 123). Wilson believes that when Ukraine defined the political nation as simultaneously supporting both the inclusion of all of Ukraine’s inhabitants within a civic nation and Ukrainians as the core of that civic nation, such a polity could no longer be defined as ‘civic’ (Wilson 1998b: 122).

If a state is defined a priori as ‘nationalising’ then those implementing these policies must be also presumably ‘nationalists’ (Arel 1995; Wilson 1997; Kubicek 1999; Lieven 1999). Following this line of thought, Ukrainian politics are simplistically divided into a struggle between ‘nationalists’ and ‘Russophiles’. Brubaker (1998: 290) also defines early post-communist leaders as ‘nationalists’. ‘Nationalists’ (i.e. ‘nationalisers’) are defined as those who back one state language and titular nation while those who back two state languages and titular nations are merely ‘Russophiles’ who are allegedly proponents of a ‘civic state’. ‘Nationalists’ and ‘nationalism’ are not theoretically defined and it is not clear why the use of this derogatory term is only applied to one side of the debate to Ukrainian speakers. Could not, for example, those demanding that Russian become a second state language also be defined as ‘Russian nationalists’? To avoid further theoretical confusion it would be perhaps advisable to not apply the term ‘nationalising’ to policies scholars disagree with and drop the practice of negatively labelling as ‘nationalists’ only Ukrainian speakers who implement the ‘nationalising’ policies that they so clearly dislike (Kuzio 2000b).

Unfortunately, the definition of Ukraine as a ‘nationalising’ state fails to acknowledge that support for the definition of a Ukrainian political nation based on one state language and one titular nation is not only confined to the Leonid Kravchuk era (1991–4). This ignores the large degree of continuity in the nation-building policies between the Kravchuk and Kuchma eras (see D’Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio 1999: 45–70; Janmaat 1999 and 2000). Such a policy, which has legal force in the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution, would aim to increase Ukrainian-language usage among Russian-speaking or bilingual Ukrainians. The fact that both Ukrainian presidents have followed similar nationality policies since 1992 indicates that what Brubaker and scholars have defined as ‘nationalising’ is in fact nation-building (Kremen’, Tabachnyk and Tkachenko 1996: 756–8). If this nation building is being undertaken within a civic polity – as it is – only those who view this project negatively have defined it as ‘nationalising’.

In his later writings Wilson has acknowledged that Ukraine cannot become a paradigmatic ‘nationalising’ state because Ukrainophones have
to share power with Russophones. Therefore, ‘Ukrainophones do not have a sufficient critical mass to enforce a wholesale Ukrainianisation policy’ (Wilson 1998b: 124). Despite this recent admission Wilson’s criticisms of Ukraine’s ‘nationalising state’ remains inconsistent. While describing Ukraine as a ‘nationalising state’ he has denied that the former USSR pursued Russification policies (Wilson 1997: 214). Such policies could also presumably be defined as ‘nationalising’ on behalf of the core Russian people of the future Soviet nation, but in Wilson’s eyes they are not perceived in such a negative light and are not therefore defined as ‘nationalising’.

Jane Dawson believes that the choice open to Crimeans is whether to define their political community in ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ terms (Dawson 1997: 428). This choice largely refers to Crimea’s Russians and Ukrainians but ignores two questions. First, the plight of the Tatars who are denied group rights in the December 1998 Crimean Constitution. Many autonomous republics in the former USSR were based upon minorities whose population made up less than half of its inhabitants (Tatars account for 15 per cent of the Crimean population). Tatars have only 6 out of 582 Crimean schools and 1 out of 392 Crimean publications in their Turkic language. The second question concerns the plight of Ukrainians in the Crimea. Although they make up a quarter of the population, only 4 out of 582 Crimean schools and 1 out of 392 Crimean publications are taught and published in the Ukrainian language respectively (Russian National TV, 27 January 1999).

It is therefore unclear why scholars have focused upon Ukraine’s central ‘nationalising’ policies while ignoring ‘nationalising’ tendencies on behalf of the Russian ethnic majority in the Crimea, which deny both Ukrainians and Tatars collective or polyethnic rights. These policies on behalf of the Crimean Russian majority are defined as ‘civic’ – not ‘nationalising’ – by these same scholars and reflect two factors. First, there is an unwillingness to apply the ‘nationalising’ term to Russian policies (see Sasse 1999 and Wilson 1997). Secondly, it remains unclear why these scholars define some states and regions as ‘civic’ (France and the Crimea) while arguing that others are ‘nationalisers’ (Ukraine and Kazakhstan) when the same policies are applied in all four locations.

The application of Brubaker’s ‘nationalising state’, ‘nationalising regimes’ and ‘nationalising tendencies’ by scholars to post-communist countries is only selectively applied to the non-Russian states of the former USSR – but never to the Russian Federation (G. Smith et al. 1998: 1–22). In the 1989 Soviet census ethnic Russians only accounted for 81.5 per cent of the Russian Federation’s population. Yet Russian is the state language and Russian historiography, myths, anthems and symbols are exclusively used in the Russian Federation, many of which are offensive to national minorities because they are those of the Tsarist empire (the two-headed eagle, for example). Ukrainians are the second largest national minority in the Russian Federation, after Tatars, but are granted no collective, group rights such as in education and the media (300,000 Ukrainians live in Tyumen oblast in Western Siberia alone).
The Russian Federation is the site of the most vicious ethnic conflict in the former USSR, whose ferocity matches that of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. In the Chechen conflict of 1994–6 over 7,500 Russian combatants (or half of the total number of casualties in the ten-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan), 4,000 Chechen partisans and 35,000 civilians died (see Dunlop 2000). The second and ongoing Chechen–Russian conflict is likely to have even higher casualty figures and has been widely condemned by international human rights organisations, the Council of Europe and the UN. Consequently, it is not at all clear why the Russian Federation escapes being labelled as a ‘nationalising state’ by those scholars who are apt at the same time to label the non-Russian successor states as ‘nationalising’.

A second factor that remains unclear is why the introduction of a second state language (Russian) and the definition of the polity with a second titular nation (ethnic Russians) would make the non-Russian states of the former USSR more ‘civic’ than their current designation as ‘ethnic’ and ‘nationalising’. If anything, this redefinition of the political community would make them into ‘bi-national states’, which Brubaker argues are defined by ethnic traits (see Kuzio 1998 and 1999; Taras 1998: 93).

The application by scholars of ‘nationalisers’ to many non-Russian Soviet successor states is also complicated by five examples. First, is a state a ‘nationaliser’ if it aims to provide affirmative action for a language, culture and identity that had been previously subjected to discrimination by the state (e.g. Ukrainian or Belarusian in the former USSR)? Affirmative action in these cases will inevitably lead to a relative decline in Russian-language usage in education, the security forces, the media and state institutions. Such policies will be regarded positively by those who advocate affirmative action and negatively by those who believe that the inherited status quo should be maintained because the provision of positive discrimination will be tantamount to the state becoming a ‘nationaliser’. Those who tend to use Brubaker’s paradigm remain opposed to affirmative action, preferring to maintain the inherited status quo, which often privileges ethnic Russians and the Russian language. Hence, ‘There is clearly the danger that we characterise a nation as cultural or civic in form depending upon whether we wish to support or oppose it’ (Brown 1999: 287–8). Although one of the three elements of Brubaker’s paradigm are national minorities it has only been applied vis-à-vis Russians, many of whom are losing their former dominant positions in the non-Russian soviet successor states. Other national minorities, such as Jews, Tatars, Poles, Gagauz, Bulgarians and others who were russified during the Soviet era are experiencing national revivals due to the provision of polyethnic rights by their host governments. These non-Russian minorities do not regard their host states as ‘nationalisers’. Indeed, the non-Russian national minorities in Ukraine voted for Kravchuk in the 1994 presidential elections, the candidate traditionally defined as ‘nationalist’.

Secondly, Brubaker also ignores the ‘nationalising’ tendencies that took place in the communist era. Soviet nationality policies utilised language,
culture, migration, employment and historiography in an attempt to create a Russian-speaking core *homo sovieticus* based upon the three Eastern Slavic nations. In Romania, Bulgaria and Poland ‘nationalising’ tendencies were also put into practice, which prioritised the core ethnic group’s values while denying polyethnic and collective rights for national minorities.

Thirdly, another problem with Brubaker’s theory is that the concept of ‘nationalising states’ is only applied to inter-war and post-communist central and Eastern Europe (Brubaker 1998: 277). He argues that the former Western colonies in Africa and Asia were largely configured as territorial states and therefore cannot be described as ‘nationalising states’. This is difficult to accept when ethnicity plays such a large role in the construction of the core identity and societal culture of the majority of the developing world (e.g. Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Morocco, China, Indonesia and Malaysia).

Fourthly, when discussing the question of ‘nationalising’ states there is usually the automatic assumption by scholars that this is a negative phenomenon. ‘Nationalising’ tendencies in post-war communist Poland were without doubt negative for the Ukrainian and German minorities. But, as Prizel (1998: 38–152) points out, the modern, civic, central European Polish nation of today, free of the ‘missionising influences’ of the past towards its Eastern neighbours, harbouring no territorial claims and with an exemplary national minority policy is a product of the communist era’s ‘nationalising’ policies. These policies have played a positive role in preparing Poland for the transition to democracy, a free market and NATO membership in 1999 (Prizel 1998: 152). ‘Nationalising’ (i.e. nation-building) policies, therefore, may bring both positive and negative results and we should not rush to assume that they are purely of the latter.

Fifthly, the debate surrounding ‘nationalising’ states may also reflect the degree to which the West (Western Europe and North America) and post-communist Europe (Central and Eastern Europe) are undergoing state- and nation-building at different periods of time. At a time when nationalism is declining in the West and it is allegedly moving towards a post-modern and post-nation-state era, which is largely welcomed by many scholars in the field, the rise of nationalism in post-communist Europe is seen as a negative phenomenon. Western ‘civic’ states are again contrasted to negative Eastern ‘ethnic’ and ‘nationalising’ states.

This neat division into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalism ignores the fact that nation- and state-building in the West was also of the ‘nationalising’ variety – although six or seven generations earlier. As Mattei Dogan points out, ‘The age of the nation-state is a determining factor in the upward or downward direction of nationalism’ (Dogan 1997: 72). All inclusive states are built upon both civic and ethnic factors and ‘What matters is the balance between the two’ (Keating 1997: 691). The balance between the influence of civic and ethnic factors is dependent upon the period of time since the launch of the state- and nation-building project and not geographic location. All Western liberal democracies never evolved into completely ‘civic’ states, thereby abandoning all reference to their ethno-cultural origins.
Nation-building: the theoretical and empirical evidence

The concept of ‘nationalising states’ has been confined by Brubaker and scholars to inter-war and post-communist Central–Eastern Europe by idealising it to state- and nation-building in Western Europe and North America. This division of state- and nation-building between Western ‘civic’ and Eastern European ‘ethnic’ polities is commonly found in much of the literature on nationalism. A more sober analysis would point out that ‘the civic/ethnic distinction itself reflects a considerable dose of ethnocentrism’ and a ‘mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinking’ (Yack 1999: 105).

The Brubaker framework serves to continue to confuse scholars of nationalism and nation-building. A less confusing division of European states would be according to whether they are civic or ethnic. One should recognise that both inclusive and ethnic states promoted – and continue to promote – ‘nationalising’ policies for, as Charles Tilly points out, ‘Almost all European governments eventually took steps which homogenised their populations’ (Tilly 1975: 43). The application of ‘nationaliser’ to only post-communist Europe also ignores the strong homogenising tendencies still prevalent in liberal democracies. Civic states are therefore neither fully civic nor themselves devoid of ‘nationalising’ tendencies. Civic states also possess ‘cultural baggage’, need a ‘rich legacy of memories’ and the identity of the governed people is defined nationally, not universally (Yack 1999: 106).

Brubaker’s theory of ‘nationalising’ states could be ostensibly applied to ethnic states because members of the non-titular minorities are not granted political rights, particularly citizenship and voting (Arabs in Israel, for example). This is how I define nationalising states in my five-part classification later in this article. In exclusive states the boundaries are clearer because certain groups are excluded from the political community, civil rights are not granted and minorities may be violently repressed. Nevertheless, these factors common to ‘nationalising’ ethnic states are also to be occasionally found in civic states. Germany was a civic democracy only for ethnic Germans until the late 1990s. Russia, Croatia and Moldova are civic states but have violently repressed their national minorities. Ethnic states such as Belarus and Yugoslavia do not exclude people from citizenship, showing that ethnic states are not always exclusive (just as civic states are not always supportive of polyethnic rights).

Scholars continue to remain confused when defining civic, inclusive, ethnic and exclusive states. States which are often classified as ‘civic’ (Australia) did not grant voting rights to native Aboriginal Australians until as late as 1967 (Grant and Clarence 1998: 138). Did Australia only become an inclusive, civic state after 1967? Or, as Grant and Clarence believe, was Australia’s conversion from an exclusive to an inclusive state only completed with the introduction of multiculturalism in 1972? Similarly, can the USA be defined as a civic state until the 1960s, prior to which many of its southern states denied the vote to its black population, or Germany prior to the adoption of a new
more inclusive constitution in the late 1990s (see Halfmann 1997 and Schmidt
1993)? Nevertheless, the new German Constitution continues to exclude
polyethnic rights for Slavic Sorbs.

A definition of ‘inclusivity’ as only applicable to societies which recognise
their ‘plurality’ and adopt multicultural policies (see Grant and Clarence
1998; Linz and Stepan 1996) is far broader than what is commonly referred to
as a civic ‘inclusive’ state. The UK, France, and Switzerland, for example, are
commonly defined as archetypal ‘civic’ states by Kohn; nevertheless, they did
not grant universal suffrage to all of their citizens until 1929, 1944 and 1971
respectively. Weber believed that the provision of the vote was a major test of
a state’s inclusivity. Therefore, the states which are defined as part of the
‘West’ could not become civic democracies until the first half of the twentieth
century when the vote was given to women and the working class (Kuzio

Some ethnic states (Estonia and Latvia) are willing to grant political rights
and 1998 Latvian parliamentary elections were defined as ‘free and fair’ by
the OSCE. In 1998 both countries eased their German-style citizenship laws
through consultations with the OSCE and the EU.1 Criticisms of these
policies by some scholars ignores the fact that citizenship is not granted auto-
matically in the majority of liberal democracies. Language (and occasionally
history) tests are usually commonplace while applicants are often required
to take an oath of loyalty (e.g. in the USA). In Canada citizenship is only
granted after a two-year period of landed immigrant status when a language
and history test is then taken.

What of the denial of group rights to national minorities? Is this cause to
define them as ethnic, ‘nationalising’ states? Whether a state provides for, or
ignores, polyethnic rights has no bearing on whether we define that state as a
liberal democracy that upholds human rights (Glazer 1997: 133). States in
both the West and East do not provide polyethnic rights but Brubaker only
defines those in the East as ‘nationalisers’. In fact, these states in both halves
of Europe are civic (Resler 1997; Tolz 1998: 1004–6 and 1013–14).

Some liberal democracies have promoted multicultural policies, which, to
varying degrees, support group rights (such as in Canada and Australia).
Others refuse to legally recognise group rights for national minorities per se
(for example, France, Greece, Germany and the USA). International organ-
isations, such as the OSCE, which spans North America, Europe and all of
the Soviet successor states, only seeks to provide selective advice and recom-
mendations on national minorities to post-communist states (such as Estonia
and Latvia). Meanwhile, it ignores ethnic conflict and the denial of polyethnic
rights in the ‘civic West’ (Bretons in France, Anglophones in Quebec, or
Slavic Macedonians in Greece).

The clear bias in all civic states is towards internal homogenisation and
external heterogeneity. All civic states promote to varying degrees public
(societal) cultures that are based upon the language, history, symbols, religion
and culture of the core, titular nation(s). The majority of states are multinational in their composition and therefore they ‘cannot survive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to the larger political community they cohabit’ (Kymlicka 1996: 13). Even in multicultural and multinational states, such as Canada and Spain, provinces (Quebec) or autonomous regions (Catalonia) adopt ‘nationalising’ policies in favour of the local public culture which exists alongside that of the states as a whole (English and Castilian respectively).

Nation-building in liberal democracies has never been purely civic but has built upon the cultural core of a territory. Civic states therefore have confusingly been defined as ‘nation-states’ although the overwhelming majority of them are multinational and would be better defined as ‘state-nations’ (see Linz 1993) or ‘national states’ (see Tilly 1975). National states are never uniformly homogeneous and may have been woven from many ethnic and linguistic strands. The dominant ethnie of the core, around which the state is created, defines the public (societal) culture of the state to provide a measure of domestic affinity and external difference (Anthony D. Smith 1996: 61 and 114). The use of historiography, myths and legends in nation-building projects is not confined to post-communist Europe and, as reported by the Council of Europe, has a long history of abuse.2

Brubaker’s limitation of his term (‘nationalising state’) to only Central and Eastern Europe therefore sidesteps the manner in which nation-building took place and how it is no different to that which took place in what are still considered today to be model civic, liberal democracies. ‘For even the most “civic” and “political” nations often turn out on closer inspection to be also “ethnic” and “linguistic”’ (Anthony D. Smith 1998: 126). Consequently, civic and ethnic nations ‘rarely exist in pure form’ (Niebueth 1999: 158).

The nationalisation of peripheries by the cores of territories in Western Europe and North America ‘ran roughshod over deeply ingrained particularism’ (Farrar, McGuire and Thompson 1998: 555). Piedmontese Italy, for example, ‘nationalised’ regional identities and imposed Tuscanese as the state language in Italy after its unification in the 1860s. The Lombards, Saxons, Scots and Normans all became the nuclei of later ‘nation-states’. As Anthony Smith points out (1996: 68): ‘If successful, it proved to weld often disparate populations into a single political community based on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic core.’

The definition of a state as ‘nationalising’ inevitably refers to the manner in which the political community’s public (societal) culture is defined. The difference between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ states rests not on whether they possess ethno-cultural components, which they all do (Anthony D. Smith 1998: 177–80). Rather, it relates to ‘the fact that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race or colour’ (Kymlicka, 1996: 24). Kymlicka therefore defines ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ states as inclusive and exclusive respectively (we have seen, however, that ethnic states can also be inclusive). If post-communist countries are therefore created as inclusive entities it is not clear
how they can be defined in Brubaker’s term as ‘nationalising states’ and, indeed, if they are fundamentally different to those defined as ‘civic’. A civic state defined in such a manner excludes only two countries from post-communist Europe – Belarus and former Yugoslavia.

Can post-communist countries learn from established liberal democracies how to be neutral when defining their societal cultures? It seems not. As Kymlicka acknowledges, the majority of liberal democratic states have a ‘dominant culture and value system’ which sometimes makes some national minorities feel marginalised. Nation-builders have to make choices in all civic states about whether to include more than one ethnic group as the titular nation, which language to make official, which historiography and national values to inculcate through the media, education system and the security forces, what national symbols and anthem to choose and whether to single out any religious denomination as the state Church.3 A cohesive society cannot be constructed without a minimum body of common values, encoded in legislation and the constitution. These values cannot be wholly morally neutral as they inevitably endorse one type of behaviour and set of values. These ‘operative public values’ are the ‘basic or primary moral structure of society’ (Parekh 1995: 437).

We therefore arrive at the conclusion that all civic states are composed of ethno-cultural elements and it is wrong to assume that only ethnic states are based upon them (see Kymlicka 1995). Civic states also require ‘Others’ to define the boundaries of the ‘We’, promote internal unity through integration and/or assimilation and conformity while requiring an overarching societal culture of common values and institutions (see Triandafyllidou 1998). As Miller points out (1995: 11, 121), without such an overarching inclusive national identity there is insufficient mutual trust between citizens to create a functioning liberal democracy. Such an identity does not necessarily require the eradication of cultural groups and is therefore compatible with internal diversity (Miller 1995: 11; see also Smolicz 1998). Market economies and liberal democracies require some degree of national unity (see Gellner 1983 and Rustow 1970). Nation integration harmonises regions, peoples and ethnic groups into a unified community with a public culture that is accepted as ‘higher’ than family ties, clan loyalty, regions, gender or class.

**Nation-building or ‘nationalising states’: a theoretical alternative**

The division of Europe and North America into ‘civic West’ and post-communist ‘nationalising’ states, intentionally or otherwise, builds upon the well-established division of Europe along Western (civic) and Eastern (ethnic) lines. Historically there may have been some basis to this division (with notable exceptions such as Eire, Spain, Belgium, Germany and Greece, which have been classified since 1945 as lying within the ‘West’). But Brubaker’s division is ill equipped to deal with the varieties of national states found in
contemporary Europe and confusingly assumes that civic states do not include ethno-cultural cores and are not therefore ‘nationalising’.

All states in post-communist Europe\(^4\) are civic apart from two. After the disintegration of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s and early 1990s independent statehood was achieved by many ‘Eastern’ European nations. Many of them developed their polities and, ‘came more or less to approximate that found in Western Europe’ (Knight 1982: 519). The pull of the West, its institutions (the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe and the OSCE) and the lure of potential membership in them have promoted the establishment of civic states in post-communist Europe.

There are two notable exceptions that are ethnic states. Yugoslavia under former President Slobodan Milosovich and Belarus are ‘nationalising’, ethnic states, which do not respect the rights of the non-titular national minorities or titular nation. Since the election of Alyaksandr Lukashenka as president of Belarus in summer 1994 he has continued Soviet-era polices of Russification and de-nationalisation of Belarusian language and culture while denying political rights to its citizens. Belarus, ironically, is therefore an authoritarian, Russian ‘nationalising’ state.

The great majority, however, are civic states. Slovakia and Romania grant political rights to their large Hungarian minorities but deny them polyethnic rights. Nevertheless, both Slovakia and Romania can be defined as civic states because, while denying polyethnic rights (in the manner of France), they do not deny their minorities citizenship or voting rights. In Estonia and Latvia national minorities are gradually being granted citizenship and voting rights. If Ukraine is used as a test case it is difficult to see how it can be defined as a ‘nationalising state’. These nationality policies in Ukraine were supported by all political parties, with the notable exception of the extreme right (see Kuzio 1998). They also conform with what Tamara Resler (1997) recommends as states adopting a middle path between those based completely upon individual and those upon group rights.

The majority of the former European communist states can no longer be defined as ‘ethnic’ or ‘nationalisers’. The majority of them are territorial, civic and inclusive democracies (although by far not all are consolidated), as defined by their willingness to allow integration for all into the societal culture (Kymlicka 1996: 24).

In place of the confused definition of post-communist Europe as ‘nationalising states’ I provide an alternative five-fold classification that defines only two of these states as ‘nationalising’. This classification should replace the traditional ‘civic West’:‘ethnic East’ division elaborated by Kohn, which needs urgent revision (Nieguth 1999: 169). According to the classification below, states are only defined as ‘nationalising’ if they are ethnic states that deny civil rights to their inhabitants. In the case of Belarus and Yugoslavia the state has provided the populations with citizenship and they cannot therefore be defined as exclusive states. Ethnic states also usually deny polyethnic rights to their members (as in Yugoslavia’s Kosovo and in Belarus to Belarusians).
I define as non-nationalising those civic states who provide citizenship and the right to vote. Civic states do not necessarily have to provide polyethnic rights. In the civic West the record is mixed on this question – some do provide them (Spain) while many others do not (France and Greece). This is

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**Civic states:**

1. *Mono-ethnic*: democratic systems that are either consolidated (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia) or where democratic transitions have failed (Albania);
2. *Plural liberal*: consolidated democracies that grant polyethnic rights (Lithuania) and unconsolidated democracies that grant polyethnic rights to their citizens (Ukraine, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, Russian Federation). Ukraine and the Russian Federation are the only two post-communist states that have also granted territorial autonomy to their national minorities;
3. *Plural non-liberal*: unconsolidated democracies that do not grant polyethnic rights to their citizens (Romania, Slovakia);
4. *Ethnic democracies*: consolidated democracies that are in the process of granting civil rights to their inhabitants but are unlikely to grant polyethnic rights (Estonia, Latvia);

**Nationalising ethnic states:**

5. ‘*Nationalising*’ ethnic states: states that deny both civil and polyethnic rights (Yugoslavia) and the Russian ‘nationalising state’ of Belarus.

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**Figure 1. Civic and ‘nationalising’ states in post-communist Europe**

**Table 1. Civic and ethnic (nationalising) states in Europe and North America**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic states</th>
<th>Nationalising ethnic states</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mono-ethnic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Plural liberal</strong></td>
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I define as non-nationalising those civic states who provide citizenship and the right to vote. Civic states do not necessarily have to provide polyethnic rights. In the civic West the record is mixed on this question – some do provide them (Spain) while many others do not (France and Greece). This is
also true in the East where some civic states do provide for polyethnic rights (Ukraine, Lithuania, Macedonia) while others do not (Slovakia, Romania, Latvia, Estonia).

Conclusion

This article has argued that Brubaker’s division of states divided into civic and ‘nationalising’ states is difficult to apply and leads to further theoretical and terminological confusion. Brubaker only defines the (inter-war and post-communist) East as ‘nationalisers’ with the West as civic. This theoretical framework looks suspiciously similar to Kohn’s division of a civic West and an ethnic East, even though Brubaker is himself critical of Kohn’s framework. Indeed, much of what we witness today in the nation- and state-building processes in the ‘East’ took place during earlier periods of history in the ‘West’ (Canovan 1996: 104).

The overwhelming majority of the post-communist European states (traditionally the ‘East’ and Brubaker’s ‘nationalisers’) can be now defined as civic and inclusive political communities built on similar foundations to those which led at an earlier period in history to the eventual creation of national states in the ‘West’. Only two out of the nineteen post-communist European states have been defined in this article as ‘nationalisers’ (namely Belarus and Yugoslavia).

Although many scholars have been quick to utilise Brubaker’s paradigms this article has brought out the difficulty in continuing to use his categorisation of states as either civic or ethnic. ‘Civic’ and ‘ethnic’ states are ideal types, which fail to take into account the wide range of historical experiences and contemporary realities found among civic nations (Canovan 1996: 75). Indeed, Brubaker and scholars who utilise his theory do not explain the difference between ‘civic’ and ‘nationalising’ in inclusive states. In civic states polyethnic rights can be denied while civil rights are granted (for example France and Greece). Civic states also pursued ‘nationalising’ policies at earlier periods in their history, policies that have were traditionally defined in a positive light as ‘nation-building’. All civic states continue to pursue to varying degrees homogenising (‘nationalising’) policies. This article has therefore argued against defining nation-building positively in the West and contrasting this negatively to ‘nationalising’ in the East. If it is being undertaken in both cases within civic, inclusive polities there is no difference between Western nation-building and Eastern ‘nationalising’. If that is the case it is difficult to understand why there is any theoretical need for a category of states defined as ‘nationalising’.

The definition of some, or all, post-communist states as ‘nationalisers’ rests on how these largely inclusive and civic states define their titular nation(s), state language(s) and national minorities. Scholars have tended to define these states, incorrectly, as ‘nationalisers’ because they aim to construct a
societal culture, which all states require, from the values, language, culture and historiography of only one defined titular nation. Yet, it is not made clear by these same scholars why these states should no longer be defined as ‘nationalisers’, and thereby be allowed to join the ‘civic’ camp, if they proceed to define their societal cultures from both the titular nation and the second largest ethnic group (Russians). This would be tantamount to redefining themselves as bi-national states created by the titular nation and ethnic Russians. To many people from the titular nation, such a policy decision would be tantamount to freezing the inherited legacy of Soviet nationality policies and not thereby permit affirmative action on behalf of their languages and cultures.

The traditional division of Europe within the literature on nationalism requires urgent revision to take into account recent developments in post-communist Europe. Such a revision should aim to come to grips with the terminological confusion in two areas still evident among many scholars working in the field. A first step in this process would be to recognise that many of the nation-building policies underway in the ‘East’ took place at earlier periods of history in the ‘West’. A second step would be to accept that all civic states in the West and East include ethno-cultural elements. The civic:ethnic proportional balance within civic states rests only upon the extent of their progress in democratisation, and creation of civil societies and has little to do with the geographic location of their country within Europe.

Notes


2 The Council of Europe believed that ‘Virtually all political systems have used history for their ends and have imposed both their version of historical facts and their definition of the good and bad figures of history.’ Recommendation 1283/1996, p. 1, on history and the learning of history in Europe, and adopted by the Council of Europe on 22 January 1996.

3 The state church in England is still the Church of England, despite the fact that only one million people regularly attend the eucharist in its churches. England is today a multiethnic society with more practising Catholics and Muslims than Anglicans.

4 My definition of post-communist Europe includes twelve Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European states as well as the seven former Soviet states of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. It does not include the three Transcaucasian republics.

References


