Multiplicity of Nationalism in Contemporary Europe

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Chapter 2
Civic Nationalism and the Nation-State: Towards a Dynamic Model of Convergence
Taras Kuzio

This chapter argues that nationalism in the West and East has never been as divergent as scholars have argued. Indeed, the transformations that the East (Central-Eastern Europe and the three Baltic states) has undergone and its integration into NATO and the EU affirm that the convergence of Western and Eastern nationalism is based on a far narrower gulf than has been traditionally articulated by scholars. The ability of the East to fulfill the requirements of the Membership Action Plan for NATO membership and the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership over two decades would also affirm that nationalism in the East was never fundamentally different to that found in the West. This chapter lays out the case that nationalism in the West and East is not radically different. Western nationalism emerged as a civic variant after two centuries of gestation, conflict and evolution. Eastern nationalism evolved into a civic variant during the course of the twentieth century, first under communism and secondly during the post-communist transition to a democratic-market economy. Both nationalisms—West and East—rapidly evolved in the second half of the twentieth century, especially during the 1960s in the West and in the 1990s in the East. The democratization of Eastern European post-communist states took place relatively quickly in the decade following the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire.\(^1\)
North American and Western European nation-states matured into civic states only in the second half of the twentieth century. The West and East therefore evolved into civic states during the same century separated by only a few decades. The major difference between the West and East was that the arrival of a consolidated democracy in the West came after a journey that had begun in the late eighteenth century whereas the East transformed into civic states during a "big bang" following the collapse of communism. The East undertook its transition to a civic state at a faster pace than the West because of external pressure from the OSCE, globalization and the desire of the East to "return to Europe" through membership of the Council of Europe, NATO and the EU.

The arrival of a democratic civic state has been traditionally associated by scholars with greater pluralism. The majority of scholarly contributions in this field have discussed the greater inclusiveness of the civic state in a normative manner by arguing in favor of, or against, increased pluralism and multiculturalism. Another group of scholars have critically responded to this claim by drawing on a wide variety of theoretical and comparative perspectives. A growing body of revisionist work argues that the growth of pluralism within nation-states is part of a long-term trend that has been taking place since the late eighteenth century, a view that this chapter upholds. This revisionist scholarship, which this chapter builds on, disagrees with the static model developed by Hans Kohn that is still widely used by many scholars, policy makers, and journalists. The chapter presents a dynamic theory of the convergence of nationalism in the West and East through a process of societal change over time, evolutionary in the case of the West over two centuries and revolutionary in the case of the East since the collapse of communism.

This chapter adds new conceptual theory to the relatively few scholars who have discussed the evolution of civic nationalism and the long-term forces that are driving North American and Western European nation-states to be more pluralistic and inclusive in how their communities are imagined. The chapter goes further by supporting a theory of the convergence of nationalism in the West and East.

The chapter analyzes the evolution of civic nationalism and movement toward greater pluralism and inclusiveness within nation-states in three areas — citizenship and the vote, gender, and immigration. These three categories of analysis are chosen for three reasons. First, citizenship and the vote are central as to how we define civic states and liberal democracies. In the West, citizenship and the right to vote evolved over two centuries from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth century with the last expansion of the right to vote in the 1960s when it was granted to native peoples. In the East, inclusive citizenship and the right to vote came automatically after the collapse of communism. Only two former Soviet republics — Estonia and Latvia — adopted exclusive citizenship and the right to vote policies. Yet, Estonia and Latvia’s policies resembled those of Germany throughout the 1990s with all three states gradually moderating their exclusive citizenship rules to integrate non-indigenous minorities. A second category of analysis — gender — is included in this chapter because this field has traditionally been ignored in studies of nationalism. As Walby states, “Literature on nations and nationalism rarely addresses the question of gender...” and “... Most texts on nationalism do not take gender as a significant issue.” Gender rights, both the right to vote and the advancement of women, took place in the West and the East during the twentieth century. The West and East advanced the right to vote for women during the inter-war years. A third category of analysis — attitudes to immigration — primarily focuses on the West as the issue of immigration is not a policy concern, political problem or electoral liability in the East. Immigration is chosen as a category of analysis to highlight the evolving nature of contradictory attitudes in the West toward immigration as both a socio-economic asset and a threat to established national identities. The first arrivals of non-Anglo-Saxon, protestants to the U.S. took place in the 1840s with the immigration of Irish Catholics (Native Americans, Mexicans, and blacks were marginalized and not perceived to be part of the imagined American community). Irish Catholics were followed by different ethnic waves of immigrants to the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and by immigration after World War II into Western Europe. Immigration has become an acute political and, in the case of Islamic terrorists, security issue in Western Europe in the last two decades leading to most Western European states and Australia retreating from policies promoting multiculturalism to those promoting integration. Immigration was always a contentious issue in the settler societies of North America, Australia, and New Zealand, all of whom had restrictions on non-white immigration until the 1960s. Australia abandoned multiculturalism around the same time as Western Europe; New Zealand never adopted these policies. Canada remains the only Western liberal democracy still committed to multiculturalist policies and open immigration and the Canadian Conservative Party the only center-right party that does not regard multiculturalism and immigration as a threat to an established national identity.

The chapter is divided into two sections. The first discusses what I define as the "static" and "dynamic" models of nationalism and nation-states. The chapter argues that the dynamic model of the convergence of nationalism in the West and East best describes the evolution of Western nation-states since the late eighteenth century and the convergence of nationalism in the West and East in the twentieth century. The second section discusses three categories of analysis of civic nationalism in the West and East: citizenship and the vote, attitudes to gender, and policies on immigration.

1. Static and Dynamic Models of Nationalism

The Static Model of Nationalism

The framework developed by Kohn of a Western civic nationalism being different in origin, essence, and form to that of Eastern ethnic nationalism has traditionally been the standard framework used by scholars to understand nationalism. Kohn's...
static framework argued that Western states were civic from their inception in the late eighteenth century. Kohn believed that Western nationalism was inherently different because it evolved in conjunction with political rights and was therefore civic (i.e., democratic). This civic nationalism therefore owed more to territorial than to ethno-cultural factors. Western civic nationalism was also inclusive in permitting anybody within the given territory of a nation-state to become a citizen, regardless of their ethnicity, race, or gender. The civic nationalism that developed in Kohn's West was individualistic, liberal, rational, and cosmopolitan.

In contrast, Kohn defines Eastern nationalism as backward looking, prone to conflict, tribal, and irrational. Eastern nationalism was primitive because it focused its energy on building a new national identity and was inter-related to religion, language, and nationality. It lacked a "high culture" and therefore focused upon ethno-cultural issues. By defining Eastern European nationalism in such a manner Kohn believed that it was inevitable that the East would tend toward creating authoritarian, culturally repressive, fascist, and autocratic states while the West would naturally establish liberal democratic states.

The alleged dichotomy between Western and Eastern nationalism was inevitable because of the backward socio-political and socio-economic level of development in the East. The East lacked a large bourgeoisie and was more closely associated with absolutist regimes. Eastern nationalism was also allegedly more prone to ethnic conflict because it inevitably had to resort to a greater degree of historical myth making. The boundaries of the nation-state did not coincide with ethnic groups and therefore there were a great number of demands for border changes along ethnographic lines. In contrast, the roots of Western nationalism lay in the age of enlightenment, liberty, the rule of law, and individualism. In the American and French revolutions individual liberty played a predominant role in mobilizing the revolutionaries. The American national idea, for example, was based on individual liberty and tolerance that overcame ethnic differences.

A static view of nationalism, national identity, and society has been increasingly challenged by integrating these phenomena within a more dynamic framework. This has argued that in the early stages of nation-states, ethnic nationalism is stronger than the civic elements that are still in their early, embryonic stages of development. Over time, as democratization is consolidated, institutions are crafted, the rule of law is established, the right to vote is expanded, and minorities and immigrants receive greater rights, the proportionate relationship between nationalist particularist and liberal universalist factors moves from the former toward the latter; that is, the civic nature of the state widens and deepens. Democratic civic states as they emerged in the twentieth century did not therefore exist in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the West or East.

Dynamic Model and Theory of Convergence of Nationalism

The static Kohn framework of nationalism failed to take into account that nation-states have evolved over two centuries since the late eighteenth century. Kohn's framework mistakenly argued that nation-states in the West had always been civic, a view that could not include a dynamic framework that factored in long-term change. A dynamic model of convergence emphasizes the link between democratization and nation-building and discusses this within the context of an evolution of nation-states into more inclusive civic states in the West and East. In other words, a dynamic model of convergence offers an alternative to the static view of nation-states as inclusive and civic from their inception in the late eighteenth century. A dynamic model sees the arrival of the civic state as a twentieth century phenomenon in both the West and East and therefore posits an argument in favor of a theory of the convergence of nationalism in the West and East.

The nation-state has always been a complicated marriage of convenience between nationalist particularism and liberal universalism. Traditional frameworks for discussing nationalism did not necessarily see this as a problem because Western nation-states were assumed to have always been civic in contrast to the allegedly ethnic basis of nation-states elsewhere in the world. When nationalism came to be seen as a negative term after World War II because of its close correlation to Nazism, the term "civic nationalism" was replaced by the less evocative "patriotism," although the theoretical or normative differences between them are unclear. One person's "patriotism" is, after all, a neighbor's "nationalism." As nation-states have become progressively more inclusive and pluralistic, nationalism has become increasingly buried deeper within Western public consciousness. Nationalism has not therefore disappeared with the arrival of greater inclusiveness and pluralism; it has merely become, in Billig's phrase, simply "banal." Civic nationalism in the West has become an accepted, everyday part of life where if it is publicly raised, such as after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., it is described as "patriotism." The "patriotism" of the Bush administration was traditionally seen as "nationalism" outside the U.S., including in Canada and Europe, and even more so in the Middle East.

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Tension between nationalist particularism and liberal universalism will always be a constant feature of nation-states because of the lack of congruence between “cultural” and “political” nationalism. The durability of the nation-state is because it mediates between ‘primordial bonds’ and ‘abstract, universal humanity,’ it is open to strangers while remaining ‘compact and contingent.’ As long as nation-states continue to exist, this conflict between nationalist particularism and universal liberalism will be an integral component of the nation-state. All nations-states are under-pinned by nationalism. The growth of rule of law and democratic institutions serves to constrain this nationalism within the confines of a democratic civic state. Since the 1990’s evidence of the continued resilience of nationalism within European nation-states can be seen through the rise of ethnic and populist nationalism. France’s National Front leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, reached the final round of the 2003 French presidential elections. Switzerland’s largest political party, the Swiss Peoples Party, caused an international outcry over its openly racist election posters in the 2007 federal elections. Populist right anti-immigration parties are also popular in Denmark and Belgium. The European Parliament has three Political Groups who incorporate euro-skeptics, euro-separatists, populist-nationalist, anti-immigrant and fascist parties from western and Eastern Europe. Western European parties from the UK, Italy, and France dominate two of the three Political Groups: Independence/Democracy and Identity and Tradition and Sovereignty, while Polish parties dominate the Union for Europe of the Nations Group.

The evolution of the civic element within nation-states, as seen in the expansion of the franchise and greater tolerance of cultural pluralism and inclusiveness, is a post-World War II phenomenon. The trend toward greater plurality did not necessarily mean that we were approaching the end of the nation-state, as many scholars have long predicted, in favor of the triumph of global universalism. The nation-state has constantly changed and adapted since its inception in the late eighteenth century and will continue to remain with us for the long-term as it will always attract greater loyalty than that given to supra-national institutions or federations. The majority of EU members continue to oppose the transfer of their key powers in domestic economic, monetary, fiscal, and security policy to a supra-national EU.

Advances in democratization, inclusiveness, and plurality within nation-states have traditionally been associated with civic nationalism while intolerance, racism, and fascism have been linked to ethnic nationalism. Nevertheless, the boundaries between civic and ethnic nationalism and inclusive and exclusive nation-states are blurred. Both types of nationalism, civic and ethnic, can be intolerant and tolerant. Civic nationalism of minorities within empires, apartheid regimes, or even in civic nation-states can be purely defensive and benign. At other times, it can be intolerant and aggressive. France has long exhibited an intolerant attitude toward national minorities and immigrants who are meant to divest themselves of their linguistic and cultural background in favor of an official, state-sponsored French identity. The two main candidates in the 2007 French presidential elections, Conservative Nicolas Sarkozy and Socialist Ségolène Roy-

al, used the nationalist card. Following his election, President Sarkozy established a new Ministry for Immigration and National Identity.

The center-right, populists, and fascists have found it most difficult to accept the evolution of nation-states since World War II. Nationality policies adopted by nation-states were never uniform, even in the civic West. Italy and Austria only began to create the foundations of a modern nation-state following the end of fascism after World War II. Italy only granted women the vote in 1945. In both countries, the fascist past still leaves a shadow over current politics, with former fascist and nationalist parties continuing to be electorally popular in Italy and Austria. Two populist right anti-immigration parties together received 29 % of the vote in the September 2008 Austrian elections after the Freedom Party jumped from 11 to 18 % of the vote and the Alliance for the Future of Austria—Jörg Haider’s List increased its support from 4 to 11 %. Together they now command as much popular support as either of the two traditional large parties, the Social Democratic and center-right Peoples Party, who received 29 and 26 % respectively. After the collapse of the corrupt Christian Democratic Party in Italy its place was taken by a curious alliance of Italian nationalists, Forza Italia, regional separatists, Lega Nord and “post-fascists,” Allianza Nationale, the former Italian Social Movement. Italy has its most right-wing government since World War II. Spain and Portugal’s fascist regimes lasted into the mid 1970s and only after a peaceful evolution in the former and a revolution in the latter did democratic nation-states emerge. Eire only emerged as a modern nation-state relatively recently after overcoming centuries of colonial rule.

Canada is also a recent addition to the Western family of nation-states, even though it became an autonomous dominion within the British Empire in 1867. Canadian citizenship, a separate flag and national anthem are all post-World War II creations. Until the 1960s the city of Toronto, Canada’s largest metropolis, hosted the largest parades outside the British province of Ulster by rabidly anti-Catholic Orange men celebrating Protestant Anglo-Saxon hegemony. In 1870, Canada had 900 Orange lodges. Today, Toronto no longer hosts large Orange parades, is a multicultural city where half of the children do not have English as their first language and its largest parade is the annual June Gay Pride Week. As in Britain, Catholics and Protestants never mixed in pre-1960s Ontario society. Catholics in Ulster and cities on the British mainland, such as Glasgow, Manchester, and Liverpool, were disbarred from entering certain professions and the ruling elites until the last decades of the twentieth century. In certain cases these religious divides have ameliorated while in other cases they continue to exist in liberal democratic states.

A key difference between civic and ethnic nationalism is that the latter is usually undertaken by insecure ethnic groups. From a gender perspective, insecure “masculinist nationalism” grows where there is a heightened conflict with a domestic or external “Other.” After insecure ethnic groups achieve their aims and become hegemonic within their territories they can continue to remain intolerant of minorities, an example being the policies and attitudes of Francophone nation-
alists toward Anglophones, Jews, and immigrants following their election victory in Quebec in 1976. Quebec separatist Premier Jacques Parizeau blamed “the ethnics and the money” following the defeat of the 1995 separatist referendum in Quebec, a reference to new immigrants and Jews. After the victory of the “Quiet Revolution” in Quebec in the 1970s a majority of Montreal’s long-standing Jewish population migrated from Quebec to Toronto, Ontario.28 Toronto has since then replaced Montreal as Canada’s business center.

Civic nationalism can be a type of nationalism that has evolved into a more liberal variant only after the ethnic group that espouses it has achieved its goal of hegemony within a state. Kaufmann traces the evolution of American nationalism in such a manner:29 France is another example of the evolution of nationalism from an ethnic to a more civic variant. In both cases, American and French nationalism evolved into civic types in the second half of the twentieth century. Contemporary French civic nationalism was a minority viewpoint a century ago in France when Ernest Renan espoused it. Heffernan argues that, “The alternative, biological or social Darwinian interpretation probably commanded wider support amongst European intellectuals until the 1940s.”30 There was little support in the nineteenth century for writers such as Lord Action who called for cultural pluralism. In fact, Western political thought prior to World War II, “has shown little understanding or respect for the cultural diversity of mankind and has made scant allowance for it as a possible concern of government.”31

The use of historical myths and nationalist historiography has been as commonplace in the West as in the East. The East may even have a better record than the West as most communist states did not utilize nationalist historiographies. Romania, Bulgaria, and Russia within the USSR were exceptions to this rule as communism had integrated with nationalism in these three cases. “Nationalistic history,” of the kind used by France and Germany in their territorial disputes over Alsace-Lorraine, was commonplace throughout Western Europe and North America until the mid twentieth century.32 Historical textbooks that legitimized empires, promoted ethnic superiority, patriotic prejudice, chauvinism, historical myths, and social Darwinism were commonplace in the West until the 1950s. Although nationalist historiography has declined into a minority viewpoint since the 1960s, “the patriotic ideals toward which those writers strove are still with us today, in certain school textbooks, and also in the popular press and comics.”33 Nationalist historiography has never completely gone away and often re-appears during elections, crises, wars, and international sports events.

2. Civic Nationalism and Nation-States:
   Three Categories of Analysis

Civic elements only came to dominate and overshadow ethnic particularism in Western and Eastern nation-states in the second half of the twentieth century. The growth of civic-political rights, let alone those pertaining to minority ethnic groups, has been a slow and very uneven process. As long as nation-states remain the primary manner in which populations are organized there will always be some elements of ethnic particularism within them as nation-states by their very nature are composed of civic and ethnic-cultural factors. The growth of the civic inclusiveness of Western and Eastern nation-states is discussed below in three categories of analysis—citizenship and the vote, gender, and immigration.

Citizenship and the Vote

Citizenship is important because it encompasses both a set of rights and demarcates “us” from “them.” Citizenship not only confers a set of rights and obligations, but citizens acquire a new identity, are socialized into “civic virtues” and “become members of a political community with a particular territory and history.”34 Citizenship incorporates within itself historical baggage, myths, culture, language, codes of behavior, and institutional legacies. Citizenship and nationalism have been linked since the late eighteenth century because nation-states are bounded and incorporate political identities. Citizenship policies are regulated, formulated, and implemented within institutions, the rule of law, and political cultures of nation-states.

Unlike in the West, the granting of citizenship in post-communist Eastern Europe was less contentious. When communist regimes collapsed in 1989-1991 only two of the 27 states—Latvia and Estonia—introduced exclusive citizenship legislation. Their exclusive citizenship policies gradually evolved toward less restrictive criteria because of the influence of the OSCE, EU, and the Council of Europe. The remaining 25 post-communist states opted for the “zero option” whereby everybody resident on their territory automatically became citizens. This applied even in authoritarian regimes, such as those that emerged from the former Yugoslavia and Belarus. The record on citizenship in democratizing post-communist Eastern European states is in many ways better than that of the West, where citizenship was gradually made more inclusive over centuries to include women, minority religious groups, and racial and ethnic minorities.

European and North American nation-states have traditionally differed in their approaches to citizenship and their evolution toward greater civic inclusive states took place in the second half of the twentieth century. Citizenship, the vote, and immigration have been intricately linked. In the twentieth century, two waves of enlarging citizenship and the vote have taken place. In the inter-war era, women were granted citizenship and voting rights. In the second half of the twentieth century, the civic state widened its inclusiveness by incorporating indigenous peoples and, in most countries, immigrants. Australia was one of the last Western nation-states to grant citizenship and the vote to Aboriginals in 1967, only five years before Australia’s adoption of multiculturalism, a policy which was itself downgraded to a policy of integration by the center-right Liberal Party in the 1990s.35
A majority of Western nation-states have evolved toward greater liberalized citizenship and immigration policies and moved away from assimilation to policies that promote the half-way house of integration over a largely discredited full-blown multiculturalism. The 1981 UK Nationality Act was the exception that moved Britain from an over-inclusive nation-state to an identity based on blood and culture. Britain moved away from multiculturalism under a Labour government toward an emphasis on integration. After Germany was re-united in October 1990 it increasingly evolved in the 1990s from an ethnic definition of citizenship, which had been in place since the nineteenth century, to an inclusive definition. Prior to 1990 the ethno-cultural definition of "German" has been evoked because German nationalism emerged after a state was created and the state was not co-terminous with the nation. Broadening the inclusiveness of the nation-state was only discussed in Germany from the 1980s but then implemented after 1999. The British and German country cases show how citizenship has been in a process of evolution. Germany now has more liberal citizenship tests than the U.S. But, unlike the U.S., Germany continues to place less emphasis on integration and remained hostile to immigration. Anti-immigration attitudes run highest in Western European EU members Germany, Austria, France, and Denmark that are the same countries that are most opposed to Turkish membership of the EU. Eastern European EU members support Turkish membership.

The U.S. evolved over the long-term toward greater civic inclusiveness. As Rogers M. Smith points out, "The U.S. is not an inherently and autonomous liberal democratic nation, as many glorifying histories would have it." Race, gender, and class, "have always been such a defining feature of American life." The U.S. evolved from a very narrow definition of the political community in 1790, when the U.S. Naturalization Act provided for citizenship to only white, protestant, wealthy men, toward greater civic inclusiveness 170 years later. Formal U.S. citizenship was only introduced in 1868 when black slaves were given the vote. The U.S. has engaged in discussions on immigration, citizenship, and their link to national identity with great frequency since the 1776 revolution. This has resulted in, "clashing ideas about the foundation of American citizenship and nationality." U.S. citizenship has, "always expressed illiberal, undemocratic ascriptive myths of American civic identity; along with a variety of liberal and republican types, in logically inconsistent but politically effective combinations." White supremacy could still be championed by those opposing slavery, full rights could be denied to those incorporated within conquered Spanish territories, Filipinos could be denied U.S. citizenship and there could be widespread fear of allowing the immigration of Jews and Catholics. The U.S. historical record on Native Indians, Mexicans, and blacks is very poor. At the same time, it has an exceptional record of integrating Jews and the U.S. has not experienced widespread anti-Semitism. In 2007, the U.S. Congress rejected legislation to grant citizenship to millions of illegal immigrants, the majority of whom are Hispanics, even though the policy was supported by President George W. Bush.

In the U.S., as in most nation-states, citizenship legislation is "a product of ongoing contestation and compromise." The dilemma of creating a political community that reflects the dominant ethno-cultural interests of the titular nation meant that this was in conflict with the civic ideals promoted by the U.S. This dilemma was only resolved as late as the 1960s when U.S. policy evolved toward combining both integration and cultural pluralism. Multiculturalism, U.S. elites believed, is likely to damage American national identity because it celebrates diversity, not unity. Meanwhile, policies of assimilation along the lines of the pre-1960s "melting pot" were no longer tenable. U.S. policies to integrate immigrants into Americans, while permitting them to celebrate their cultural background in the private domain, has been the dominant U.S. policy since the 1960s. The U.S. has continued to support integration while rejecting Canadian-style multiculturalism.

The U.S. has always remained concerned that if citizenship was granted to non-Anglo-Saxon ethnic groups they would not become sufficiently "American"; that is, their ethnic origins would determine if immigrants could assimilate into Americans. These views on citizenship and immigration changed in the 1960s in Europe and North America. In comparison to prior to the 1960s the culture, language, and history of immigrants is no longer vilified as inferior baggage only to be jettisoned at the earliest opportunity. Today, integration into American values and civic nationalism is not seen as contradicting the maintenance of pride in one's cultural heritage. Nevertheless, immigrants are still subjected to strong Americanizing pressures and taught "common core American values, a common U.S. history, and a common language." This is what fundamentally differentiates the U.S. from its northern multicultural neighbor, Canada.

Pressures on new immigrants to become true Americans have led to new demands by those arriving from Asia and Latin America. They have denounced policies of integration as tantamount to continuing alleged "melting pot" policies that attempt to maintain white supremacy. Asians, blacks, and Hispanics have called for affirmative action and multicultural education that no longer ignores the contributions of blacks, Indians, Asians, and Hispanics to U.S., European, and World history. Such demands increase the fears of nativist Americans, such as Samuel Huntington, who warned of "The Hispanic Challenge." A major contrast between consolidated democracies in the West and democratizing states in post-communist Europe rests on the manner in which the vote has been introduced. In the West, the vote was only gradually introduced over the course of nearly 200 years, between the late eighteenth century and the second half of the twentieth century. Women, for example, were given the vote after World War I in both the West and the East. Women only obtained the vote between the 1920s-1970s in the West, with France only granting women the vote in 1944 and Switzerland as late as 1971. In France, women received the right to vote in 1944, fourteen years after Turkish women in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Turkey. In Eastern Europe, the vote was granted to women in the inter-war period, then taken away from both gender groups in the communist era and granted to all citi-
zents after the communist regimes disintegrated and their transitions to democracy began. The universal suffrage that took Western nation-states nearly two centuries to introduce came immediately to all sections of all post-communist states, with only two exceptions of exclusive citizenship and right to vote: state policies, Latvia and Estonia.

Between the 1780s and the 1960s, the vote was gradually expanded in Europe and North America to include all social classes, religious groups, women, and aboriginal peoples. Even in two of the three countries that introduced multicultural policies—Canada and Australia—aboriginal peoples only obtained the vote in 1960 and 1967 respectively, a century later than in another settler nation, New Zealand, where multicultural policies have never been introduced.49 In a large number of U.S. southern states, blacks were denied the vote until the 1960s through local racist Jim Crow policies.

Gender

The scholarly literature on nations and nationalism rarely addresses the gender question.44 In Canada, for example, history textbooks dwelt exclusively on men when discussing the nation-building project.45 Yet, women participate in the nation-building project in many different ways through membership of nationalist movements, biological reproduction, contributing to the ideological reproduction of collective culture and in the promotion of ethnic difference.50

Introducing gender issues into a dynamic theoretical framework of the convergence of nationalism will contribute towards understanding of the role played by nationalism in nation-states. Nation-states could not be defined as civic if women were disbarred from voting. Even based upon the criteria of gender and the vote, nation-states traditionally defined as civic, as such as France, the UK and the U.S., therefore only became civic and democratic after they granted women the vote in 1920, 1929, and 1944 respectively. Women obtained citizenship and the vote centuries or decades after men. In some cases, such as the American south, black women only enjoyed these rights many decades after white women had successfully achieved them.

Women were not only denied the vote between the conclusion of World War I and World War II, when 28 countries gave them the vote. They were also prevented from fully participating in politics, employment, and the social sphere until the great advances that came about as a consequence of societal changes in the 1960s. The advancement of women into traditional male employment preserves in Western and Eastern states remains an on-going struggle. Although the Labour Party under Prime Minister Tony Blair has greatly increased the proportionate number of women MPs, the Conservative Party remains dominated by middle class, white, male Anglo-Saxons. Multicultural Canada has a lower or similar proportion of women parliamentarians than the majority of post-communist states.51

In Britain, as in most European states, married women and men in the nineteenth century traditionally shared separate lives. Public life was reserved for men. Politics, education and culture were not reserved for women, a view promoted throughout European and North American nation-states until the 1950s. Cambridge University did not allow women to become full members until 1948 and many trade union and gentlemen clubs remained men only establishments until the last two decades of the twentieth century.52

The gradual expansion of women into politics, the media, and academia has contributed toward transforming the civic inclusiveness of nation-states.53 Their advancement is felt to be a product of the “sixties revolution” that increased sexual freedom, women’s rights, education, independence, and influence. Such advances for women also took place in the communist regimes of Eastern Europe where women, at least in legislation, were granted equal status to men. Women, in turn, in Western democracies are likely to be more cosmopolitan, less opposed to EU integration, supporters of the moderate wings of the Labour, Liberal, and Conservative parties, more supportive of policies to promote cultural pluralism toward racial and ethnic minorities and more open to change than their male counterparts.54

Women’s greater support for policies that promote cultural pluralism does not necessarily translate into support for multiculturalism. Ethnic ghettos in Muslim communities, for example, can lead to the continued denial of women’s rights. Muslim men may see women’s rights granted by the host nation-state as a threat to their continued hegemony over the Muslim community. Young Pakistani men have used Islam to justify violence and harassment against women, forced marriages, and to enforce a strict dress code and behavior. Multicultural policies in such situations can grant autonomy to men to create authoritarian environments for women by excluding “Western” (non-Islamic) rights. Asian women have a suicide rate in the UK three times the national average.55

Immigration

Post-communist states have not had to deal with the question of immigration, unlike Western Europe, North America, and Australia and New Zealand. Asylum seekers and immigrants from developing countries continue to look upon Eastern European states as transit routes to the more affluent West. They are also unlikely to seek employment as “guest workers” because employment opportunities are limited in post-communist countries. The attitude of the population in post-communist states to racial minorities and immigrants from developing countries is more likely to resemble that found in Western democratic states prior to the 1960s. Even in some of the democratically advanced post-communist states, such as the Czech Republic, the treatment of Roma continues to remain poor.

Western nation-states have adopted four policies to deal with greater immigration.56 First, differential exclusion relates to policies where immigrants are
excluded from full participation in the political, economic, and cultural life of society. Immigrants were typically only treated as "temporary" guest workers in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Japan, and Belgium. Second, rapid assimilation was a policy that demanded immigrants to give up their culture and language in return for citizenship by assimilating into the majority titular nation's culture. This model was applied to some degree in all Western nation-states, at least until the 1960s. The UK, U.S., Australia, and Canada pursued these policies until the 1960s; France and the Canadian province of Quebec continue to uphold these policies of assimilation. The adoption of French culture and language in France and Quebec is viewed as an act of civicisme with little tolerance of cultural diversity and cultural pluralism. Third, a policy of gradual integration was enacted as a moderate variant of rapid assimilation. Britain, for example, has adopted a mixture of both assimilation and pluralism, "without a clear overall objective." Finally, there was a policy of pluralism where immigrants were accepted as ethnic communities granted equal rights with the "indigenous" or "titular" nation(s). The U.S. no longer adopts a negative view of cultural pluralism in the private domain. At the same time, it does little to promote the culture and language of ethnic groups. Australia, Canada, and Sweden, in contrast, encourage immigration and officially support ethnic groups through multicultural policies and short residencies of only two years for qualification for citizenship. A backlash against multiculturalism throughout the Western world has turned many countries toward policies that encourage integration, including in Australia. Indeed, Canada remains the only bastion of continued faith in the policies of multiculturalism with the developed world's most liberal immigration policy. In this regard, Canada's Conservative Party stands out as unique in not being hostile to either immigration or multiculturalism.

The growth of Asian, Indian sub-continent, West Indian, and Hispanic immigration into European and North American nation-states since the 1960s has altered their ethnic make-up and increased cultural pluralism. The threat imposed by Asian immigration was perceived as sufficiently high for it to be fully banned in the U.S. and Canada until the 1950s. In the U.S. it was not until 1965 that all racial exclusions on immigration were fully removed. The "White Australia" policy introduced in 1901 aimed to keep out Asians and was only rescinded in 1966. Similar restrictions on non-white immigration existed until 1965 in the U.S., Canada until 1962-1967, and in New Zealand as late as 1986. Nativism, understood as hostility to immigration, "was a recurrent phenomenon in America, particularly during periods of economic and political crisis" as perhaps vividly seen in the film Gangs of New York where "Native Americans," as white, protestant settlers called themselves, clashed in the 1840s with the first non-protestants to immigrate to the U.S., Catholic Irish. Restrictions on immigration were in place in Western Europe until the de-colonization of their empires after World War II and characterized each wave of migration to the U.S. since the 1840s when the country was first opened up to non-protestant outsiders.

There has been a gradual growth in the inclusiveness of the majority of Western nation-states, although more than often this was undertaken reluctantly by the states. Germany and Austria were the only two countries that adopted "differential exclusion" policies of immigration until the 1990s. In Germany the evolution toward a more inclusive society was clearly linked to greater security felt by its ruling elites after the unification of Germany in 1990. Of the defeated World War II powers, Western Germany was also the country that undertook the most in terms of overcoming its fascist past, especially in relation to other axis powers Japan, Austria, and Italy. German nationhood has cautiously evolved toward a more civic-territorial definition in the 1990s. Japan, often described as a model democracy since 1945, does not permit immigration and continues to disbar half a million Koreans living in Japan, including those born in the country, from citizenship.

Britain has moved in the opposite direction to the majority of nation-states. The 1948 Nationality Act and 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Acts reflected an elite consensus among both the Conservative and Labour parties that was not hostile to immigration from the Commonwealth. This policy changed with the Margaret Thatcher government's 1981 British Nationality Act that moved toward a more ethnic policy of "racial group particularism." Prior to the 1981 Act, Britain had an over-inclusive definition of the civic nation as "citizenship universalism." The 1981 Act reduced the possibilities for immigration and reflected the ascendency of the "nationalist and anti-EU wing" within the Conservative Party. Conservative leaders William Hague, Ian Duncan-Smith, and Michael Howard continued in the Thatcher tradition with only David Cameron attempting to re-fashion a different "New Conservatism" following Tony Blair's example in transforming the center-left Labour Party into a centrist "New Labour" Party. After 150 years of being barred from citizenship, Asians in the U.S. continue, "to be viewed as a group whose loyalty to America remains in doubt." In World War II, 120,000 Japanese, including many U.S. citizens, were interned after they were collectively defined as a "fifth column." Such a collective designation of guilt was not directed against Germans living in America even though the U.S. was also at war with Germany. Ukrainians were interned in Canada in World War I and Italians were interned in Britain in World War II. Chinese, Japanese, and other Asians were seen as carriers of cultures that were allegedly incompatible with democratic systems and American (i.e., white Anglo-Saxon, protestant national identity) values. Asian "authoritarianism" and "non-European" values were contrasted with American democratic values. Despite four decades of immigration and success in business and the professions in the U.S., only three out of 435 congressional representatives and two senators are Asians. A similar situation exists in most European democracies where there are few visible minorities in parliament. In France, which has Europe's largest Muslim population and minorities account for 12% of the population, only two of the 555 deputies to the lower house of parliament are from minority backgrounds.
Immigration policies became more liberalized in Europe and North America in the 1960s; the exception was the UK which already had a liberal policy that changed toward increased restrictions. This evolution toward greater liberal immigration policies mirrored the transformation of Europe and North America into civic and inclusive nation-states. The evolution reversed a “two-hundred year tradition of increasingly ‘ethnic’ citizenship in Europe.”68 In the EU only Greece, Austria, and Luxembourg continue to deny citizenship rights to second-generation immigrants. While no longer demanding that immigrants should assimilate, the majority of Western nation-states do not provide official support for minority rights and only a minority ever introduced multicultural policies. The British Council on Racial Equality, which since October 2007 has been renamed the Equality and Human Rights Commission supports a culturally diverse Britain through integration. The middle ground of integration, while opposing multicultural policies rather than policies designed to promote assimilation, remains the most popular policy among nation-states because it attempts to reconcile the nation-state’s unity with cultural diversity that has emerged since the 1960s. Integration is the most popular policy pursued by Western nation-states.

The majority of European nation-states adopted liberal immigration policies from the 1950s to the 1980s and immigration profoundly changed European and North American states. Until the 1950s three quarters of all Canadians could claim British or French backgrounds. By 1991, this had declined to only 40%. The very fact that these nation-states became de facto more multi-ethnic made traditional assimilation policies untenable. These policies became untenable because assimilation into the dominant culture did not necessarily bring integration and acceptance into society, especially for non-Europeans, such as Northern African Muslims in France. Socio-economic marginalization and racism has made the allure of assimilation less tempting leading to calls for greater equality and cultural pluralism. In the U.S., the “American dream” has also not resolved the dilemma of extreme divisions based on class, race, and ethnicity.69

Liberal immigration policies came under attack from the populist and extreme right and center-right in the 1990s because of three factors. First, the perceived large numbers of immigrants were viewed to be too great in number for society and state institutions to accept.70 This viewpoint became particularly resilient in countries such as The Netherlands and Britain into which the largest number of Eastern European immigrants arrived after the enlargement of the EU in 2004. Second, non-European immigrants were not viewed to be assimilating or even integrating into the host society. Third, the rise of Islamic terrorism, particularly of the homegrown variety in Britain, made societies nervous of the security threat posed by a minority of their Muslim populations. The resultant backlash has been tighter immigration controls, the incorporation of many extreme right anti-immigration policies into the platforms of the moderate center-right parties, as seen in the 2007 French elections, the rise of the populist right, and greater surveillance by intelligence agencies. The continued salience of ethnicity in Western European states could be readily seen in the electoral victories of populist and fascist parties in Italy, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands.71 In the European Parliament three populist and fascist political groups emerged in the 1990s and bring together 91 out of 786 MEPs.

Three decades of liberal immigration policies did not translate into general societal acceptance of immigrants, particularly those who arrived from outside Europe. Historical experience has shown that public acceptance of immigrants takes place over many decades.72 The growth of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism may lead to public reluctance to accept Muslims as co-citizens. This will be particularly the case in countries where homegrown Islamic terrorism has emerged, such as Britain and the Netherlands.

Conclusion

A static model of nationalism contrasting “Western civic nationalism” with that of the backward “ethnic nationalism” in the East ignores the evolution of European and North American states from the late eighteenth century, does not take into account their transformation into civic states only in the second half of the twentieth century. This chapter argues in favor of an alternative dynamic theory over time of the convergence of nationalism in the West and East. A dynamic model argues that nation-states only became inclusive and civic in the twentieth century, particularly during its second half. The transformation of Eastern European nationalism took place over the same time-frame. In the inter-war years Eastern European states granted women voting rights at the same time as Western Europe and North America. Women’s rights and their societal advancement were simultaneously expanded under communism in Eastern Europe and during the “1960s revolution” in the West. In the second half of the twentieth century, nationalism in Eastern Europe transformed under communism with minor exceptions where nationalism merged with communism in Romania, Serbia within Yugoslavia, and in the Russian SFSR within the USSR. Eastern Europe’s transition from communist totalitarianism to democratic market economies took place in the 1990s with the inducement of EU and NATO membership, the support of the U.S. and under the watchful eye of the OSCE and Council of Europe. Eastern Europe is no more prone than Western Europe to vote for populist or nationalist parties in national and European elections.

Citizenship and the franchise have traditionally developed in parallel. The major difference in the granting of citizenship and the franchise in the West and East has been the time factor. In the West, these rights were granted over the course of a two hundred year period that lasted from the late eighteenth to the second half of the twentieth centuries. The process was only completed in the 1960s when native peoples were given the vote in immigrant societies, such as Canada and Australia. In the case of Germany, its citizenship policies only became civic
in the late 1990s. In the East the granting of citizenship and the vote took place immediately after the removal of communist regimes over a far shorter time frame in the 1990s.

Gender has been largely ignored in nationalism studies. Yet, nation-states could not be defined as civic if women were denied the vote, as they were until in the 1990s. Immediately after the removal of communist regimes over a far shorter time frame in the late 1980s, France, the home of the 1789 democratic republican revolution, granted women the vote later than many Eastern European states and Turkey. The West does not therefore have a better historical record on gender rights than the East and in the contemporary world women's proportional representation in North American and Western European parliaments is often lower than that found in Eastern European parliaments.

The tension between civic and cultural aspects of nation-states will continue to be an on-going problem because political parties in Europe have to fashion policies and react to the challenges of immigration, racism, and the new threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Immigration issues have been high on the agendas of European democracies, pushing the center-right to incorporate policies espoused by the populist or fascist right. The center-right and populist nationalist right have become the guardians of the traditional nation-state against immigration, multiculturalism, and a supra-national, federal EU. The politics of immigration has forced Western states to abandon assimilation policies, confront charges of racism and adapt. The nature in which European and North American states are in a constant process of evolution is provided by the turn away in the 1990s from multiculturalist and liberal immigration policies toward a strong emphasis on integration. Multiculturalism has all but become a negative word in every Western democracy, except Canada.

Notes


23. See the comparison of Italy's and Germany's political culture to that of the U.S. and UK in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (London: Sage, 1989).
44. Foner 2001, 36.
53. Edmonds and Turner.
54. Edmonds and Turner.
Chapter 3
The Unbearable Lightness of British “Liberal Nationalism”

Enric Martínez-Herrera

Nationalism has had a bad intellectual reputation since World War II. Although it partially recovered during the decolonization struggles of the 1950-60s, the positive aura was soon dissipated again by ethnic conflict in many of the new and old states. The 1990s witnessed, however, a two-fold scenario of intellectual revisiting and debate on the subject. On the one hand, a racist revival in Western Europe and, overall, civil wars in former Yugoslavia revived fears about nationalism. On the other, a wave of political thought has postulated nationalism also has a human face. The aim of this study is to evaluate empirically some key theoretical assumptions about a hypothetical friendly side of nationalism and national identification. Some outstanding “liberal-nationalists” contend the existence of a number of positive elements in nationalism. Two alleged virtues often associated discursively with “good nationalism” are citizens’ political confidence and support for the welfare state—the latter mediated through a perception of a national “common good” and “national solidarity.” Unfortunately, there has been little systematic empirical evidence to support these claims, so this study tests them empirically as conventionally falsifiable scientific hypotheses.

The data examined here come from England and Scotland, as there the intellectual controversy on this subject is fairly lively and David Miller, one of the main proponents of these strands of thought, bears in mind British nationalism