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The Journal of Slavic Military Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fslv20>

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Version of record first published: 21 Nov 2012.

To cite this article: Taras Kuzio (2012): Russianization of Ukrainian National Security Policy under Viktor Yanukovych, *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 25:4, 558-581

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2012.730372>

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Russianization of Ukrainian National Security Policy under Viktor Yanukovich

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Since Viktor Yanukovich's election in 2010, Ukraine's politics and national security policies have become increasingly similar to those in Russia under Vladimir Putin. The influence of the siloviki in Ukraine is at its greatest, parliament is marginalized for the first time and the country's democratization is under threat. These policies are a product of the authoritarian neo-Soviet political culture in the Party of Regions and unreformed siloviki, such as the Security Service (SBU), and with the goal of preventing a second Orange Revolution. Ukraine is also different from Russia in terms of the inability of the ruling party to use nationalism, weak national resources and regional diversity.

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INTRODUCTION

Since Viktor Yanukovich's election in 2010, Ukraine's politics and national security policies have become increasingly similar to those in Russia under Vladimir Putin. The influence of the *siloviki* in Ukraine is at its greatest, parliament is marginalized for the first time, and the country's democratization is under threat. These policies are a product of the authoritarian neo-Soviet political culture in the Party of Regions and unreformed *siloviki*, such as the Security Service (SBU), and with the goal of preventing a second Orange Revolution. Ukraine is also different to Russia in terms of the inability of the ruling party to use nationalism, weak national resources, and regional diversity.

Viktor Yanukovich, elected Ukraine's fourth president in February 2010, has adopted a foreign and security policy that is heavily influenced by Russia which is leading to the 'Putinization' of Ukraine's security forces and national security policy. Russia's demands for the correct set of policies to be pursued by the next Ukrainian President were outlined in President Dmitri Medvedev's August 2009 open letter to President Viktor Yushchenko, the majority of which have been fulfilled by President Yanukovich.¹ Medvedev's open letter demanded changes in domestic policies on national identity, and in the realm of foreign and security policy which is discussed below.

Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, now Foreign Minister, told US Ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor that Russia's leaders seek a 'regency' in Ukraine; that is, someone in power who is totally subservient to Moscow. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 'hated' President Yushchenko and even has a low regard for Yanukovich.² This confirmed Putin's disrespect for Ukraine as a sovereign state in a speech he made in April 2008 to the NATO-Russia Council in Bucharest. 'Well, you understand, George (Bush), Ukraine isn't even a state,' Putin said, arguing, 'The country obtained from Russia vast territories in what is now eastern and southern Ukraine.' Putin went further: 'Ukraine is home to as many as 17 million ethnic Russians. Who will dare to claim that we don't have any interests there? Southern Ukraine is entirely populated with ethnic Russians.'³ Putin confused Russophones (compatriots) with ethnic Russians, thereby doubling the number of 'Russians' allegedly living in Ukraine exaggerating the

¹ <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/5158> (accessed 31 March 2010).

² Peter Byrne, 'Putin shows no respect for Yanukovich, U.S. cable says,' *Kyiv Post*, 11 March 2011. Russian opposition leader Borys Nemtsov said that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 'believes all Ukrainians are banderites (followers of Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalist leader Stepan Bandera).' Interview with Nemtsov in UNIAN, 24 January 2011.

³ Vladimir Putin's speech was leaked by a diplomat who was present at the NATO-Russia Council and parts of it were published as 'To shcho zh skazav Volodymyr Putin u Bukharesti,' *Dzerkalo Tyzhnnya*, 19 April 2008.

need for Russia to exert influence on Ukraine to remain within its sphere of influence. The 2001 Ukrainian census recorded 8.3 million Russians living in Ukraine (or 17.3 percent of the population) and the only region with an ethnic Russian majority is the Crimean autonomous republic where Russians constitute 58 percent of the peninsula's population.

This article is divided into three parts. The first discusses the power and influence of the *siloviki* in Russia and Ukraine. The second section surveys the 'Putinization' of Ukraine's political system in three areas, the rise of The Family, SBU's anti-democratic policies and marginalization of parliament into a rubber-stamp institution. The third section analyzes the 'Putinization' of Ukrainian national security policies and the relationship of these policies to the erosion of democracy in Ukraine.

SILOVIKI IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Since Vladimir Putin first came to power in March 2000, Western and Russian scholars and analysts have debated the growth of influence of the *siloviki* in the state and government. The size of the numerous competing branches of the Russian security forces is massive by Western standards and a legacy of what has been inherited from a superpower, the USSR. Bettina Renz lists ten Russian security forces with a total uniformed strength of 2.5 million with the largest forces the military (1 million), Interior Ministry (650,000), and Federal Security Service (FSB) (350,000).⁴ These huge numbers of personnel in uniform are a reflection of the highly militarized nature of the Soviet system and have no analogy in a democratic state with the rule of law.

Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White found that by the end of Putin's first term in 2004 every fourth member of the Russian elite had a military or security background.⁵ By the end of that decade the proportion of *siloviki* had more than doubled in the state and government apparatus and had taken a commanding control of Russian state. The ascent of Putin was tied to the widely popular feeling of the need for 'stability' following 15 years of instability, conflict, and transition under Soviet and Russian leaders Mikhail Gorbachev and Borys Yeltsin in 1985–1999. The *siloviki* under Putin 'became, in effect, the basis of public order for the new regime.'⁶ The *siloviki* in Putin's team were characterized by a smaller number of intellectuals and lower education, greater predominance of men and provincial roots.

⁴ Bettina Renz, 'The *Siloviki* in Russian Politics: Political Strategy or a Product of the System?' *Russian Analytical Digest* 17 (20 March 2007).

⁵ Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, 'Putin's Militocracy,' *Post-Soviet Affairs* 19 (December 2003), p. 289. For a different interpretation see B. Renz, 'Putin's Militocracy? An Alternative Interpretation of Siloviki in Contemporary Russian Politics,' *Europe-Asia Studies* 58 (August 2006), pp. 903–924.

⁶ Kryshtanovskaya and White, p. 291.

Ukraine under Yanukovich has all four of these attributes. He came to power in February 2010 on a wave of hankering for 'stability' following years of instability under President Viktor Yushchenko that grew out of a hastily reformed constitution and parliamentary system and his personal conflict with Yulia Tymoshenko. 'Stability' has been a long-time important political slogan for Yanukovich and the Party of Regions. The Party of Regions 2006 election program prioritized 'stability, well-being, and development perspectives' and after becoming Prime Minister he promised he would install 'order' in the country. Yanukovich said on ICTV channel in the second round of the 2010 elections that, 'democracy in the first instance is order.' Ukraine's Ambassador to Belarus Viktor Tykhonov has praised 'stability' in Belarus and President Yanukovich's parliamentary coalitions have been called Stability and Well Being (2006–2007) and Stability and Reforms (2010–2012). The Nikolai Azarov government is the first of 14 since 1991 that did not include a single woman and both Yanukovich and Azarov have made sexist remarks about women and Tymoshenko. Yanukovich, although he has a PhD in Economics he received when Donetsk Governor in 1997–2002, has little education and his provincialism, two terms in prison and lower social roots make him very different to Leonid Kuchma who as Director of *Yuzhmash (Pivdenmash)* military-industrial plant belonged to the Soviet *nomenklatura* elite. Until the formation of the Party of Regions in 2001 and Yanukovich's appointment as prime minister the following year the Donetsk clan had largely stayed out of central politics. Today, the Party of Regions, like Unified Russia, is Ukraine and Russia's most powerful political machine.⁷

Since 2010, Ukraine has also witnessed a gradual assertion of the influence of the *siloviki* within the state and government apparatuses. In September 2010, the Constitutional Court annulled constitutional reforms adopted in December 2004 and returned Ukraine to the 1996 presidential constitution. A new law on the Cabinet of Ministers strengthened presidential powers further transforming the semi-presidential system in the 1996 constitution into a fully presidential system. The president controls all the *siloviki* and their appointees remain loyal to himself and 'The Family,' the term used to describe the growing Yanukovich home town clan. The Russian Security Council has played a central role in consolidating an authoritarian state in Russia. 'The 'presidential government' by this time incorporated not only the 'military' section of the cabinet of ministers, but also the Security Council — a collective organ that was headed personally by the president.'⁸ In February 2012, the appointment of Andriy Kluyev as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (RNBO) confirms the trend towards the growing

⁷ See Serhiy Kudelia and Taras Kuzio, 'Organizing for Dominance: Explaining the Dynamics of Party-Building in Post-Orange Ukraine,' Forthcoming.

⁸ Kryshchanovskaya and White, p. 296.

influence of the *siloviki*.⁹ The Russian Security Council has become ‘in number and composition,’ Kryshatanovskaya and White write, ‘a reasonably close approximation of the Politburo of the Soviet period.’¹⁰ Kluyev, a close business ally of Yanukovych since his period as Donetsk Governor, was head of Yanukovych’s shadow (i.e., unofficial) election campaign in 2004 that played a central role in election fraud and violence.

The RNBO under Kluyev is in effect the legalization of his role as head of shadow election campaigns he has run since 2004 for Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. In Russia and Ukraine personalized rule and loyalty to an over-powerful president replicate the Soviet political system with an institutionalized hierarchy of power embodied in the *nomenklatura*, Politburo, and General Secretary.¹¹ The Soviet Politburo, like the Russian Security Council and RNBO, had a strict internal hierarchy with a two tier structure.¹² In Russia the FSB took on many of the forms of the Soviet KGB and, following Yanukovych’s election, the SBU also resumed the role of the ‘sword and shield’ of the Ukrainian state; that is the president.

Another important component of Russia’s and Ukraine’s militocracies is the close association of the political and business worlds. This association was never broken under President Yanukovych and has grown since 2000 with the influence of big business upon politics and because all Ukrainian political forces are financed by big business. Yeltsin, Kuchma and Yushchenko permitted big business to finance opposition and pro-regime political forces and often they support both sides. Under Putin and Yanukovych this system changed with both leaders demanding big business halt its support for the opposition. Oligarchs and businessmen became the first to defect from the opposition to the 2010–2012 Stability and Reforms coalition in the Ukrainian parliament.

But there have also been three important differences between Russia and Ukraine. Firstly, Putin removed oligarch control over Russian television whereas in Ukraine they continue to control Ukraine’s main channels. Secondly, at a July 2000 meeting between President Putin and Russian oligarchs he laid out radical new rules of the game for their relationship to the state. Oligarch Khodorokovsky told the BBC after the meeting, ‘Political uncertainty has left business-persons feeling at risk until this meeting. We didn’t know what they wanted from us.’ He added, ‘Now, we know the rules of the game.’

Thirdly, Putin warned the oligarchs, ‘If you chose business, please stick to business.’¹³ Most Russian oligarchs accepted the new terms and most of those who did not fled abroad. The result has been, ‘The Kremlin has

⁹ <http://www.president.gov.ua/news/22947.html> (accessed 10 June 2010).

¹⁰ Kryshatanovskaya and White, p. 297.

¹¹ Kryshatanovskaya and White, p. 297.

¹² Kryshatanovskaya and White, p. 298.

¹³ ‘Putin, Russia and the West 1: Taking Control.’ BBC, 20 January 2012.

established control over Russia's oligarchs, reducing once-mighty Rottweiler's to shivering Chihuahuas and transforming supposedly private companies into organs of the state. The brutal persecution and imprisonment of Khodorkovsky helped to instill obedience, and periodically the state waves a bloody stick at the oligarchs to keep them in their place. 'They dutifully pick up the tab for public works (such as the 2014 Winter Olympics) and keep out of politics.'¹⁴ Yushchenko and Yanukovich never removed oligarch control over television and have not demanded they stay out of politics.

In Ukraine, the election of Yanukovich permitted oligarchs to capture the state. In Russia, Putin had set out a new relationship between the state and oligarchs a decade before Yanukovich became Ukrainian president. More importantly, Putin would have never permitted one private individual to control a quarter of Russia's GDP, in the same manner as Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov controls a quarter of Ukraine's economy. At the same time, Yanukovich remains in the early period of his presidency and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that 'The Family' could move towards more Putin-style authoritarian policies towards oligarchs.¹⁵

A major difference between Ukraine and Russia and Belarus is Ukraine's regional diversity. Putin and Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Russia and Belarus have maintained high levels of public support through manipulating Russian great power and Soviet nationalism respectfully. This is buttressed by high standards of living in Russia from high prices for oil and gas and in Belarus from Russian subsidies. The Party of Regions has always been mobilized as an 'anti-nationalist' political force that protects Russophone voters from orange and radical nationalist forces in western Ukraine.¹⁶ The Party of Regions has drawn on some aspects of Soviet nationalism in its discourse and election rhetoric but this has limited value in Ukraine.¹⁷ Paul D'Anieri has written that Ukraine's regional and linguistic diversity would make it difficult to construct a Russian or Belarusian style authoritarian regime when at least half the country is opposed to you.¹⁸ In Russia, Slavophilism and Russian patriotism coupled with an acceptance of the market economy has underpinned Putin and Unified Russia.¹⁹ In Belarus,

¹⁴ 'State Capitalism Is not All the Same,' *The Economist*, 21 January 2012. <http://www.economist.com/node/21542924> (accessed 21 January 2012).

¹⁵ T. Kuzio, 'Ukraine's Business Class and Viktor Yanukovich,' *UPI*, June 1, 2012. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2012/06/01/Outside-View-Ukraines-business-class-and-Viktor-Yanukovich/UPI-93421338546600/ (accessed 1 June 2012).

¹⁶ See T. Kuzio, 'Ukrainian Nationalism again under Attack in Ukraine,' *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 (19 July 2010) and 'Ukrainian Education Minister Tabachnyk Confirms His Russian Nationalist Credentials,' *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 (1 October 2010).

¹⁷ See T. Kuzio, 'Yanukovich Relies on Soviet Nationalism to Stay in Power,' *RFERL Commentary*, 7 June 2011 and 'Russian, Soviet Nationalism Is the Biggest Threat to Democracy, Ethnic Stability in Ukraine,' *Kyiv Post*, 30 January 2012.

¹⁸ Paul D'Anieri, 'Ethnic Tensions and State Strategies: Understanding the Survival of the Ukrainian State,' *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 23 (March 2007), pp. 4–29.

¹⁹ Kryshstanovskaya and White, p. 303.

Lukashenka cultivated Soviet Belarusian patriotism with his antagonism toward the market economy.²⁰

More importantly, Ukraine does not possess Russian natural resources and cannot expect to receive the same level of subsidies as Belarus. Ukraine is too big for Russia to subsidize and Ukrainian elites would balk at the kind of concessions given by Lukashenka to Russia such as transferring gas pipelines to a Russian-led consortium. Putin and Yanukovych are more similar in the eclectic nature of their leftist and rightist ideologies, merging Soviet-style social paternalism that provides support to Unified Russia and the Party of Regions from former Communist Party voters.²¹ The Party of Regions has gone one step further than Unified Russia in drawing the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) into three parliamentary coalitions (2001, when they jointly voted no confidence in the Yushchenko government, 2006–2007 and since 2010).

‘PUTINIZATION’ OF UKRAINE’S POLITICAL SYSTEM

All Power to the Family

Yanukovych has become independent of the Donetsk oligarch allies whose patron he had been while Donetsk was governor from 1997 to 2002. The first stage took place as opposition leader in 2006–2007 when he aligned himself with the ‘gas lobby’ that ran Eural-Trans Gas (2002–2004) and RosUkrEnergO ([RUE] 2004–2008) gas intermediaries. Since 2010, the Family has given him additional independence from Donetsk clan. The capital assets of ‘The Family’ are estimated to be \$130 million and 64th in Ukraine’s 100 wealthiest and in 2011, Oleksandr Yanukovych, entered for the first time the ranks of the top 100 wealthiest Ukrainians.

The Family are loyal to the president and come from Yanukovych’s home region of Donetsk. ‘They are all far from politics and owe their advancement only to the president,’ according to *Segodnya* (8 November 2011). ‘The president is establishing his power base upon people who are equally distant from business groups. The times are changing,’ *Segodnya* added (8 November 2011). The Family’s *Grey Cardinals* are Party of Regions deputies Oleksandr Yanukovych, and Yuriy Ivaniushchenko, who ‘is a key player in the ‘family group.’²²

The gas lobby and The Family are now in the commanding heights of the Yanukovych administration. The leadership of the presidential administration is divided between the head Serhiy Levochkin (‘gas lobby’) and

²⁰ See Natalia Leshchenko, ‘A Fine Instrument: Two Nation Building Strategies in Post-Soviet Belarus,’ *Nations and Nationalism* 10 (September 2004), pp. 333–352 and ‘The National Ideology and the Basis of the Lukashenka Regime in Belarus,’ *Europe-Asia Studies* 60 (December 2008), pp. 1419–142.

²¹ Kryshchanovskaya and White, p. 303.

²² *Korrespondent*, 11 November 2011.

deputy head Stanislav Skubashevskiy ('The Family'). Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, Chairman of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) in 2010–2012 and now First Deputy Prime Minister, is an influential figure who, together with the gas lobby's Dmitri Firtash, owns Inter, Ukraine's most influential television channel. Ivaniushchenko has been dogged by allegations of 'a criminal past.'²³ The main allegations, 'link him to an organized crime group allegedly involved in the assassination of Akhat Bragin, a close associate of Ukraine's richest man Rinat Akhmetov' and 'the 2005 assassination of Anatoly Bandura, the head of Mariupol-based Azov Shipping Company.'²⁴

The Family controls all the *siloviki*. Yanukovych is Godfather to his son, Party of Regions deputy Artem Pshonka, son of Prosecutor-General Viktor Pshonka. The prosecutor-general's office has become an arm of political repression and selective use of justice. Crimean Prime Minister Anatoliy Mogiliov, former Minister of Interior, replaced another cadre from Donetsk, Vasyliy Dzartyy, following the latter's death. Both are from Yanukovych's home town of Yenakiyev where Dzhartyy had been mayor when Mogiliov was head of the city's Interior Ministry. Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko, who replaced Mogiliov, is a member of The Family. In February 2012, the appointment of Igor Kalinin, until recently a Russian citizen, as SBU Chairman transformed the SBU into Yanukovych's personal guard, focused on protecting the president.²⁵ Minister of Defence Dmitri Salamatin, a Russian citizen until 2005, is also a member of The Family.

The Family has taken control of financial flows to the Ukrainian state. These include head of the State Tax Administration (DPI) Oleksandr Klymenko, the head of Kyiv's DPI Iryna Nosachova and Chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine Sergei Arbuzov. Party of Regions members represent 90 percent of regional governors, including in Lviv where a member of The Family, Mikhail Kostyuk, was appointed as governor. Ukraine is evolving from an oligarchic system under Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Yushchenko toward Russian-style state capitalism and militocracy based on the *siloviki*.

The SBU versus Democracy

The SBU's domestic political role has remained in place from its KGB past because of a Soviet political culture that was never rooted out, a lack of democratic oversight, and an over-staffed agency that is primarily focused on domestic 'threats.' The SBU's 30,000 personnel is five times greater than the combined 6,000 personnel in Britain's MI5 domestic and MI6 (Special Intelligence Service [SIS]) foreign intelligence services. A final factor is the

²³ *Kyiv Post*, 29 April 2011.

²⁴ *Kyiv Post*, 29 April 2011.

²⁵ Ukrainian analyst Vadym Karasyov quoted in *Korrespondent*, 3 February 2012.

temptation of Ukrainian presidents to use the SBU against their political and business opponents. Under Yanukovych the SBU has increased its surveillance of politicians, journalists, and civil society activists, a policy inherited from the KGB that the SBU has never fully relinquished.

The SBU had a controversial history in this sphere under President Kuchma. In 2004, General Valeriy Kravchenko, the SBU officer in the Ukrainian embassy in Germany, publicly accused his agency of spying on opposition politicians at home and when they travelled abroad. Although the SBU's investigation of Yushchenko's 2004 poisoning has been inconclusive, the agency has been accused of wire-tapping a wide range of prominent political figures in association with the case. In summer 2008, the SBU and presidential secretariat submitted a 350-page dossier on Prime Minister Tymoshenko's alleged 'treason' to the Prosecutor-General's office. The 'Razumkov' Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies pointed out that the misuse of the SBU in political games by politicians has, 'negatively influenced the effective activity of this organ and undermines social trust in it.'²⁶

The SBU Alpha unit was used in a highly controversial March 2009 raid on *Naftobaz Ukrainy* state gas company which falls under the government's jurisdiction. The raid was ordered by SBU First Deputy Chairman Khoroshkovskyy who has business ties to the opaque gas intermediary RUE. The Tymoshenko government had confiscated gas from RUE following the January 2009 gas agreement signed by Prime Ministers Tymoshenko and Vladimir Putin that had removed RUE from the bilateral gas relationship. The relationship between former SBU Chairman Valentyn Nalyvaychenko and former SBU First Deputy Chairman Khoroshkovskyy has remained close, as seen by Nalyvaychenko supporting the arrests of some members of the 2007–2010 Tymoshenko government. Nalyvaychenko supported Khoroshkovskyy's appointment to the position of SBU Chairman in March 2011 as the best person for the position.²⁷ Our Ukraine is reportedly funded by Khoroshkovskyy through National Bank of Ukraine Chairman Sergei Arbutov who is a member of The Family.²⁸

SBU policies revive Soviet KGB and current Russian FSB policies in line with the authoritarian culture of the Party of Regions, and directed towards maintaining the current administration in power by pre-empting and preventing a second Orange Revolution. In December 2011, amendments to the law

²⁶ 'Politychna korupciya v Ukraini: Subjekty, Proyavy, Problemy Protydii,' *Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona* 7 (2009) p. 32.

²⁷ In two interviews with Our Ukraine leader Nalyvaychenko he praises Khoroshkovskyy as a candidate for the position of SBU Chairman. *Levyi Bereg*, 16 February 2011 and *Komentarii*, 5 March 2010. http://lb.ua/news/2009/10/07/10327_valentin_nalivaychenko_spodivayu.html; (accessed 21 May 2011). <http://gazeta.comments.ua/?art=1267723120>. (accessed 21 May 2011).

²⁸ The information on Arbutov is found in *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 2 February 2011. Information on Khoroshkovskyy comes from a private source who wishes to remain anonymous in Kyiv.

'On the Armed Forces of Ukraine' 'expanded the possibilities of using the armed forces in peacetime' if called upon to 'counter terrorist attacks'²⁹ and restore constitutional order.³⁰ In the same month, the SBU's powers were expanded to investigate 'mass riots' and a new department on 'Information Security' were established. In May 2012, a presidential decree 'On steps towards intensifying the struggle against terrorism in Ukraine,' which came less than a month after ten bombs exploded in Dnipropetrovsk,³¹ included 'extremism' alongside terrorism, signaling the likelihood that mass protests would come under the legal definition of 'extremism.'³² Additional powers given to the military, SBU, and MVS, and The Family's control over the *siloviki* and imprisonment of Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko, are elements of the authorities operation 'Stop Orange Revolution-2'³³ (see Table 1).

Intervention in the media, and especially television, has made them more tightly controlled by oligarchs on private channels and by the authorities on state television. Censorship and the slanting of news portrays the opposition in a negative light while at the same time allocating overwhelming space to positive reports about the authorities. Former SBU Chairman and oligarch Khoroshkovskyy and business partner Firtash control Ukraine's most popular television channel, Inter.³⁵ Khoroshkovskyy is a member of the gas lobby that is influential within the Party of Regions and Yanukovych administration.³⁶ Intrusion into the media has included threats to domestic and foreign journalists.

Western foundations based in Ukraine, such as the Soros Renaissance Foundation, are targeted by the SBU.³⁷ An SBU spokesperson claimed the investigations aimed to find out if Ukrainian political parties were receiving funding for the October 2010 local elections. Nico Lange, who has been Ukraine director of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung since 2007, a foundation

²⁹ In Ukraine and Eurasia 'terrorists' and 'extremists' are often terms inter-changeably used in Ukraine and Russia. T. Kuzio, 'Ukrainian Officials Increasingly Denounce Opposition as 'Extremists' and 'Terrorists,' *Eurasian Daily Monitor* 1 96 (30 September 2004).

³⁰ Ukrainian analyst Viktor Chumak quoted in *Delo*, 10 February 2012.

³¹ T. Kuzio, 'Terrorist Bombings in Ukraine Resolved, but Are Likely to Continue to Grow,' *Jamestown Foundation blog*, 5 June 2012.

³² Decree 388/2012. On the decision of the Council on National Security and Defence of 25 May 2012 'On steps towards strengthening steps in the struggle against terrorism in Ukraine.' <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/14822.html> (accessed 1 June 2012).

³³ Deputy Prime Minister Borys Kolesnykov warned the Yanukovych administration would never permit a repeat of the Orange Revolution. <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1356788-nachinaetsya-serial-lyubi-druzi-2-kolesnikov-zayavil-chto-vlast-ne-dopustit-povtoreniya-sobytij-2004-go> (accessed 5 June 2012).

³⁴ In Ukraine and Eurasia 'terrorists' and 'extremists' are often terms inter-changeably used in Ukraine and Russia. T. Kuzio, 'Ukrainian Officials Increasingly Denounce Opposition as 'Extremists' and 'Terrorists,' *Eurasian Daily Monitor* 1 (30 September 2004).

³⁵ Pavel Korduban, 'WikiLeaks Confirms Role Played by Firtash in Ukrainian Politics,' *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 (8 December 2010).

³⁶ See T. Kuzio, 'Gas Lobby Runs Yanukovych Administration,' *Kyiv Post*, 19 July 2010.

³⁷ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 7 September 2010.

TABLE 1 Operation Stop Orange Revolution-2

Policy	Target
Deal with Orange Opponents	Revolutionaries Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko imprisoned. Arseniy Yatseniuk and Vitaliy Klichko are less of a threat because they are constructive oppositionists - not revolutionaries Buy off Viktor Yushchenko.
Subdue Elites	Those who betrayed Yanukovich in 2004 are threatened with criminal charges (Leonid Kuchma, Volodymyr Lytvyn) or co-opted (Sergei Tigipko). Imprisonment of Tymoshenko, like Mikhail Khoroshkovskyy in Russia, sends a signal to political and big business elites.
Destroy Funding and End Level Playing Field	Western foundations are under surveillance. Big business are no longer permitted to finance the opposition
Boost and Control <i>Siloviki</i>	SBU, Interior Ministry and military given additional powers to deal with unrest. <i>Siloviki</i> taken under the control of The Family, and its heads are personally loyal to President Yanukovich.
Provide Legal Cover	Legislation approved on combatting terrorism and extremism. ³⁴
Marginalise Institutions	Control parliament and Parliamentary Chairman Lytvyn. Marginalize the Supreme Court.
Control the Media	Censor television Resume Russian-organized <i>temnyky</i> .

linked to Germany's Christian Democratic Party, was detained for ten hours in Kyiv's Borispil airport on 26 June 2010. Lange was threatened with deportation and only permitted to enter Ukraine after high-level intervention by Chancellor and Christian Democratic Party leader Angela Merkel. Afterwards both sides agreed ahead of Yanukovich's late August visit to Germany, to downplay the incident by declaring it a 'misunderstanding.' Many Ukrainian political experts and opposition politicians believed the Lange affair was an attempt by Russia working through Khoroshkovskyy to derail Ukraine's integration into Europe. 'This was a direct, open, and well thought out provocation,' former Party of Regions deputy Taras Chornovil said.³⁸

An investigation by the Prosecutor-General's office found grounds for his detention claiming Lange had allegedly violated Ukrainian legislation pertaining to foreigners living in Ukraine; namely, the 'responsibility of foreign citizens to not intervene in affairs that lie within the competence of our state.'³⁹ What this implies for other Western foundations and media

³⁸ *Liga Novosti*, 24 December 2010.

³⁹ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 30 July 2010.

operating in Ukraine is unclear as such a vacuous charge could be applied to any of them. The charges have a background in Soviet political culture that re-surfaced in 2003–2004 when the Party of Regions, other pro-Kuchma centrist parties and the Communist Party established a parliamentary commission to investigate Western funding of NGO's, three years ahead of a law adopted in Russia that made it difficult for Russian NGO's to receive Western funding.

In 2003–2004 the authorities delayed permitting the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to open a Kyiv office and threatened Radio Liberty with the closure of its Kyiv office in retaliation for broadcasts of excerpts from former presidential bodyguard Major Mykola Melnychenko's tapes made illicitly in Kuchma's office in 1999–2000. The conspiracy mindset alluding to Western intelligence agencies lying behind democratic revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine is as deep among the leftist and centrist Ukrainian political constituency as it is in Russia. This political culture draws on Soviet ideological tirades against dissidents and nationalists who were seen as agents of Western intelligence agencies and draws upon latent anti-Americanism mobilized in the 2004 elections against Yushchenko whose wife is a Ukrainian-American. Former President Kuchma and Parliamentary Chairman Volodymyr Lytvyn continue to reiterate that the November 2000 Kuchmagate scandal was orchestrated by the West. Kuchma replied to newly launched charges of ordering the murder of journalist Georgi Gongadze that, 'this was a horrible provocation against Ukraine and its President.'⁴⁰

The SBU targets students and academics as potential supporters of the opposition. The first indication of this was a visit by an SBU officer to Father Borys Guzdiak, Dean of Lviv's Ukrainian Catholic University, asking him to assist them in ensuring students did not attend political rallies and become politicized.⁴¹ The US State Department and Ukrainian-Canadian MP Borys Wrzesnewskyj condemned the SBU's interference in respective 28 May and 2 June 2010 statements.⁴² Guzdiak described the SBU's demands as a return to KGB tactics.⁴³ Khoroshkovskyy ridiculed the complaints as 'political technology' used by 'opponents of the stabilization processes taking place in the state.'⁴⁴ When the issue became an international scandal he traveled to Lviv to offer his apologies to Gudziak. Similar SBU visits have taken place in other universities where academics have been more forthcoming in signing pledges to prevent their students from becoming involved in opposition activities.

Historian Roman Zabily was arrested after arriving on a train in Kyiv from his home and work base of Lviv. The SBU claimed he had been

⁴⁰ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 23 March 2011.

⁴¹ <http://ucu.edu.ua/eng/news/549/>

⁴² *Kyiv Post*, 3 June 2010.

⁴³ *Kyiv Post*, 28 May 2010.

⁴⁴ *Komersant-Ukraina*, 31 May 2010.

spreading state secrets. Zably replied that they were declassified KGB archives released by the SBU under Yushchenko and dealt with the 1933 *holodomor* and 1940s Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement. In February 2012, the SBU arrested an academic and accused him of being an American spy in a case similar to FSB operations against academics in Russia. Volodymyr Strilka, Director of the Institute of Sorption and Oncology at the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, was accused by the SBU of sending state documents to the United States. Strilka replied he was visiting his son who lives in the United States and asked for documents to be sent to him so that he could continue his research while he was on his visit. In January 2012, the SBU received a new department to defend the interests of the state in 'information security' in what can be seen as giving the Security Service the possibility of using the legislation in a highly dangerous and elastic manner in a multitude of areas.⁴⁵

Pressure against business-persons has led to the return of the 'blackmail state' to Ukrainian politics.⁴⁶ This is a policy whereby business-persons are permitted to be corrupt in exchange for political loyalty. They can be criminally charged, as in the case of former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko in 1997–1998, if they go into opposition. Pressure on oligarchs and businessmen to no longer financially support the opposition, coupled with pressure on businessmen to defect, has severely damaged the ability of political parties to run election campaigns, pay for media resources and maintain central headquarters staff and regional branches. In some cases family members are targeted to put pressure on senior opposition members.⁴⁷ All Ukrainian political parties, including the Communist Party, have relied on funding from oligarchs and big business. Governors have been instructed to collect intelligence on businessmen for the SBU which pertains to their education, profession, party loyalties, and whom they supported in the 2010 elections.⁴⁸ The authorities are also interested in their 'willingness to cooperate' which is indicated by a '+,' 'o' or '-' placed in their files.

The SBU has begun to visit political activists with the purpose of issuing threats and seeking informers. FEMEN women's student activists, who have become notorious for bearing their breasts to obtain public attention, have been threatened with expulsion from universities.⁴⁹ Criminal charges against opposition leaders and parties groups include those against Tymoshenko whose seven-year sentence and three years ban from public office removes her from three parliamentary (2012, 2016, 2020) and two

⁴⁵ 'Zakhyst vid informatsii: SBU otrymala novi mozhlyvosti dlia stezhennia za opozytsiyeyu,' *Ukrayinsky Tyzhdnen*, 2 February 2012.

⁴⁶ See T. Kuzio, 'The 'Blackmail State' Re-Emerges in Ukraine,' *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 9 14 (20 January 2012).

⁴⁷ See the complaints of police intimidation of family members of the former head of State Reserve Tetiana Sliuz in *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 2, 4 March 2011.

⁴⁸ See leaked document published by *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 26 July 2010.

⁴⁹ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 23, 30 June 2010.

presidential elections (2015, 2020) thereby giving Yanukovich and the Party of Regions a monopoly of power over the coming decade. Yanukovich defeated Tymoshenko by a mere three percent in the 2010 elections which was far less than the ten percent victory margin he predicted he would receive in a conversation with the US Ambassador to Ukraine.⁵⁰ Former SBU Deputy Chairman Oleksandr Skypalskyy said the SBU seeks to, 'destroy her force ahead of local and future elections so that this political force would no longer exist.'⁵¹

Former Interior Minister Lutsenko was arrested in December 2010 and convicted in spring 2012. Lutsenko is accused of authorizing the payment of Interior Ministry funds to his driver who continued to work beyond the compulsory retirement age, again a step widely undertaken in Ukraine, and abusing police funds. In reality, his incarceration is revenge by senior members of the Yanukovich administration for his pursuit of members of the Kuchma administration for high-level abuse of office and the brief imprisonment of Borys Kolesnykov, First Deputy Prime Minister in the Azarov government.

Criminal charges have been laid against leaders of the autumn 2010 anti-tax code protests in Kyiv. Oleh Akhtyrsky, commander of the anti-tax code tent city, arrested in January 2011 and charged with, 'deliberate damage to property that entails large-scale losses (article 194 of the Ukrainian criminal code).' Another of the seven leaders of the protests in pre-trial detention, Ihor Harkavenko, went on a hunger strike in prison in March 2011. The charges against the seven organizers of the anti-tax code protests are 'ridiculous,' Oleh Levitskyy, Harkavenko's lawyer, said adding they were politically motivated.⁵² Levitskyy said if his client is charged with damage to stone tiles on the Maidan the same charges should be brought against Yanukovich and the Party of Regions when it put up tents on the Maidan during their protests in spring 2007 against the dissolution of parliament.

Similarly, charges should be also brought against the millions of participants in the Orange Revolution many of whom lived in tents on the Maidan during the 17-day protests in 2004. Nine leaders of the anti-tax code protests were sentenced to prison in late 2011. Further charges were laid against members of the nationalist organization *Tryzub* (Trident) who were imprisoned in January 2011 on charges of 'hooliganism' for beheading a controversial monument to Jozef Stalin unveiled in Zaporizhzhia in May 2010. *Tryzub* admitted to beheading the Stalin monument and even posted a video on the internet of them undertaking the action but, they categorically denied involvement in the blowing up of the beheaded statue three days later which Ukrainian political experts believe was the work of the security services. The aim of those behind the explosion was to change the charges against *Tryzub*

⁵⁰ <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10KYIV199.html#> (accessed 12 October 2011).

⁵¹ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, July 27, 2010.

⁵² Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2 March 2011.

members from 'hooliganism' to the far more serious charge of 'terrorism.' The arrests play up both west Ukrainian nationalist bogeymen from the Soviet era and assassination phobia discussed earlier.

Marginalization of Parliament

The independence of parliament was always an element of Ukraine's political pluralism but since 2010, it has for the first time become a rubber stamp institution and, together with the judiciary, controlled by the president. This is evident in the buying up of opposition deputies and railroading through parliament of national security legislation. Payments of \$500,000 to \$1 million have been paid to bribe opposition deputies to defect to the Stability and Reforms coalition. An offer of \$450,000 was made to Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) deputy Roman Zabzaliuk to defect to the Stability and Reforms coalition together with \$25,000 monthly 'salary.'⁵³ The 2012 elections returned Ukraine to the same mixed single mandate-proportional system used in the 1998 and 2002 elections permitting the Party of Regions to bribe a large proportion of the 225 deputies elected in single mandate districts to join the pro-presidential coalition.

On 27 April 2010, parliament voted by 236 for an extension of the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol ('Kharkiv Accords') and on July 1, 2010, parliament voted by 259 for a new law on the 'Fundamentals of Domestic and Foreign Policy.' On both occasions the votes were falsified as in the former only 211 deputies were registered to vote while in the latter only 50 from the 260 Reforms and Stability coalition were registered in parliament (a minimum of 226 are needed to pass a vote). Donetsk oligarch Akhmetov, for example, 'voted' on both occasions but has not attended a parliamentary session since October 2007 when he was elected and took the oath. Though both votes touched on sensitive national security issues they were nevertheless railroaded through a rubber stamp parliament without proper discussion or process. The views of three parliamentary committees that deal with national security and foreign policy were ignored (two of them voted against the 'Kharkiv Accords').

Ukraine's constitution bans foreign bases and the 1997 20-year Black Sea Fleet treaty was permitted on the basis of a 'temporary' article that included a proviso for the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet by 2017. The July 2010 law on 'Fundamentals' declares Ukraine to have a 'non-bloc status' but 'non-bloc' and 'neutral' countries never host foreign bases. Clearly, 'non-bloc' is understood as 'anti-NATO membership,' not as an impediment to host the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Our Ukraine-Peoples Self Defense bloc deputy and leader

⁵³ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 8 February 2012 and <http://tvi.ua/ua/watch/author/?prog=698&video=5562> (accessed 15 February 2012). He taped the conversation with the offer of the bribe which can be listened to at: <http://ostro.org/articles/article-349540/> (accessed 15 February 2012).

of the For Ukraine! political party Vyacheslav Kyrylenko described the July 2010 vote on such an important issue of national security as a 'farce' and added '(Parliament's) hall is a pure profanation of the democratic process.'⁵⁴ The law on 'Fundamentals' transforms Ukraine from a 'subject of foreign policy to a subject,' former Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk wrote.⁵⁵ These two important votes on national security reveal a deep sense of legal cynicism and transformation of parliament into a rubber stamp body.

The 2010 'Kharkiv Accords' that extended the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol send three signals to Russian elites. The first signal is that it confirms in their eyes what they had always argued during the last two decades; namely that Sevastopol has always been a 'Russian' city.⁵⁶ Removing the Russian navy in 2017 would not have been an easy task for the Ukrainian leadership then in power but removing Russia from Sevastopol in 2042–2047, in light of Russia's plans to expand the Black Sea Fleet, may prove impossible.⁵⁷ A 2008 survey found that 47 percent of Ukrainians supported the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet by 2017 with only 24 percent supporting an extension.⁵⁸ The treaty's extension has psychologically changed Russia's attitudes towards the Sevastopol base into a long-term, *de facto* strategic asset. 'I am quite sure that the Russian Black Sea fleet will stay in Ukraine till doomsday,' Kirill Frolov, an expert with the official Russian Institute of Commonwealth of Independent States, was quoted as saying.⁵⁹

Russia has raised the issue of the granting of dual citizenship to Russian citizens serving on the Black Sea Fleet because many retired officers continue to live in Sevastopol and the Crimea. Optimism that the Black Sea Fleet base extension treaty would calm Russian-Ukrainian relations in the Crimea were dashed by then Moscow Mayor Luzhkov who said in July 2010 that he had not changed his mind about Sevastopol being a Russian city. 'Sevastopol is a Russian city, a naval-military base of Russia which ensures the geo-strategic balance in southern Russia.' If Russia were to lose the base she would lose southern Russia, he argued.⁶⁰

The second signal is that Moscow now has an important strategic objective in maintaining Yanukovich in power indefinitely because the Ukrainian opposition has stated its intention of annulling the 2010 treaty. Arseniy

⁵⁴ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 1 July 2010.

⁵⁵ <http://blogs.pravda.com.ua> (accessed 2 July 2010).

⁵⁶ See T. Kuzio, *The Crimea: Europe's Next Flashpoint?*, Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, November 2010.

⁵⁷ T. Kuzio, 'Russia Plans to Strengthen the Black Sea Fleet,' *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 (7 December 2010).

⁵⁸ *Dissatisfaction and Disillusionment in Ukraine. Findings from an IFES 2008 Survey*. http://www.ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/Survey/2008/1390/UkraineSurvey_2009.pdf (accessed 12 October 2011).

⁵⁹ *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 October 2010.

⁶⁰ *Hazeta po-Ukrainski*, 22 July 2010. 'Luzhkov again Raises Russian Right to Sevastopol,' *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 (19 August 2010).

Yatseniuk describes the 'Kharkiv Accords' as criminal.⁶¹ Russian strategic interests will be therefore served by maintaining an authoritarian regime in place in Ukraine as free elections and free media could lead to an opposition victory, particularly in the 2015 presidential elections.

The third signal is that Ukraine's membership of NATO is ruled out as long as Yanukovych and the Party of Regions remain in power and they guarantee the *de facto* permanent basing of the Black Sea Fleet base. Yanukovych is the first of four Ukrainian presidents to oppose Ukraine joining NATO. Kostiantyn Zatulin, Deputy head of the State Duma committee on the CIS, pointed out, 'The prolongation of the Black Sea Fleet base is a declaration that during this period Ukraine will find it impossible and will probably not even attempt to join NATO.'⁶² Even if the Ukrainian opposition were to be successful in returning to power and again support NATO membership, Zatulin believes NATO members will be reluctant to support such a move due to the likely ensuing political instability and frequent changes in Ukraine's foreign policy.

A long-term Black Sea Fleet base will lead to a proportional change in military exercises conducted by Ukraine and inevitably a greater number will be undertaken with Russia. In 1994–2009, Ukraine undertook intensive cooperation within NATO's Partnership for Peace program. In October 2010, Ukraine and Russia held the Peace Fairway naval exercise that involved the landing of troops and a search and rescue mission. 'It is necessary to enlarge the number of participants, and to involve aviation, submarine and surface fleets,' Defense Minister Yezhel said.⁶³ Disruption of NATO Partnership for Peace exercises first began in 2005–2006 when the Party of Regions aligned with Russian nationalists in the Crimea and came together with them in the For Yanukovych! election bloc in the 2006 Crimean elections. Such an alliance would never have been supported by President Kuchma who battled and marginalized Russian nationalists in the Crimea and destroyed the separatist movement. Close cooperation between the Party of Regions and Russian nationalists in the Crimean parliament paved the way for the adoption of a resolution in September 2008 supporting the independence of Georgia's two frozen conflicts, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A similar resolution tabled by the Party of Regions and Communist Party in the Ukrainian parliament failed to receive the minimum 226 votes.

'PUTINIZATION' OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Prime Minister Azarov's government included 12 out of 29 cabinet members who had been implicated in criminal cases or were witnesses to

⁶¹ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 14 June 2012.

⁶² *Ekho Moskvy* radio, 17 May 2010.

⁶³ *UNIAN*, 20 October 2010.

them.⁶⁴ Nearly half the Azarov cabinet were former high ranking members of the Soviet Ukrainian *nomenklatura* or KGB. Among 29 cabinet members, 13 were former KGB officers or had collaborated with Soviet security departments.⁶⁵ The best known example was Deputy Prime Minister Volodymyr Sivkovych who had been a thorn in the side of parliaments investigation of Yushchenko's poisoning in the 2004 elections. In 2010–2011 he was responsible for overseeing the security forces until he was moved to the RNBO.

Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia under Yushchenko, had high ranking ties to the *nomenklatura* in Moscow during the Soviet era. Gryshchenko admitted that the Russian leadership had lobbied for him to receive the position of Foreign Minister.⁶⁶ Gryshchenko said on Inter television channel (March 21, 2010) that, 'Ukraine will never allow any organization she is a member of to be used against Russia.'

Following the Orange Revolution, Gryshchenko joined the Republican Party (RPU) established by then head of the state gas company *Naftobaz Ukrainy* Yuriy Boyko who is closely tied to the RUE gas intermediary.⁶⁷ Gryshchenko was number 18 on the 'Ne Tak!' (Not Like That!) election bloc organized by the Social Democratic United Party (SDPUo) and RPU for the March 2006 elections. Ne Tak! stood on a virulently anti-NATO platform and failed to enter parliament after receiving only one percent of the vote. Boyko, who was on the verge of arrest in summer 2005 for abuse of office when he was head of *Naftobaz Ukrainy*, moved to the more powerful Party of Regions with which the RPU merged in 2007. Boyko stood in the Party of Regions list in the 2007 elections and is Minister of Energy and Coal Industry in the Azarov government. Boyko and Gryshchenko, like Firtash, Khoroshkovskyy and Levochkin, are members of the gas lobby who from 2006–2007 are an alternative source of financial support and competition to the Donetsk clan.

Russian influence in the Yanukovych administration is the highest of any Ukrainian administration (see Table 2). 'Putinization' of the SBU under Chairman Khoroshkovskyy has done the most to undermine Ukraine's democratic gains following the Orange Revolution and harm Ukraine's international image. The September 2010 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and November 2010 European Parliament resolutions condemned the use of the SBU for political ends. PACE stated, 'The role of the state security services, and especially its head, Khoroshkovskyy, who is a close ally of Yanukovich, is a point of controversy in Ukraine, where any possible influence of the security services in

⁶⁴ *Korrespondent* magazine, 18 March 2010.

⁶⁵ <http://chykulay.livejournal.com/11787.html> (accessed 30 March 2010).

⁶⁶ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 22 March 2010.

⁶⁷ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 13 March 2010.

TABLE 2 Russian Influence in the Yanukovich Administration

Person	Position	Lobbied
Dmytro Tabachnyk	Minister of Education	Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill
Igor Shuvalov, Russian political technologist	Heads media policy in the Presidential Administration led by Serhiy Levochkin and in charge of media politics on Inter television channel. Inter is owned by Valeriy Khoroshkovskyy who with Levochkin are members of the 'gas lobby.'	Produced <i>temnyky</i> (secret instructions sent to television channels for the Presidential Administration in 2002–2004 when it was headed by Viktor Medvedchuk)
Kostyantyn Gryshchenko	Foreign Minister	Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia in 2008–2010. Lobbied by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mykhailo Yezhel	Minister of Defense (2010–2012)	Daughter is married to an Admiral in the Russian Pacific Fleet. Lobbied by Russian Ministry of Defence
Valeriy Khoroshkovskyy	Chairperson of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in 2010–2012 and First Deputy Prime Minister (2012–)	Major business interests in Russia and strong ties to the Federal Security Service (FSB)
Igor Kalinin	SBU Chairman (2012–)	Russian citizen until 2004 and dual citizenship with Ukraine. Personally loyal to Yanukovich
Dmitriy Salamatin	Head of state-owned <i>Ukrspetsexport</i> arms export agency (2010–2012) and Minister of Defence (2012–)	Ukrainian citizenship received in 2005 and has dual citizenship with Russia. Party of Regions parliamentary deputy, son-in-law of former Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets
Viacheslav Zanevskyy	Head of President Yanukovich personal bodyguards.	Russian citizen

political life is seen as highly suspicious as a result of its recent history. Khoroshkovskyy is also owner of TV Inter and is alleged to have ordered investigations by the secret services into a disputed licensing decision, in which his channel is a party . . . ' The PACE resolution continues:

The role of the state security services, and especially its Head, Khoroshkovskyy, is not only controversial in relation to the media but is also of concern in other respects. . . . However, the public unease with what it sees as increased involvement in public life of the security apparatus has increased following President Yanukovich's appointment of Khoroshkovskyy to the High Council of Justice, despite potential conflicts

of interest. Indeed, the state security services are responsible for investigating any allegations against judges in Ukraine. This is a matter of concern.⁶⁸

The European Parliament resolution stated:

Whereas following the presidential elections held in January 2010 there are increasingly worrying signs of the erosion of democracy and pluralism, as evidenced, in particular, by the treatment of some NGOs and individual complaints by journalists about pressure from their editors or the owners of their media outlets to cover or not cover certain events, as well as increased and politically motivated activity by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and the misuse of administrative and judicial resources for political purposes⁶⁹

SBU Chairman Khoroshkovskiy has close connections to Russia in the business and political fields. ‘This is the only person who can receive instructions from Moscow,’ Taras Chornovil revealed.⁷⁰ Ukrainian political experts believe he is directly working for Russia to undermine Ukraine’s European integration (as in the Lange case) and seeks to prove himself to Moscow with the aim of receiving Russian support for future presidential ambitions. In another interview, Chornovil went further:

‘Khoroshkovskyy is fully dependent on the Kremlin. He receives orders only from there. I think that there (in Moscow) they have placed a taboo on these areas and he is forbidden to take orders from the (Ukrainian) president, only (taking orders) from the president or prime minister of Russia.’⁷¹ SBU Chairman Khoroshkovskyy has explicitly fanned assassination phobia to ensure Yanukovych’s loyalty. When asked about threats to the President and additional security measures, Khoroshkovskyy replied: ‘Yes, there was a threat to the president’s life. We have taken quite a lot of measures. We haven’t yet eliminated the threat. It was not a simple phone call.’⁷²

Censorship in Ukraine has a long-term connection to Russia and its leadership. In 2002–2004, Russian citizen Igor Shuvalov was in charge of *temnyky* censorship instructions sent by the Presidential Administration to television channels.⁷³ Shuvalov coordinates the news policies of Inter and

⁶⁸ <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/EDOC12357.htm> (accessed 30 March 2010).

⁶⁹ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2010-0120&language=EN> (accessed 30 March 2010).

⁷⁰ *Krayina* magazine, 10 December 2010.

⁷¹ Interview with Taras Chornovil in *Ostrov*, 8 February 2011.

⁷² *Interfax-Ukraine*, 15 June 2010.

⁷³ On *temnyky* see Marta Dyczok, ‘Was Kuchma’s Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine before 2004,’ *Europe-Asia Studies* 58 (March 2006), pp. 215 – 238.

State Channel 1 on behalf of the Presidential Administration. When asked about the employment of a Russian citizen, Khoroshkovskyy and Presidential Administration head Serhiy Levochkin gave different answers, the former stating he was an adviser to Inter channel while the latter claimed he was his unpaid adviser. Levochkin admitted Shuvalov is partly responsible for 'unpaid' 'informational-analytical work' in the Presidential Administration while based in an 'analytical-consulting center,' the name of which he had conveniently forgotten.⁷⁴

In July 2010 Dmitriy Salamatin was appointed head of the state-owned *Ukrspetsexport*, Ukraine's arms exporting agency, which has a \$1 billion annual turnover.⁷⁵ In 2012 he was moved to the Ministry of Defense. Salamatin was born in Kazakhstan, worked in Russia in 1991–1997 and is the son-in-law of former First Deputy Russian Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets.⁷⁶ Salamatin moved to Ukraine in 1999 and was elected illegally to parliament in 2006 and 2007 by the Party of Regions, although he had only received his Ukrainian citizenship at that time. Ukrainian legislation requires deputies to have been citizens for five years prior to their election.⁷⁷ Salamatin would seem to have a pathological hatred of 'orange' nationalists. During the 27 April 2010 riot in parliament over the Sevastopol Black Sea Fleet base extension, Salamatin was seen fighting members of the opposition.⁷⁸ During an 11 August 2010 altercation in *Ukrspetsexport's* Kyiv offices he hit his opponent with a chair.⁷⁹ The most serious damaging evidence of his violent behavior was during the 16 December 2010 attack by Party of Regions deputies and government ministers upon BYuT deputies who had blockaded parliament's rostrum.⁸⁰ The attack, during which Salamatin was filmed hitting opposition leaders over their heads with wooden objects, led to the hospitalization of BYuT deputies.

Mykhailo Yezhel, Minister of Defense in 2010–2012, was lobbied by Russia for this position. Yezhel established close working relations with the Black Sea Fleet when he was commander of the Ukrainian navy in Sevastopol. Yezhel also has close family ties to a senior commander in the Russian navy through his daughter who is married to an admiral of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Grytsenko, head of parliament's Committee on National Security and Defense, believed that Yezhel would not bring 'strategic thinking' to the Ministry of Defense or conduct reforms because his, 'business

⁷⁴ Khoroshkovskyy is quoted in *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 27 August 2010 and Levochkin is quoted in Serhiy Leshchenko's *Ukrayinska Pravda* blog, 17 March 2011.

⁷⁵ <http://www.ukrspetsexport.com> (accessed 30 March 2010).

⁷⁶ *Segodnya*, 14 July 2010.

⁷⁷ T. Kuzio, 'Ukraine's (Russian) Defense Minister and Selective Justice,' *Jamestown Foundation blog*, 16 April 2012.

⁷⁸ The riot can be seen at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4EbnYNsi_ic (accessed 30 March 2010).

⁷⁹ *Hazeta po-Ukrainski*, 15 August 2010.

⁸⁰ The violence can be seen at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLfLT9xMVuo> (accessed 30 March 2010).

interests will most likely prevail over his task of reforming the armed forces.⁸¹ Yezhel served as Deputy Minister of Defense in 1996–2001 and commander of the Ukrainian navy but was dismissed by President Kuchma in 2003 following a scandal over embezzled assets and poor living and working conditions for naval personnel. Yezhel's appointment was aimed at, 'rallying public support for the extension of the lease for the Russian Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet beyond 2017.'⁸² Yezhel was appointed a month before the Black Sea Fleet treaty was extended by parliament.

The head of President Yanukovich's presidential guard is a Russian citizen, Viacheslav Zanevsky, whose photograph is first shown in a report accompanying Yanukovich on his October 2010 visit to France.⁸³ Zanevsky's unofficial title is 'Head of the personal guard of the President.' He was hired to be head of Yanukovich's bodyguards in summer 2008 because Yanukovich did not trust the SBU or the UDO, an outgrowth of Yanukovich's pathological fear of being attacked or even assassinated. The SBU provided indirect support to the 2004 Yushchenko election campaign (for example, warning them about plans to send Interior Ministry Internal Troops to crush the Orange Revolution on 28 November 2004) and when the SBU was headed by Nalyvaychenko the institution became personally tied to Yushchenko. The SBU illicitly taped Yanukovich's election headquarters during the 2004 elections and gave the tapes to Oleh Rybachuk who became Yushchenko's Chief of Staff in 2005–2006.⁸⁴

The choice of a Russian citizen as the President's main bodyguard is also a product of Yanukovich's close relationship with Russia which intervened overtly and covertly in his support during the 2004 presidential elections.⁸⁵ In 2005, the Party of Regions, then led by Yanukovich, and the Unified Russia party signed a long-term cooperation agreement. Zanevsky accompanied Yanukovich throughout the 2010 elections. Since Yanukovich's election, Zanevsky's position has become a question of national security because his continued presence as the head of his personal guard is illegal as he is a foreign citizen. Zanevsky and Russian political technologist Igor Shuvalov, who heads media policy on Inter television channel, are officially titled 'non-resident presidential advisers' to camouflage their illegal status. Zanevsky remains a senior instructor in the Russian Academy of Bodyguards⁸⁶ and his earlier clients were Oleksandr Lebed, secretary of Russia's National Security Council in the mid-1990s, and Russian oligarchs. Zanevsky is a frequent

⁸¹ *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnnya*, 13 March 2010.

⁸² *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnnya*, 13 March 2010.

⁸³ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 6 October 2010.

⁸⁴ For background see T. Kuzio, 'Yanukovich-Gate Unfolds after Ukrainian Elections,' *Eurasian Daily Monitor* 1 (3 December 2004).

⁸⁵ This is discussed in greater detail in T. Kuzio, 'Russian Policy to Ukraine during Elections,' *Demokratyzatsiya* 13 (December 2005), pp. 491–517.

⁸⁶ <http://www.academy-bodyguard.com/> (accessed 1 June 2011).

contributor to the Russian Academy of Bodyguards internet forum where he presents himself as the 'Head of the personal guard of the President' (not as a 'non-resident presidential adviser').

The head of the presidential bodyguard has access to every state secret coming through the hands of the Ukrainian President and would be in a position to overhear most conversations as well as observe the president's private life. The intelligence that such a placed person would be in a position to collect over the course of a five-year presidential term would be substantial. Former SBU Deputy Chairman Skypalskyy described Zanevsky as, 'an eye of a neighboring state' because a Russian citizen in this field of national security would inevitably be approached by the FSB to cooperate with them. 'Why does President Yanukovich have an alien eye in his team? Every intelligence service has dreamed of having its man next to the president of a neighboring state,' Skypalskyy noted.⁸⁷

CONCLUSION

Russian and Ukrainian leaders are similar in their preference for 'stability' over pluralistic politics, their groups come from provincial backgrounds, are anti-intellectual, suspicious of the West, and dominated by male machismo. This is the first time in Ukraine where the *siloviki* have such unbridled influence, parliament is marginalized, and the building of an authoritarian state is a real possibility.⁸⁸ Putin and Yanukovich both quickly laid out the rules of the game to oligarchs and big business that they were not permitted to finance the opposition. Putin's militocracy network of former and current *siloviki* that forms the base for his regime is similar to the emergence of The Family and who are personally loyal to President Yanukovich. The Family control all the *siloviki* and financial flows to the state.

At the same time, Ukraine is different from Russia and Belarus. Regional diversity in Ukraine makes it far more difficult to establish an authoritarian regime than in Russia and Belarus. Ukraine cannot buy off the population as it does not possess Russia's natural resources or receive Belarusian-style subsidies from Russia. The Party of Regions is an anti-nationalist ('orange') political force whereas Putin/Unified Russia and Lukashenka draw on different types of nationalism to mobilize their core voter bases. Finally, Putin's rules of the game for oligarchs moved them out of politics and control of television whereas Yanukovich has presided over oligarch capture of the state and they continue to control Ukraine's media outlets.

⁸⁷ *Hazeta po-Kyivski*, 8 October 2010.

⁸⁸ Freedom House President David Kramer warned Ukraine could drop to Russia's ranking. <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2012/06/13/6966616/> (accessed 13 June 2011).

The Chairman of the SBU and Ministers of Education, Foreign Policy, and Defense were successfully lobbied by Russia. Two Russian citizens (illegally) control the Ukrainian Presidents bodyguards and 'informational-analytical work' in the Presidential Administration. Taken together these factors provide Moscow with unprecedented influence and leverage over Ukraine that far outweighs influence from Brussels and Washington.

Yanukovych's election signifies a fundamental revision of how Ukraine defines its national security as the first Ukrainian President unable to view Russia as any form of threat to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity will have important implications for Ukraine's foreign policy and national security. Yanukovych acceded to Russia's demand to end Ukraine's goal of NATO membership and Ukraine's integration into the EU is frozen because of democratic regression and selective use of justice. As a Russian participant at the September 2010 Yalta European Strategy (YES) forum confided, 'They can still play a little with their European integration but sooner or later they will return to the (CIS) Customs Union.'⁸⁹ Yanukovych did not displease Russian participants as during his speech and answers to questions at the YES forum he did not mention Ukraine's desire to join the EU.⁹⁰ Yanukovych could have no option to secure re-election in 2015 by deepening the Russianization of the silovyky and acquiescing to Russian pressure to join the CIS Customs Union in order to bolster his voter base and receive Russian support for a second term.

⁸⁹ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 4 October 2010.

⁹⁰ *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 4 October 2010.