Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution

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ABSTRACT

This article is the first to study the positive correlation between nationalism and democratic revolutions using Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution as a case study. The Orange Revolution mobilized the largest number of participants of any democratic revolution and lasted the longest, 17 days. But, the Orange Revolution was also the most regionally divided of democratic revolutions with western and central Ukrainians dominating the protestors and eastern Ukrainians opposing the protests. The civic nationalism that underpinned the Orange Revolution is rooted in Ukraine’s path dependence that has made civil society stronger in western Ukraine where Austro-Hungarian rule permitted the emergence of a Ukrainian national identity that was stymied in eastern Ukraine by the Tsarist empire. 

Following the disintegration of communism, ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus and other parts of the world have led to nationalism becoming widely seen as intrinsically hostile to democratic development. In reality, as this article seeks to demonstrate, the relationship between nationalism and post-communist transitions and democratization is more nuanced. Different types of nationalism have played both positive and negative roles in post-communist European transitions. This article will build on earlier scholars who have argued that civic nationalism [also described in scholarly literature on nationalism as patriotism, state nationalism and Bilig’s (1995) banal nationalism] had a positive correlation to the success of post-communist transitions and democratization. Three other types of nationalism found in post-communist societies – ethnic, Soviet and great power-imperial – have led to ethnic conflict, chauvinistic xenophobia and the establishment of authoritarian regimes. Anti-Western nationalisms in Serbia, Belarus and Russia have underpinned authoritarian regimes that display no interest in integrating into ‘Europe’. Civic nationalism in Ukraine played a positive role in mobilizing mass protests against election fraud in the 2004 presidential elections that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Following the Orange Revolution, out of twelve members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) only Ukraine has been designated as ‘free’ by the New York-based Freedom House think tank (www.freedomhouse.org).

Western studies of democratic revolutions have ignored nationalism as a factor in the mobilization of civil societies (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a, b, c). McFaul’s (2005) seven factors that he believes facilitated the 2000 Serbian Bulldozer, 2003 Georgian Rose, 2004 Ukrainian Orange and 2005 Kyrgyz Tulip revolutions does not incorporate nationalism into his framework. Way’s (2008) response to critical earlier studies of his survey of the factors facilitating democratic revolutions – entitled ‘The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions’ – does not add nationalism as an eighth factor to McFaul’s seven. Four responses to Way (2008) debate his criticism of frameworks to discuss democratic revolutions but again they continue to ignore nationalism (Beissinger, 2009; Fairbanks, 2009; Silitski, 2009) while a fifth discussant (Dimitrov, 2009) adds ‘anti-Western nationalism’. In their contribution to the debate entitled ‘Getting Real About “Real Causes”’ Bunce and Wolchik (2009) similarly ignore nationalism. In his response to his critics, Way (2009, p. 95) did not discuss nationalism as either supportive of, or opposed to, democratic revolutions but Way did credit mobilization in the Orange Revolution as having, ‘tapped into widely shared anti-Russian nationalist sentiments dominant in the west of the country’. Both Way (2009) and

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Dimitrov (2009) ignored one side of the nationalist competition that was at the centre of electoral contestation in democratic revolutions; Way ignored pro-Russian nationalism in eastern Ukraine while Dimitrov fails to discuss civic nationalism. Civic nationalism has mobilized to varying degrees the democratic opposition and civil society in all of the democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in the fourth wave of democratization since 1996, particularly among young people. The civic nationalism of the democratic opposition in Slovakia and Croatia competed with the regimes extreme right and populist nationalism respectively. In Serbia, the democratic opposition sought to break with the autocratic and ethnic nationalist Slobodan Milosevic regime and return Serbia to a European path. In Georgia and Ukraine civic nationalism mobilized populations in the Rose and Orange Revolutions in support of integration with ‘Europe’ and movement away from Russian rule. Wolczuk (2000) discussed the link between Ukrainian national identity and foreign policy.

This article is the first to expand these discussions of democratic breakthroughs and revolutions by integrating nationalism as an additional facilitator of democratic revolutions using Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as a case study. The Orange Revolution was the largest, in numbers of participants, and longest in terms of duration of the revolution on the streets, democratic revolution but it was also the most regionally skewed in who supported and opposed the protests. Mass electoral fraud in the 2004 elections culminated in the largest mass protests in the second group of democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in former communist states of the fourth wave of democratization in the world: Romania (1996), Bulgaria (1997), Slovakia (1998), Croatia and Serbia (2000), and Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004).1 Compared to earlier democratic breakthroughs and revolutions the number of participants in the Orange Revolution was not only greater (one in five of Ukrainians) but the Orange Revolution’s 17 day-long non-violent protests lasted far longer than elsewhere. In Serbia, a large number of protestors lasted for only a short period of time and set the parliament ablaze while in Georgia the number of protestors in Georgia were small in size and storded parliament during the protests. All transitions to democracy in Central Europe have followed mass protests, except in Hungary (Bunce, 2003, p. 172; McFaul, 2002), making them different to the elite-pacted transitions in the third wave of world democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Ukraine’s Orange revolution follows in the Central-Eastern European tradition of democratization following mass protests. Russia’s intervention in support of Yanukovich’s candidacy was unprecedented in any election outside Russia and did not take place in any other democratic breakthrough in the second wave (Kuzio, 2005).

This case study builds on Shulman’s (2005a) framework – written prior to the Orange Revolution – that defines two competing nationalisms in Ukraine: ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ and ‘eastern Slavic’. Shulman (2005a) concluded that ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ nationalism supports domestic reform and integration into Europe while ‘eastern Slavic’ nationalism is less supportive of reform and cooler towards Ukraine’s integration into the West. Shulman’s (2005a) framework for discussing nationalism can be applied to the ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ Viktor Yushchenko and ‘eastern Slavic’ Viktor Yanukovych, the two main presidential candidates who bitterly fought Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections. Hansen and Hesi conclude in a similar way to Shulman that of the three identities they find in Ukraine – ethnic, civic and hybrid – ethnic identity is the most supportive of democratic and market reforms. Hansen and Hesi (2009, p. 20) write that, ‘respondents with an ethnic identity tend to be more supportive of democracy and more likely to participate in elections than civic or atomized individuals’. The Orange Revolution, ‘reveals the mobilization potential of ethnic as well as hybrid identities’ (Hansen and Hesi, 2009, p. 21). Shulman and Hansen and Hesi therefore reach the same conclusion about the close correlation between ethnic identity and support for democratic and market economic reforms in Ukraine, supporting the presupposition that ethnic national identity is not always hostile to democracy.

Nationalism and democracy: theoretical reflections and path dependencies

Nationalism and civil society are not always mutually antagonistic. Civic nationalism and a defined national identity can generate the mobilization capacity for strong civil societies and democracies (Kuzio, 2007, pp. 83–176). Brubaker (2004, p. 121) believes that: ‘Patriotic communities can furnish the energy and passions that motivate and sustain civic engagement’. Nationalism has been described as a, ‘battery generating popular power for rapid mobilization’ (Nakano, 2004, p. 218; Shils, 1995; Canovan, 1996). Participation in social movements is motivated by injustice and moral outrage, collective identity and agency, as well as the confidence that sustained collective action will bring desired outcomes (Githens-Mazer, 2008, p. 45). Western Ukraine’s different history under the comparatively liberal Austrian–Hungarian Empire facilitated Ukrainian nation-building, political and civil society development, thereby providing the identity and agency that generated a more mobilized western Ukrainian civil society. Widespread corruption and the growth of parasitic oligarch elite during President Leonid Kuchma’s decade in office, topped by mass election fraud in 2004, provided the indignation that facilitated mobilization of mass protests in Ukraine. Greenfeld (2005, p. 329) writes that, ‘revolutions are a modern form of political action: at their root always lies nationalism’. Different nationalisms can lead to the establishment of democratic regimes or to the institutionalization of authoritarian systems. Support for democratization, coupled with elite rhetoric in support of ‘returning to Europe’, ‘can certainly be used as a mobilizer to facilitate the transition towards liberal democracy in the countries of Central Europe’ (Auer, 2000, p. 235).

Ethnic nationalism, as in Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, is most commonly associated with autocracies (Auer, 2000, p. 218). Other types of nationalisms, Soviet and great power-imperial, are to be found in the former USSR where they

1 The first group of democratic breakthroughs and revolutions took place in 1989–1991 in what has become known as the fourth wave of democratization. In some communist states, the collapse of communism in 1989–1991 did not lead to democratization as communist successor parties remained in power. These communist successor parties were removed in democratic breakthroughs and revolutions between 1996 and 2004 (Kuzio, 2008).
underpin authoritarian regimes which have a disinterest in ‘returning to Europe’. In Belarus, the dominant nationalism since Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s election in 1994 has been ‘Soviet’ (Leshchenko, 2004, 2008). After coming to power in Russia in 2000, Vladimir Putin promoted great power-imperial nationalism that integrated Soviet, Tsarist and Eurasian symbolism (Tsygankov, 2005).

The 1989 Romanian revolution began in Transylvania and the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring (known by its Ukrainian abbreviation Rukh) was born in western Ukraine from where the greatest number of participants in the Orange Revolution originated. Western Ukraine has a history of political activity and civil society stretching back to the mid-nineteenth century in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. political participation denied to eastern Ukrainians in the Tsarist Empire (Subtelny, 1995, p. 198; Kuzio, 1998). In the Tsarist Empire, the Ukrainian language was the only language to be banned by the imperial authorities in a government strategy to undermine Ukrainian nation-building. Roper and Fesnic (2003) linked greater support for democratization in western Ukraine and Transylvania to inherited path dependencies in Ukraine and Romania respectively. Transylvania is as different to the remainder of the Romanian provinces of Moldova and Wallachia as is Galicia to eastern Ukraine. Galicia and Transylvania are both largely Catholic and, ‘the Austrian–Hungarian legacy has left a lasting impression on these two regions’ (Roper and Fesnic, 2003, p. 123). Outside of Transylvania and Galicia, ethnic nationalists (in the Romanian case) and post-communist successor parties (in both countries) dominate political spectrums that are ambivalent in their support for democratization and integration into ‘Europe’ (Kuzio, 2008). Transylvania and Galicia are simultaneously both the most liberal and the most civic nationalist regions of Romania and Ukraine, Roper and Fesnic (2003) believe. The Party of Social Democracy (PSD), led for much of the post-communist era by former President Ion Illiescu, has little support in Transylvania while the Party of Regions has little support in western Ukraine. Party of Regions leader Yanukovych and former PSD leader Illiescu are unpopular in western Ukraine and Transylvania respectively.

Prizel (1999) concluded that Orthodoxy (in contrast to the Catholic Church, as most visibly demonstrated in Poland) has not supported post-communist democratization. While applicable to the Balkan post-communist states of Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia, as well as to Russia, Prizel’s conclusions are not applicable to Ukraine. In Romania, the Orthodox Church was co-opted by the national-communist regime, as in the USSR, and has been cool towards democratization and integration into ‘Europe’ (Stan and Turcescu, 2000). The Russian Orthodox Church is traditionally xenophobic, anti-Western, anti-Semitic and an ally of Russian great power-imperial nationalism and the country’s autocratic regime.

In contrast, religion has strengthened the link between nationalism and reform in Ukraine, as is evidenced by the support given by its two largest denominations – Greek-Catholic and Orthodox – to the Orange Revolution. That an overwhelming majority of Greek-Catholic voters in western Ukraine voted for Yushchenko in all three rounds of the 2004 elections is unsurprising as the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has historically been linked to Ukrainian civic and ethnic nationalism. Ukrainian Orthodoxy is different from most other Orthodox Churches in three ways. First, unlike Russian and Balkan Orthodox Churches, which were co-opted by national-communist regimes, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was suppressed in the late 1920s, two decades before the same fate befell the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Second, supporters of Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly see Russia as the ‘other’ and therefore support Ukraine’s integration into ‘Europe’ as a means of escaping Russian domination. This would, in turn, assist in establishing a Ukrainian Orthodox Church independent of the Moscow Patriarchate. Third, the geographic base and path dependency of Ukrainian Orthodoxy plays an important role in determining its pro-Western (and pro-Orange Revolution) orientation. In the USSR, two thirds of the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) were located in Ukraine with an over-preponderance of these parishes in central and western Ukraine, many of which were former Greek-Catholic parishes forcibly taken over by the ROC after the Greek-Catholic Church was abolished in 1946. In the post-Soviet era the more Sovietized eastern Ukraine continues to possess fewer religious parishes and believers than western and central Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Orthodoxy has a pro-Western orientation and a majority of its believers supported the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s candidacy. Ukraine’s two primary Orthodox churches, the pro-autocephalous Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox church, under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, are predominantly located in western and central Ukraine (not, as is customarily believed, in Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine) and consequently a majority of Ukraine’s Orthodox believers voted for Yushchenko in each of the three rounds of the 2004 elections. As shown in Table 1, an average of 50.36 percent of Orthodox believers voted for Yushchenko while an average of 37.83 percent voted for Yanukovych (Riazanova, 2005). Fifty one percent of Ukrainian Orthodox believers were ‘revolutionary enthusiast’ supporters of the Orange

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Round 1 (31 October)</th>
<th>Round 2 (21 November)</th>
<th>Round 2 (26 December)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viktor Yushchenko</td>
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<tr>
<td>31.3% Non-religious voters</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>43.5% Orthodox voters</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>89.2% Greek-Catholic voters</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viktor Yanukovych</td>
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<td>37.7%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
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Revolution (Buerkle et al., 2005). Therefore, a majority of both of Ukraine’s two largest religious denominations, Greek-Catholic and Orthodox, voted for the pro-Western candidate Yushchenko.

Western Ukraine has a longer tradition of civic than ethnic nationalism. From the second half of the nineteenth century through to the inter-war years, Ukrainian democratic parties and civil society participated in Austrian and Polish institutions. In inter-war Poland this civic nationalism competed with the growth of integral, ethnic nationalism of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – OUN. Underground armed resistance by nationalist partisans, Ukrainian Insurgent Army – UPA, in western Ukraine lasted until the early 1950s and after its demise these traditions were incorporated into the platforms and ideologies of dissident groups, such as the Ukrainian National Front active in the 1960s and 1970s, but restricted to western Ukraine. Democratic parties espousing civic nationalist, inclusive platforms re-emerged in the 1960s and were active through to the Mikhail Gorbachev era of the second half of the 1980s (Bilocerkowycz, 1988; Kuzio, 2000). It would be therefore incorrect to argue that Ukrainian nationalism evolved from an ethnic to a civic version as both have been present in western Ukraine since the 1930s. Ethnic nationalism had indeed dominated opposition activity in the 1930s and 1940s in western Ukraine, inside Poland. From the 1960s in Ukraine a civic, inclusive nationalism had re-established its dominance of Ukraine’s political groups that it had briefly lost three decades earlier. Western Ukraine therefore has a longer civic than ethnic nationalist tradition to draw upon. Integral, ethnic nationalism remains dominant in the Ukrainian Diaspora in the West where the OUN monopolizes politics.

Because of the higher levels of ethnic Ukrainian national consciousness to be found in western Ukraine, the Soviet authorities adopted different nationality policies in this region from those applied in western Belarus, two regions that were occupied by the USSR at the same time (Szporluk, 1979). The Soviet authorities immediately introduced Russification policies in western Belarus whereas in western Ukraine, nationality policies were less restrictive towards the Ukrainian language and culture. Galicia has historically experienced a higher level of civic society activity in the Soviet and post-Soviet era’s. In the USSR, Ukrainian political prisoners were the largest ethnic group in the Gulag camps proportionate to the republic’s population and the overwhelming majority of these Ukrainian political prisoners were from western and central Ukraine. Released from the Gulag in 1986 during Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost, Ukrainian political prisoners re-entered politics and established the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring (Rukh). In comparison, the more Sovietized and Russified eastern Ukraine produced few dissidents in the USSR. Rukh was launched as a popular front in Lviv in 1987 and spread to Kyiv and central Ukraine in the next two years, but never became popular in eastern Ukraine. In the December 1991 presidential elections, former communist ideological secretary Leonid Kravchuk defeated Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil by winning a majority of the vote in central, eastern and southern Ukraine restricting support for Chornovil to the western Ukrainian region of Galicia. Communist successor parties and leaders led Ukraine for the next thirteen years until the 2004 Orange Revolution.

Aberg (2000) uses Robert Putnam’s earlier research, particularly on the differences between northern and southern Italy, to analyze how weak social capital has negatively impacted on civil society with certain regions, imbued with clientele networks and lacking civic traditions. Trust is generated, Aberg believes, by regenerating social capital that facilitates civic engagement. Western Ukrainians have inherited greater social capital, higher political awareness and more trust, as seen in their willingness to petition officials, participate in protests and join NGO’s. Aberg found a large difference between social capital in Orange Lviv compared to anti-Orange Donetsk, with lower amounts in the latter. Ukrainian polls have found that Galicians exhibit a greater degree of optimism in the future, in contrast to the pervading cynicism and skepticism found in eastern Ukraine. This optimism was crucial in determining different attitudes to the two leading candidates, Yushchenko and Yanukovych in the 2004 elections. Then, only western-central Ukrainians believed that their candidate, Yushchenko, was honest, not corrupt and thereby morally superior to other candidates, particularly to Yanukovych. Yanukovych’s twice-criminal record did not flummox eastern Ukrainians to vote for him but permitted western and central Ukrainians to readily contrast their ‘honest’ candidate (Yushchenko) with the ‘criminal’ alternative (Yanukovych).

Over the previous decade opinion polls had shown that Ukrainians believed that ‘organized crime and the mafia’ were the most influential group in Ukrainian society, a view that grew from 33.9 percent in 1994, when Kuchma was first elected, to 40.2 percent in the 2004 elections (Panina, 2005). Many Ukrainians believed that the imposition of Yanukovych as the official candidate was confirmation that organized crime was undertaking the final stage of its take-over of Ukraine. A united opposition candidate with moral standing, such as Serbia’s 2000 Democratic Opposition of Serbia candidate Vojislav Kos-tunica and Yushchenko, are crucial for the success of democratic revolutions (McFaul, 2005). Both western and eastern Ukrainians believed the authorities would steal their vote but only the first group was ready to protest this theft. Eastern Ukrainians held to the common-place cynical view found in most post-communist societies that all politicians were corrupt and self interested, including their own candidate. Eastern Ukrainians were less disillusioned by Ukrainian politics during Kuchma’s decade in power; 18.1 and 17.5 percent of eastern and southern Ukrainians respectively maintained trust in the president as late as his last year in office in 2004 compared to only 9.2 and 14.3 percent of western and central Ukrainians (Bevzenko, 2005, p. 29).

Western Ukrainians have turned out in larger numbers in elections and have established a greater number of local branches of political parties. Lviv, Rivne, Trans-Carpathia and Poltava, four oblasts that supported the Orange Revolution, have produced the largest turnouts in Ukrainian elections. Of the seven Ukrainian cities with the greatest number of local branches of political parties, five are to be found in the western and central Ukrainian oblasts of Lviv, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytsky, Zhitomir, and Kyiv, all of which voted for Yushchenko (Ukrayinska Pravda February 13, 2007). Western Ukrainians are more interested in politics and are the best informed about Ukraine’s political and electoral system. A total of 32.6 percent of western Ukrainians – compared to only 22.3 percent of eastern Ukrainians – are informed about political parties. A total of 41.6 percent

of western Ukrainians were informed about the proportional system first used in the 2006 elections compared to only 19.1 percent of eastern Ukrainians (Ukrayinska Pravda November 25, 2005).

Political parties in western Ukraine have deeper historical roots, are more developed, and they emerged a decade earlier than those in eastern Ukraine. Centrist parties, that dominate eastern Ukraine, only emerged in the late 1990s; the Party of Regions was established as late as 2001. Deputies elected to local councils in western Ukraine are twice as likely to be from political parties than eastern Ukrainian deputies elected to local councils. A total of 7.4 and 8.7 percent of western and central Ukrainians respectively are members of political parties compared to only 4.3 and 5.4 percent of southern and eastern Ukrainians (Razumkov Centre, 2005, p. 19). Centrist parties often claim far higher membership figures than those claimed for national democratic parties, but this has never been translated into greater mobilization or a larger number of local party branches. Centrist, top-down party membership figures are likely to be inflated as many centrist parties have forcibly conscripted members at workplaces making their membership figures more virtual than real. This again weakens their ability to mobilize their members except through threats of losing employment, violence or through payment for participation in protests. Donetsk is the only Ukrainian region with the machine politics found in a ‘managed democracy’, such as Russia (Zimmer, 2005).

Western Ukraine has the highest civic activity of any Ukrainian region and the highest number of those who are ready to participate in civil society. NGO’s were most active in Lviv and Kyiv oblasts; Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and the Crimea also had a high number of NGO’s although these tended to be social, in contrast to the dominance of political and cultural NGO’s in western and central Ukraine (O’Loughlin and Bell, 1999). A total of 62 percent of Yushchenko voters – but only 35 percent of Yanukovych voters – believed in the importance of NGO’s for Ukraine (Buerkle et al., 2005). Prior to the 2004 elections, a greater number of western Ukrainians were ready to participate in protests. Prior to the Orange Revolution, 15.5 percent of western Ukrainians had either taken part in unlawful protests or were ready to do so compared to only 5.6 percent of eastern Ukrainians. Western and central Ukrainians were the most ready to participate in protests and the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies think tank (www.uceps.com.ua) concluded that, ‘the western region upholds its reputation as the most active and radicalised’ (Yakymenko, 2002).

Eastern Ukrainians supported stability over change while those who voted for Yushchenko opted for change in the 2004 elections. When asked to choose between maintaining stability and participating in protests only 18 percent of Yushchenko voters chose stability while three times as many (60 percent) Yanukovych voters supported stability (Bereshkina, 2005). The Kuchma regime claimed that it stood for civic peace and social stability that the opposition allegedly threatened; the allegation that Yushchenko’s election would lead to instability was a staple of the Kuchma regime’s propaganda during the 2004 elections. Sixty-four percent of those who voted for Yanukovych in the 2004 elections believed completely or somewhat that the purpose of the Orange Revolution protests was to create ‘chaos’ while only 9 percent of Yushchenko voters agreed with this proposition (Buerkle et al., 2005).

Two years prior to the Orange Revolution, 54 percent disagreed and 27 percent agreed with the authorities claim that opposition protests were a threat to Ukraine’s national security and could lead to civil war. It is highly likely that in the first group were opposition supporters and future participants in the Orange Revolution while in the second group were Yanukovych voters (Grytsenko, 2002). Opinion polls in the approach to the 2004 elections asked Ukrainians what potential presidential candidates stood for, change or the continuation of the status quo and stability. Ukrainians associated opposition presidential candidates Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and Oleksandr Moroz with change while pro-regime potential candidates were perceived as standing for the status quo (Yanukovych, Presidential Administration head Viktor Medvedchuk, and Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn). Russia under Putin has also emphasized social stability over democratization, change, and has received high popular support by delivering on stability and economic growth, at least until the onset of the global financial crisis in autumn 2008 (Whitmore, 2007).

In opposition during most of the Yushchenko era (2005–2010), Yanukovych as leader of the Party of Regions emphasized the importance of ‘stability’ (Ukrayinska Pravda November 23, 2007). The Party of Regions 2007 pre-term election program was entitled ‘Stability and Well Being’ and during the elections Yanukovych emphasized his party’s principles as the ‘renewal of justice and victory to those political forces that work for stability’ (Ukrayinska Pravda September 21, 2007). After being elected president in February 2010, Yanukovych continued to reiterate the importance of ‘stability’ as reflected in the ‘Stability and Reforms’ parliamentary coalition established to support him and the Nikolai Azarov government. The Party of Regions emphasis upon ‘stability draws on Yanukovych’s ‘eastern Slavic’ identity, as evidenced in the similar emphasis placed upon ‘stability’ in Belarus (Marple, 2007) and Russia (Kusov and Yaroshesvsky, 2007).

Nationalism and democratization: exploring the relationship in Ukraine

Of the four nationalisms described at the beginning of this article – civic, ethnic, Soviet and great power-imperial found in post-communist states – only the first two have the capacity to mobilize societies. In the late Soviet era a close correlation between support for nationalism and calls for democratization was found in the three Baltic republics, western Ukraine, Moldova and the three Trans-Caucasian republics. Regions of the USSR with weak civic nationalist mobilization also experienced weaker demands for democratization (Beissinger, 2002). This was particularly the case in Soviet republics where Soviet assimilation and Russification was highest, such as Belarus, eastern Ukraine and Russia. The Russian Diaspora in the USSR did not replicate the Serbian Diaspora in Yugoslavia by mobilizing through ethnic nationalism because Russian identity is grounded in territory, empire and the state, rather than – as in Serbia – in ethnicity (Kuzio, 2007). In the Russian SFSR, no
Republican-wide popular front was established in the late Soviet era and the republic did not declare independence from the USSR. Toltz (2001) developed a framework of five types of nationalism in Russia: imperial, Eurasian, racist, Russian-speaking and civic and found that civic nationalism was both a ‘novel’ idea in Russia and had minority support among Russian political and intellectual elite’s. Writing in the pre-Putin era of the 1990s, Toltz (2001) believed that the growth of support for civic nationalism in Russia was dependent on the success of democratization and market reform but if democratization was reversed she pointed to the likelihood that other forms of nationalism would gain ground in Russia. After Putin came to power in 2000, democratic regression has been accompanied by the installation of an authoritarian regime classified by Freedom House as ‘unfree’ (www.freedomhouse.org) coupled with the emergence of xenophobic, racist and ‘anti-Western nationalism’ (Dimitrov, 2009).

Eastern Ukrainians were largely passive in the late Soviet era, except for economically motivated miner’s strikes in 1989. Rukh and other national democratic political groups were unpopular in Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine and political parties with bases of support among Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians did not emerge until a decade later. The Communist Party, with its strongest base in eastern Ukraine, was banned between 1991 and 1993 and when re-legalized was a small shadow of its Soviet era size (100,000 members in 1993 compared with 3.5 million members in 1985) and without property that had been nationalized when the party was banned in August 1991. The Party of Regions, the most successful communist successor party to emerge in eastern Ukraine, was only established in 2001; earlier centrist communist successor parties, such as the People’s Democratic Party (known by its Ukrainian abbreviation NDP), had failed to gain widespread support. Centrist successor parties first participated in elections in 1998, eight years later than national democratic parties that had contested the March 1990 elections as the Democratic Bloc (Kuzio, 2000). Smith and Wilson (1997, p. 861) found that: ‘The key resource necessary for mobilization, a strong sense of communal boundedness, is more weakly developed than is often presumed, particularly, amongst the more fragmented Diaspora in the Donbas’ (see also Wilson, 1998). In the Crimea, the only Ukrainian region with an ethnic Russian majority, the far smaller Tatar minority has been more successful in mobilizing the Tatar population than Crimea Russian nationalists have accomplished in mobilizing ethnic Russians; nearly half of the peninsula’s Tatar population participated in the sixtieth anniversary of the deportation of Crimean Tatars in May 2004. Ethnic Russians in the Crimea hold cross-cutting Soviet, Crimean territorial and ethnic Russian identities, rather than exclusive ethnic Russian allegiances (as with the Serbian Diaspora), Densely populated eastern Ukraine, the industrial heartbeat of the country and base of support for the anti-Orange candidate Yanukovych, was unable to mobilize a counter-revolution against the Orange Revolution. Using Shulman’s (2005a) framework, ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ nationalism proved to be more adept at mobilizing Ukrainians than did ‘eastern Slavic nationalism’ (Arel, 1995; Wilson, 1997, 2000; Kuzio, 2002).

The largest group of political forces that supported anti-regime protests in Ukraine from the 2000–2001 Kuchmagate crisis to the 2004 Orange Revolution was collectively described as ‘national democrats’ who were divided over a multitude of centre-right parties that combined nationalist and democratic demands. A second political constituency of the anti-regime protests was the moderate left Socialist Party. National democrats have been the strongest supporters of democratization and opponents of authoritarianism in Ukraine (Solchanyk, 2001, p. 124). Prisiajniouk (1995) found that, ‘National identity contributes most to the formation of civil society’ in Ukraine. Of Ukraine’s political parties in the 1990s, Rukh is, ‘the most rooted in independent civil society’, Birch (2000, p. 1034) believed. Evidence provided by the Kuchmagate protests of the centrality of civic nationalism to mass protests and support for democratization in Ukraine led to a re-conceptualization of nationalism by Western scholars who began to increasingly stress the positive links between Ukrainian nationalism and support for democratization (Arel, 1995; Wilson, 1997). Arel (2001, p. 59) concluded that, ‘democratic, economic reforms and national identity in Ukraine are symbiotically linked’ (also Wilson, 2005, pp. 169, 177). In a later study of the link between nationalism and the Orange Revolution, Arel (2005) wrote that the road to democracy in Ukraine had become successful, ‘due to the strength of its nationalism’. Arel concluded that, ‘nationalism produced the Orange Revolution’ because civic society is stronger in Ukrainian regions with a more consolidated national identity and because ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ has a far clearer vision of its goals.

These new studies supported earlier findings (Shulman, 2005a; Hansen and Hesli, 2009). Shulman (2005a) found weaker support for liberal democracy within ‘eastern Slavic’ identity and believed that the stronger the ‘eastern Slavic’ identity the lower the support for democratic and market economic reforms. Hansen and Hesli (2009) found that Ukrainians with an atomized identity were least supportive of democracy and more inclined to support a return to the Soviet past. Ethnic Russians and proponents of ‘eastern Slavic’ nationalism in Ukraine were more inclined towards authoritarianism, a tendency reflected in support for communist successor parties (Kuzio, 2008), that is rooted in the patrimonial paternalism that

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2 Russia celebrates its ‘independence day’ based on the Russian SFSR declaration of sovereignty in June 1990. The Russian SFSR never followed the other 14 republics in declaring independence after the failure of the August 1991 hard-line coup d’état. Ukraine’s independence day is based on its 24 August 1991 declaration of independence – not on its July 1990 declaration of sovereignty.

3 The Kuchmagate crisis was sparked by the release of a tape recording in the Ukrainian parliament on November 28, 2000 made in President Leonid Kuchma’s office by Mykola Melnychenko, a rogue officer in the Directorate for State Protection (analogous to the U.S. Secret Service and a separate institution to the Security Service of Ukraine. It was established from the Soviet KGB’s 9th directorate that protected senior officials). The tape recording included fragments of conversations during which Kuchma ordered the Interior Minister to ‘deal’ with journalist Georgi Gongadze. Gongadze was kidnapped by police officers on September 16, 2000 and his decapitated body was found on November 3, 2000 near Kyiv. Melnychenko fled to the Czech Republic before the tape recording was made public and, following the collapse of anti-regime protests, was granted political asylum in April 2001 in the US.
pervades eastern Ukrainian regions such as Donetsk (Van Zon, 2005). Orange Revolution protestors have been contrasted with their opponents who looked nostalgically to a paternalistic Soviet past (Slivka, 2005).

Ukrainians who had supported the country’s independence from the USSR in 1991 – and continued to do so in the economic recession of the 1990s – also backed democratic and economic reforms. Birch (2000) found a link between Ukrainians who supported the private sector, democratization and Ukrainian independence. Over time, nation-building and the very existence of an independent state would therefore increase support for democratization by strengthening the proportional power of ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ identity (Shulman, 2005b) – a view confirmed by Ukrainian academic and political critics of ‘Ukrainianization’. ‘Ukrainianization’ and the ‘ethnic consolidation’ of the Ukrainian nation’ since Ukrainian independence, at the expense of downgrading Russian language and culture, had led to the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s victory, Ukrainian Russophone critics of ‘Ukrainianization’ believed (Pogrebinsky, 2005; Malynkovych, 1999, 2005). A survey conducted after the Orange Revolution found that 76–88 percent of ethnic Ukrainians but only 9–21 percent of ethnic Russians in Ukraine had been ‘Revolutionary Enthusiasts’ or ‘Revolutionary Agnostics’ supporters of the Orange Revolution (Buerkle et al., 2005). As Shulman (2005b) argued, support for nationalism (Ukrainian independence) and democratization went hand in hand with nation-building and had strengthened the pro-reform and pro-Western camp, that is ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ nationalism, in the post-Soviet era. In 1991 a Rukh candidate, Chornovil, had won in a province ruled by Poland for 500 years, while in 1994 a pro-Western candidate, Kravchuk, won in a province ruled by Poland for 300 years; finally, Yushchenko won in an area ruled by Poland for only 100 years (Ash and Snyder, 2005, p. 29). Ash and Snyder (2005) concluded that, ‘western Ukraine keeps expanding eastward’ (see election maps in Vasylchenko, 2005). In the late Soviet era, support for Ukrainian nationalism gradually moved from western to central Ukraine and came to, ‘dominate the agenda of public protest’ (Beissinger, 2002, p. 193). The swing central Ukrainian region voted for the ‘anti-nationalist’ candidate – Kuchma – in 1994 but then voted for the ‘nationalist’ candidate – Yushchenko – 10 years later.

Another factor central to nation-building, in addition to national integration, was territorial consolidation. In a celebrated article, Rustow (1970) had argued that successful democratization required a prior settlement of the national and state question (Roeder, 1999). In the first half of the 1990s, more time was spent discussing a new Ukrainian constitution, national symbols, cultural and language policies than democratic and human rights (Pigenko et al., 2002, p. 95). Ukraine was the last of the Soviet republics to adopt a new constitution in 1996. Ukraine completed the international recognition of its borders and a resolution of Crimean separatism in the second half of the 1990s (Kuzio, 2001; Roeder, 1999). Between 1997 and 1999 Russia recognized Ukraine’s borders. In other words, the consolidation of Ukrainian territory had taken up Kuchma’s entire first term in office. Russian President Borys Yeltsin visited Kyiv four years after the election of the ‘pro-Russian’ Kuchma in 1994 who had campaigned on an election platform claiming that he – unlike the ‘nationalist’ Kravchuk – could negotiate with Russia.

‘Ethnic Ukrainian’ and ‘eastern Slavic’ nationalisms both incorporated a range of tendencies. The former included centre-right and extreme right parties that have drawn on pre-Soviet legacies while the latter were successor parties to the Soviet-era Communist Party of Ukraine. ‘Ethnic Ukrainian’ nationalism incorporated national democratic parties that supported Yushchenko’s candidacy as well as extreme right ethnic nationalists who drew their inspiration from the inter-war ethnic nationalist OUN. Ethnic nationalists in Ukraine have always been electorally unpopular and therefore unable to provide a large reservoir of supporters who could defect to national democrats. Ethnic nationalist parties have been included in national democratic formations; the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), an outgrowth of the OUN, was a member of Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc in the 2002 and 2006 elections. Centre-right parties supported Ukraine’s integration into ‘Europe’ while the extreme right did not and were as anti-Western as they were anti-Russian.

‘Eastern Slavic’ nationalism incorporated communist successor parties that included a Soviet wing that appealed to supporters of the Communist Party and political forces traditionally defined as ‘centrist’, such as the Party of Regions. Both of these wings drew on the Russian-speaking population and were ‘pro-Russian’, although to varying degrees with pro-Russian being both ideological (as on the left) and pragmatic (with centrists). Speaking to the Party of Regions congress, Prime Minister Yanukovych said, ‘Russia was, is and will be for us a country tied to us by blood, history, religion and through spiritual values’ (Ukrayinska Pravda July 5, 2004). The extreme left and centrist spectrums within Ukraine’s ‘eastern Slavic’ nationalism have drawn support from one another. The collapse of the Communist Party vote after its peak in 2002, when it received 20 percent, to a low of five percent in the 2007 elections, was in large part attributable to Communist voters moving to the Party of Regions. Yanukovych’s 44 percent support in the December 2004 re-run second round of the elections was far higher than voter support given to the Party of Regions in the 2006 (32 percent) and 2007 parliamentary elections (34 percent). Communist Party leader Piotr Symonenko was pushed to fourth place in the 2004 presidential elections and the Communist Party came fifth and fourth respectively in the 2006 and 2007 elections. In Russia a similar tendency has been observed after Putin came to power when Communist voters defected to the Unified Russia party that he leads since 2008.

‘Eastern Slavic’ nationalism was stronger among eastern Ukrainians (especially in Donetsk and Luhans oblasts – Donbas) and Crimea, a majority of whom have defined their national identity as ‘Soviet’. In the 1990s, a majority of the inhabitants of the Crimea and Donetsk, two Party of Regions strongholds, exhibited Soviet (rather than Ukrainian or Russian) national identities, an identity that crossed ethnic allegiances. This Soviet identity has progressively declined but retains a large number of adherents in Donetsk and the Crimea. A quarter of Donetsk residents identify themselves as belonging to a Soviet cultural group. In Lviv, epicenter of support for the Orange Revolution, only 4 percent defined themselves as members of

\[4\text{ KUN refused to join the Our Ukraine-People’s Self Defense 2007 pre-term election bloc.}\]
a Soviet cultural group (Kipen and Pasko, 2006, p. 5). As Table 2 shows, ethnic Russians in Donetsk are more likely than ethnic Ukrainians to define themselves as culturally Soviet but nevertheless both ethnic groups can be found within adherents of Soviet culture. The Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (best known as the Razumkov Center) surveyed national identities (Soviet, Ukrainian, Russian) in Ukraine. The survey found that Donetsk had the highest Soviet identity of all Ukraine’s regions with 37.1 percent of the region identifying their ‘cultural traditions’ as Soviet (as well as 25.8 percent Ukrainian and 22.5 percent Russian). The Crimea came a close second with 32.2 percent declaring allegiance to a Soviet identity (and another 30 percent Russian and 19 percent Ukrainian). In contrast, Soviet cultural traditions in western Ukraine ranged from the maximum of 15.7 percent in Volyn in north-western Ukraine to a medium of 5.9 percent in Chernivtsi (Northern Bukovina) to only 0.3–1.5 percent in Galicia (Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona, no. 9, 2007). Soviet cultural identities in eastern-southern Ukraine and the Crimea have greater adherents than ethnic allegiances and cross-cut among ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians making it difficult to mobilize along ethnic lines. The dominance of Soviet over ethnic identities in Russified eastern-southern Ukraine helps to explain the comparative weakness of the link between national identity and civil society that exists in western-central Ukraine, the heartland of the Orange Revolution, and also vis-à-vis Serbia where ethnic identity proved to be stronger than Yugoslav identity. The reason is that Ukrainian and Serbian ethnic identities in western Ukraine and Serbia emerged before Soviet and Yugoslav identities, whereas Soviet identity emerged before, or at the same time, as ethnic identities emerged in Russified eastern-southern Ukraine and in Belarus.

One factor that accounted for the blending of Soviet and Russian identities in the USSR was the Soviet Union’s attitude to two other communist federations, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. In the USSR, the Russian SFSR did not have corresponding republican institutions until the 1990 election of Borys Yeltin as Russia’s president, whereas the Serbian and Czech republics possessed republican institutions separate of Yugoslav and Czechoslovak institutions. Peculiar among communist states, only the USSR merged the identities of the federal state and metroplex creating a blended Russian and Soviet identity among ethnic Russians.

**Civic nationalism and the Orange Revolution**

Civil society mobilization in the Orange Revolution proved possible due to the ‘strength of its nationalism’, Arel (2005) believes. Arel (2005) explains this statement by contrasting the clear-cut national identity found in western-central Ukraine with that of a more ambiguous and cross-cutting eastern Ukrainian identity. Arel (2005) emphasizes the importance of Galician protestors who, he believes, ‘were overrepresented in the backbone of the Maidan (Square).’ Without Galicia – he believes – there would have been ‘serious organizational problems’ in the Orange Revolution. Arel is correct to link civic nationalism and democracy in Ukraine but he overemphasizes Galicia’s role in the Orange Revolution and in doing so under-estimates the impact of the large number of participants from the capital city of Kyiv and central Ukraine. Kyiv was crucial to the Orange Revolution in providing logistics, finances, local political support and tolerance on the part of its inhabitants whose city centre was blocked for 17 days. Over the preceding decade of nation-building, central Ukraine had become more ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ in its identity and therefore more supportive of civic nationalism, as seen during the Orange Revolution and the success of the Orange Revolution. Kyiv has traditionally voted for pro-Western candidates, whether Kravchuk in 1994 or Yushchenko in 2004.

The Orange Revolution was both a ‘civic uprising’ and a ‘nationalist-democratic revolution’, Ukrainian sociologist Stepanenko (2005a) concluded. The synthesis of the idea of a democratic renewal of society and authorities coupled with the reaffirmation of political national interests were organically and effectively united in the mobilized ‘orange’ slogans (Stepanenko, 2005a). Stepanenko concluded that the Orange Revolution had combined nationalism and democracy: when Ukrainians were asked why they had participated in the Orange Revolution, 33.2 and 24.7 percent of western and central Ukrainians pointed to heightened national consciousness, as compared to only 9.1 percent of eastern Ukrainians (Stepanenko, 2005b). Yevhen Nyschuk, an Orange Revolution activist, described how Ukrainians who stood on the Maidan Square, ‘wanted to see Ukraine as Ukrainian, as opposed to how many wanted to see it as an appendage of Russia’ (Sedova, 2006). Pogrebinsky (2005, p. 113), a political technologist who worked for the Yanukovych election campaign, believed that the Orange Revolution mobilized large numbers of western Ukrainians because the fierce competition between the two leading candidates had been translated into a life and death struggle of the Ukrainian nation. Not surprisingly therefore, ‘These people were ready to pay any price for victory’ (Pogrebinsky, 2005, p. 113).

**Participation in the Orange Revolution**

The numbers of Ukrainians willing to participate in anti-regime protests dramatically grew during and following the Kuchmagate crisis. Two factors accounted for this. First, Ukraine’s return to economic growth in 2000 had removed the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Language use</th>
<th>Cultural group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian (58.4)</td>
<td>Ukrainian (10.1)</td>
<td>Russian (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian (35.2)</td>
<td>Russian (73.8)</td>
<td>Soviet (23.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (6.4)</td>
<td>Other (14.9)</td>
<td>Ukrainian (21.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other (16.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

central issue of survival from the concerns of most Ukrainians, one of the factors that had dampened civil society during the 1990s when Ukraine’s economy declined by 60 percent. Second, two social groups crucial to civil society protest had emerged: a generation of young people who had grown up with little recollection of communism and a small and medium business class that had outgrown the competitive authoritarian political system. Ukrainians, born when Gorbachev became Soviet leader in 1985, came of age two decades later in the Orange Revolution. Middle class Ukrainians looked to Yushchenko to rein in oligarchs and corrupt officials and to provide a level playing field for all businessmen. Kyiv was an important centre of Ukraine’s emerging middle class and small and medium business sectors.

The Yushchenko election team never pre-planned a strategy whereby millions of Ukrainians would participate in post-election protests. Protest meetings and election rallies leading up to the Orange Revolution had mobilized between 50 and 150,000 Ukrainians and the Yushchenko election campaign planned to increase these numbers to 200,000. The authorities believed that the size of opposition protests up to the 2004 elections were manageable and therefore would not halt the authorities plans to commit electoral fraud and install their candidate, Yanukovych, as president. Both the Yushchenko team and the authorities were therefore taken aback by the size of the protests, but for different reasons (Zhvannia, 2006). Stepanenko (2006) discussed why far larger numbers of Ukrainians had actually participated in the Orange Revolution. Some participated as ‘an emotional and psychologically popular protest’ against the authorities and the theft of their vote while others did so for a better future for their children. Another common refrain was that only a Yushchenko presidency would guarantee future free elections. Above all, Stepanenko (2006) found that participants were angry that the authorities were attempting to steal their vote as they were perceived to have stolen their money and the country’s assets in the previous decade.

Table 3 points to the factors behind the greater numbers than expected of Ukrainians participating in election protests that became known as the Orange Revolution. In the four years leading up to the Orange Revolution, protest potential remained concentrated in western and central Ukraine, a factor confirmed by pre and post-revolutionary surveys. These found that the number of Ukrainians who had participated in the Orange Revolution ranged between 18–22 percent of the population (Razumkov Centre, 2004). Bevzenko (2005) found that 18 percent of Ukrainians had directly participated in the Orange Revolution while an additional 5 percent had assisted it through the provision of finances, technology and foodstuffs. Of the total number of protestors in support of, and against the Orange Revolution, 89.9 percent were Yushchenko voters and only 6.4 percent Yanukovych supporters. Of the 18.4 percent of Ukrainians who had participated in protests and rallies, 15.4 percent were Yushchenko voters and only 3 percent were Yanukovych voters. A poll by the Institute for Sociological and Psychological Research found a higher 22 percent of Ukrainians (5.5 million or nearly 1 in 5 Ukrainians) who had participated in the Orange Revolution. The poll found that 34 percent of Yushchenko voters had participated in the Orange Revolution while only 9 percent of Yanukovych voters had taken part in counter-protests.

The dominance of protestors from Ukraine’s western and central regions in the Orange Revolution can be seen in Table 4. From western and central Ukraine 77.2 percent of the participants came to the Orange Revolution came and only 13 percent from eastern and southern Ukraine. Western and central Ukrainian voters were far ‘more energized’, as seen in Table 3 (Bereshkina, 2005). Western and central Ukrainians played a disproportionate role in the Orange Revolution, accounting for 35.5 and 30.1 percent respectively of the protestors (Wilson, 2005, p. 127). As Arel (2005) has pointed out, Galicia provided the largest number of protestors with 69 percent of Ivano-Frankivsk, 46 percent of Lviv and 35 percent of the residents of Ternopil oblasts respectively claiming to have participated in the Orange Revolution. Each western Ukrainian oblast was mobilized to provide a minimum of 100,000 protestors to which were added 200,000 residents of Kyiv and an unspecified number from Sumy oblast, Yushchenko’s home region in north eastern Ukraine (Guzhva et al., 2005).

| Table 3 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Attitude                  | Participated | Did not participate |
| Struggle of citizens to defend their rights | 64.3          | 25.3          |
| State coup supported by the west | 8             | 28.2          |
| State coup organized by the opposition | 7.7           | 13.7          |
| Protest by the population | 15.5          | 10.9          |
| Don't know                | 4.5           | 21.9          |


| Table 4 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Regional participation in the Orange Revolution (%) |
|              | West | Centre | South | East |
| Kyiv          | 8.9  | 9.3    | 0     | 1.2  |
| Locally       | 31.1 | 11.5   | 3     | 7.4  |
| Supply goods  | 13.9 | 5.8    | 1.9   | 1.2  |
| No participation | 51  | 76.7   | 95.6  | 90.6 |

Of the smaller number of Yanukovych protestors, 82 percent were from eastern Ukraine and, of these, the largest group (22 percent) was from the Party of Regions stronghold of Donetsk. Eastern Ukrainians and Yanukovych voters in general participated in smaller numbers for three reasons. First, surveys prior to the Orange Revolution had found that a greater number of Yushchenko voters were willing to protest. Forty-one percent of Yanukovych voters were unwilling to take part in any protests while only 17 percent of Yushchenko voters were politically apathetic. Second, a greater proportion of the older generation voted for Yanukovych, many of whom were former Communist Party supporters, and this reduced the numbers of anti-Orange supporters willing to protest in winter weather. Younger voters, mobilized by youth NGO’s such as Pora (Its Time) whose leaders had been trained by their Serbian (Otpor [Resistance]) and Georgian (Kmara [Enough]) equivalents, were far more energized by street protests and revealed at their involvement in ‘underground’ activities. Third, the Orange Revolution, as with other democratic revolutions, was facilitated by the large involvement of young people (see Table 5) who have been more willing to support pro-democracy and ‘return to Europe’ electoral platforms in post-communist Europe (Kuzio, 2006). Younger Yushchenko voters braved the winter weather through fortitude and the carnival atmosphere found on the Maidan that featured many of Ukraine’s best musicians in the world’s longest music festival (Klid, 2007).

Not all of the nearly 1 in 5 Ukrainians who participated in the Orange Revolution did so in Kyiv. Of the 20 percent who claimed to have participated, a quarter (4.8 percent) did so in Kyiv, or approximately 2.3 million people. A total of 40 percent of Kyiv residents participated in the Orange Revolution, or approximately 1 million out of a city’s population of 2.5 million, a figure which would dispute Arel’s (2005) claim that Galicians played a disproportionately large role in the Orange Revolution. Another one third of Kyivites were passive supporters. Only a quarter of Kyivites (23 percent) were opposed to the Orange Revolution (Ukrayinska Pravda November 25, 2005). Another survey found that nearly a third of the residents of the city of Kyiv (30 percent) had taken part in the Orange Revolution (Bereshkina, 2005). A total of 12.8 percent Ukrainians participated in numerous local protests outside Kyiv and 5.2 percent assisted these protests. The majority of Kyiv’s residents voted for Yushchenko in all three rounds of the 2004 elections (Stepanenko, 2005c). Yushchenko won between 62 and 78 percent of the vote in the three rounds of the 2004 elections in the city of Kyiv (all election results can be found at www.cvk.gov.ua).

Table 5
Participation of age groups in the Orange Revolution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>Up to 30</th>
<th>30–55</th>
<th>55+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participated in Kyiv</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated locally</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided aid</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not participated</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Conclusion

Western discussions of democratic breakthroughs and democratic revolutions in post-communist states have ignored the role of nationalism. This study, drawing on Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as a case study, has shown this to be conceptually mistaken. This study does not discount other factors, such as the seven outlined by McFaul (2005), as unimportant but instead, argues that democratic breakthroughs and democratic revolutions in post-communist states cannot be fully understood without nationalism included in the framework. One way to study democratic breakthroughs and democratic revolutions in post-communist states is to investigate them as clashes between different forms of nationalism and national identities. Pro-Western civic nationalism competed against anti-Western ethnic, pro-Russian and pan-Slavic nationalism. Nevertheless, the victory of pro-Western civic nationalism did not necessarily remove competing nationalisms, as seen in the resilience of anti-Western nationalism in Serbia and Ukraine. In other post-communist states, such as Belarus and Russia, anti-Western nationalism has proven to be more popular than pro-Western civic nationalisms (Leshchenko, 2004, 2008; Tsygankov, 2005).

This article has demonstrated that nationalism per se is not negatively disposed towards democracy and that civic nationalism has positively influenced democratization in post-communist states, such as Ukraine. Civic Ukrainian nationalism was the driving force behind mobilization for Ukrainian independence from the USSR in the late Soviet era and became a bastion of support for democratic reform in independent Ukraine (Kuzio, 2000, 2002; Shulman, 2005a: Arel, 2005). In Ukraine, national democratic political forces that were the backbone of anti-regime protests and the Orange Revolution, have been the strongest supporters of democratization, the greatest opponents of authoritarianism and the strongest proponents of a foreign policy of ‘returning to Europe’. Over the course of two decades of independence, nation and state building in Ukraine has strengthened the national democratic, and thereby Orange Revolution, political camp by increasing the proportion of Ukrainians holding an ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ identity, enabling the candidate espousing this identity – Yushchenko – to win the 2004 elections (Kasianov, 1998; Shulman, 2005a). ‘Eastern Slavic’ nationalism in Ukraine has remained passive at two crucial junctures in contemporary Ukraine’s history: the drive to independence in the late Soviet era and during anti-regime protests and the Orange Revolution during Kuchma’s second term in office. ‘Eastern Slavic’ nationalism, grounded in a preference for stability over change, and ensconced in the paternalistic political culture of...
eastern Ukraine, has reacted to, rather than initiated or supported, protests and democratic breakthroughs in Ukraine from the late 1980s to the 2004 Orange Revolution (Zon, 2005).

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