Contemporary Nationalism in Ukraine:
Why we need a Broader Analytical Framework

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This paper puts forward the proposal that nationalism in Ukraine should be investigated in a broader context than is traditionally undertaken by scholars who focus on one region (Western Ukraine) and one element (ethnic Ukrainian nationalism). This paper is divided into three sections. The first section surveys the phenomena of racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism in Ukraine. The second section analyses the failure of the émigré OUNb (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Stepan Bandera wing) to establish its political force in Ukraine compared with the success of the Svoboda (Freedom) political party. The third section analyses Russian and Soviet nationalism in Ukraine. Skinheads and Nazi parties and movements are included in my analysis of Russian and Soviet Nationalism because they do not espouse ethnic Ukrainian nationalist ideologies but instead propagate eclectic combinations of Ukrainian state nationalism, anti-Americanism and pan-Slavism.

Racism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Semitism in Ukraine

Racism

Racist crimes in Ukraine against foreigners, migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and Roma are rarely prosecuted and when they are they usually fall under the rubric of ‘hooliganism’ which leads to minor criminal charges. Racist and anti-Semitic crimes in Ukraine go unreported because of very low levels of public trust in the police and courts and fear of police racism and brutality. Racial profiling and individual targeting of identity checks in public places of immigrants and asylum seekers are commonplace which reduces confidence in the police and leads to under-
reporting of racist attacks. With tolerance towards Jews, Russians and Roma in decline during the second decade of Ukrainian independence, the Council of Europe’s European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), ‘remains concerned by the phenomenon of racist violence in Ukraine.’ The ECRI encouraged the Ukrainian authorities ‘to pursue and intensify their efforts to combat racism in football’ and ‘step up their efforts to raise awareness about the dangers of racism in sport.’ Racism and intolerance by Ukrainian and Polish football fans shown waving Nazi banners and giving the Sieg Heil salute, was the subject of a 29 May 2012 BBC Panorama documentary on the eve of the EURO 2012 football championship.

The pursuit of tolerance and the fight against racism and anti-Semitism has taken decades to bring results in Europe, the US and Canada. But, in order to fight racism and anti-Semitism it is first of all necessary to acknowledge it exists, and herein is the crux of the problem in Ukraine. Prosecutor-General Viktor Pshonka believes there is no racism in Ukraine. When the BBC showed their footage of Nazi salutes at Ukrainian football games a senior Ukrainian official replied this was not the case, claiming they were merely greeting their football team! English football clubs strove to eliminate racism from the game a generation ago and today racist chanting is rarely seen or heard at British football matches where about 20 percent of players are black which rises to a third of players on the English team.

Attempts to come to grips with racism and xenophobia in Ukraine only began under President Viktor Yushchenko, ironically the most nationalistic of Ukraine’s four Presidents, with the first policies launched in 2006. In October 2007, a presidential decree laid out steps to combat racism and xenophobia and bans some Nazi and skinhead groups. Yaroslav Savchin, deputy chief of the SBU’s Department to Combat Xenophobia, accused the National Labour Party, Group 82,
Patriot of Ukraine and Svoboda with undertaking racist attacks. Under Yushchenko the authorities also reduced significantly the large volume of anti-Semitism published by MAUP (Inter-Regional Academy) of Personnel Management).

Ukraine’s ability to combat racism and anti-Semitism has eroded since 2010 after three institutions were disbanded that had played an important role in combatting intolerance and educating the public. In December 2010, the State Committee on Nationalities and Religion, which had been coordinating the work of the Inter-Agency Working Group to Combat Xenophobia and Ethnic and Racial Intolerance, another body that was closed which had brought together state institutions, government departments and civil society NGO’s, was disbanded during administrative reforms. The Inter-Agency Working Group had adopted a ‘Plan of Action to Combat Xenophobia and Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in Ukrainian Society’ for the period 2008-2009 and 2010-2012 but was only able to implement the first of these. The work undertaken by these two bodies was not transferred to other government departments or state institutions and the ECRI reported that, ‘it remains the case that there is no body in Ukraine that is clearly and specifically entrusted with combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance.’

A third important institution that was closed under President Viktor Yanukovych was the Human Rights Monitoring department in the Interior Ministry that was a setback to the development of a uniform system of monitoring racist incidents and neo-Nazi and skinhead groups. The Human Rights Monitoring department had also, together with the Inter-Agency Working Group, brought together civil society NGO’s and state institutions and government departments. The ECRI warned, ‘The risk is that the momentum that was starting to build and progress
that was beginning to be made through the Inter-Agency Working Group towards combining forces to tackle racism in an integrated and strategic manner will be lost and that efforts in this field will become increasingly scattered and ineffective.’ The closure of the State Committee and Working Group, ‘created a vacuum in the responsibilities for leading this work.’

Racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism draws on ethnic Ukrainian nationalism in Western Ukraine and Russian and Soviet nationalism and anti-Tatar xenophobia in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. Xenophobia and anti-Western attitudes are fanned by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Russian Patriarchate) which has more parishes than the other two Orthodox Churches in Eastern Ukraine. These views are vividly demonstrated by an elderly lady who entered an Orthodox Church and, reacting in horror at the presence of a black Orthodox priest, shouted ‘We will defend Orthodoxy!’7 Black priests are increasingly common in Western European countries such as Italy because fewer Europeans are entering the priesthood.

Xenophobia in the Crimea

The Party of Regions has little interest in fighting its own ingrained prejudices and condemns in Soviet-style language Western accusations of its anti-democratic practices and racism. Soviet and multiple identities in the Crimea are ‘associated with nationalistic tendencies,’ ‘characterised by conflict beliefs’ and an ‘enemy image,’ particularly towards Tatars and other national groups who seek language rights.8 The belittling of Ukrainian language and culture has traditionally been undertaken in the Crimea ‘alongside anti-Tatar and anti-Muslim stereotypes.’9 Mykhaylo Bakharev, Editor of the popular Krymskaya Pravda newspaper, has repeatedly said the Ukrainian language is ‘artificial,’ spoken by the uneducated part
of population and invented by Taras Shevchenko and other Ukrainian writers, he believes no Ukraine nation exists and that the Ukrainian state has no future. Well-known Crimean television anchor Yuriy Pershykov has a long record of producing xenophobic anti-Tatar reports on Inter, Ukraine’s most popular television channel owned by Valeriy Khoroshkovskyy until it was sold in early 2013 to gas tycoon Dmytro Firtash and Yanukovych’s Chief of Staff Serhiy Levochkin.

Anti-Tatar racism and xenophobia is the most widespread not in Western Ukraine but in the Crimea and the ECRI condemned the fanning of anti-Tatar discourse and anti-Tatar ‘hate speech’ by the Crimean authorities. The ECRI stated:

‘As noted elsewhere in this report, anti-Tatar sentiment remains an issue in Ukraine and appears to have increased in recent years as politicians’ rhetoric has given it a semblance of respectability. Local politicians’ tendency to ignore or deny the specific problems faced by Crimean Tatars also pushes the latter to seek their own solutions and voice their identity more strongly. The end result is a risk of radicalization rather than resolution of the issues, to the detriment of Crimean society as a whole and Tatars in particular as targets of prejudice. ECRI observes that there is a need for the authorities actively to combat prejudice against Crimean Tatars while working to raise the majority population’s awareness and understanding of the problems they face.’

Pro-Russian groups in the Crimea play on anti-Tatar sentiments and fan racial stereotypes that nurture high levels of xenophobia. The US Embassy in Kyiv reported that Russian nationalists in the Crimea, ‘attempt to maintain a constant level of interethnic tension for political reasons.’ Natalya Vitrenko, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, and Bratstvo (the Eurasianist splinter group from UNA-UNSO) has:
‘incited racial hatred of Crimean Tatars on behalf of the Slavic inhabitants of Crimea, warned of the NATO threat to Crimea as indicated by this spring’s Feodosia events around the Sea Breeze exercise, denounced NATO, UPA "Banderivtsi," and fascists together in one breath and "American lackeys" Yushchenko and Yanukovych in another, and gave thanks that Russian President Putin and the Duma were defending true Slavic interests.’

In the 2006 elections, Konstantin Zatulin, Director of the CIS Institute, brokered a coalition of the Party of Regions with the Za Soyuz (For Union) party that brought together the Soyuz Party, Slavic Party and two smaller Russian nationalist political parties. The coalition revived the fortunes of the latter after they were marginalised in the late 1990s by President Leonid Kuchma. A US cable revealed high-level Russian influence within the Party of Regions through Zatulin who, the Embassy reported, ‘had personally brokered the electoral alliance between Russian Bloc and Regions’ Crimean branch, even negotiating party list placement for favoured Russian Bloc members.’ The US believed, ‘Regions had given the Russian Bloc undue political prominence in 2006 by forming a single Crimean electoral list, providing them with slots in the Crimean Rada they would not have won on their own.’

The Party of Regions alliance with Crimean Russian and neo-Soviet nationalists has ever since has stoked interethnic conflict and exacerbated anti-Tatar xenophobia. An example of a xenophobic Party of Regions leader is former head of the Crimean and Ukrainian Interior Ministries and Crimean Prime Minister Anatoliy Mogilyov. Crimean Tatars protested at Mogilyov heading the Crimean government
because of his reputation for ruthlessness in suppressing Tatar protests and because as Interior Minister he had written a xenophobic commentary for *Krymskaya Pravda* supporting Soviet leader Stalin’s ethnic cleansing of the Crimean Tatars.\(^{15}\) Mogilyov’s relations with Crimean Tatars have rapidly deteriorated. As the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (KHRPG), Ukraine’s leading human rights NGO, reported:\(^{16}\)

‘The latest remarks from Anatoly Mohylyov, prime minister of the Crimea, are in no way out of character. This is, in fact, the problem. President Viktor Yanukovych was well aware of Mohylyov’s rabid hate speech directed against Crimean Tatars and role in the gratuitously violent confrontation on Ai-Petri plateau in Crimea on Nov. 7, 2007 when he appointed Mohylyov as interior minister in March 2010. The president then promoted him to the top post in the Crimean leadership in November 2011.’

Halya Coynash from the KHRPG, continues:

‘Mustafa Dzhemiliev is convinced that Mohylyov is simply carrying out Yanukovych’s instructions. He believes that the latter has it in for the Mejlis because it acts as an autonomous body and has in recent years supported parties and candidates in opposition to Yanukovych.’\(^{17}\)

Xenophobic and racist views of the Crimean Tatars as Nazi collaborators draw on similar Soviet legacies that depicted Western Ukrainians and diaspora Ukrainians as bourgeois nationalists and Nazi hirelings. Xenophobia and racism towards Crimean Tatars exists among Soviet and Russian nationalists. Crimean Tatars meanwhile, have been elected to the Ukrainian parliament within *Rukh*, Our Ukraine and *Batkivshchina*. Communist Party leader Piotr Symonenko defended the
ethnic cleansing of Tatars in a speech given in parliament in 2012 protest at the annual commemoration of the deportation. Symonenko said, ‘In order to save the Crimean Tatar people they were deported from the Crimea. Why? The presence of these criminals (in the Crimea) would inevitably have led to civil war.’ He claimed that Tartars were given education and employment in exile but ignores the fact that nearly half of them died en route to Central Asia. Former Crimean Parliamentary Chairperson Anatoliy Hrytsenko told US Ambassador William Taylor that Crimean Tatars ‘betrayed’ the USSR in World War II and that, ‘a majority of Crimea’s inhabitants viewed Tatars as traitors.’

Intolerance of national minorities in the Crimea has led to low level violence between Russophone Slavs and Tatars. The homes of Crimean Tatar activists have been bombed, Tatar journalists murdered and Tatar activists sentenced to lengthy prison sentences for acts of civil disobedience. The most serious violence has erupted over the misuse of historic Tatar sites, such as the former imperial seat of the Tatar Khans in Bakhcharay. Clashes have taken place during protests against attempts to build apartments and business offices on ancient Tatar sites and cemeteries. Tatars have also undertaken acts of civil disobedience to bring attention to their plight, particularly over social issues such as the lack of land allocated to them by the local authorities and changes to the criminal code that have led to severe punishments for illegal seizures of land.

The presence of Russian Cossacks from the Transdniestr frozen conflict and Northern Caucasus, two regions plagued by inter-ethnic violence since the 1990s, has stoked conflict and their presence has been largely ignored by the Security Service of Ukraine. Russian Cossacks in the Crimea are traditionally Ukrainophobic, intolerant of all religious denominations other than Russian Orthodoxy, they are able to wear
paramilitary uniforms without legal sanction and fly Russian imperial banners and flags. The paramilitary Crimean Cossack Union, which is linked to the Russian Community of Crimea (ROK), is ‘the single most dangerous and active pro-Russian actor in the Crimea’ according to a US cable, and many of its members are former or serving Interior Ministry and Security Service personnel. The Crimean Cossack Union is allied with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Russian Patriarchate) and Russian nationalist extremist groups. One of the most active Russian nationalists in the Crimea has been Serhiy Tsekov, leader of the ROK and the Russian Bloc.

Table 1. Russian and Neo-Soviet Nationalists in the Crimea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Active in Ukraine</th>
<th>Russian Support</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Community of Crimea (ROK)</td>
<td>Controls the Russia Bloc and Crimean Cossack Union</td>
<td>Russia Bloc</td>
<td>Moscow-Crimea and Moscow-Sevastopol Foundations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia Bloc</td>
<td>Political face of ROK</td>
<td>Allied with Party of Regions in For Yanukovych! Bloc (2006)</td>
<td>For Yanukovych! Bloc brokered by Konstantin Zatulin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean Cossack Union</td>
<td>Paramilitary and most extreme of pro-Russian groups. Some members are local Interior Ministry and SBU personnel.</td>
<td>Active in Crimea, Odesa and Donbas</td>
<td>ROK, Don and Kuban Cossacks in Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proryv (Breakthrough).</td>
<td>Tiraspol, Transdniester separatist region, Moldova</td>
<td>Banned</td>
<td>Russian military intelligence in the Transdniester and the Black Sea Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurasian Youth Union</td>
<td>Pan Russian Eurasia Movement</td>
<td>Banned</td>
<td>Aleksandr Dugin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopol–Crimea—Russia Front</td>
<td>Active in Sevastopol</td>
<td>Banned</td>
<td>Moscow-Sevastopol Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
<td>Extreme leftist breakaway from the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU).</td>
<td>Marginal political force in Ukraine. Active only in Crimea.</td>
<td>Under Kuchma reportedly received assistance from the presidential administration.</td>
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Former Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov provided financial and other resources to the Russian bloc and ROK through two foundations. A US cable reported that Russian military intelligence (GRU) in the Black Sea Fleet fanned inter-ethnic tensions and provided financial and publishing resources to pro-Russian groups in the Crimea. Former Moscow correspondent of The Guardian Luke Harding writes that following Yushchenko’s election, ‘Moscow begins a systematic, organised campaign to finance pro-Russian groups in Crimea.’ During the Yushchenko presidency, Russian covert activities in the Crimea were routinely condemned and the Ukrainian authorities placed Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and other officials on visa black lists. In summer 2009, Russian diplomats were declared persona non grata after the Ukrainian authorities alleged they had been covertly supporting Russian nationalists and separatists in Odesa and the Crimea. These tougher counter-espionage and counter-separatist steps, which would be normally undertaken by democratic states, were viewed in an inflammatory manner by Moscow and led to President Dmitri Medvedev’s August 2009 open letter to President Yushchenko.

Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism

With three major pogroms and genocide committed against Jews on Ukrainian territory since the seventeenth century it is not surprising that the Jewish community in Ukraine is sensitive to the existence of anti-Semitism. At the same time, in comparison to high levels of support for nationalist and neo-Nazi political parties and movements in neighbouring Romania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia, the nationalist right have never had widespread public support in Ukraine and Svoboda’s ten per cent in the 2012 elections represents a third of the combined
vote of the nationalist-populist right in Austria. Hannah Rosenthal, Special US Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, believes anti-Semitism is not a widespread phenomenon in Ukraine:

‘Ukraine’s performance has also improved over the past five years. The number of anti-Semitic acts of vandalism has decreased by more than half in 2010. Moreover, due to joint pressure exerted by the Ukrainian government, NGOs and the Jewish community on the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management, we have witnessed a sharp decline in the publication of anti-Semitic articles, proving that we can succeed if we work together.’

It is important to bear in mind that anti-Semitism in Ukraine draws on two political traditions. Firstly, anti-Semitism stems from extremist nationalism in Western Ukraine that grew in the 1930s and culminated in pogroms and genocide in World War II. Secondly, anti-Semitism emerged from the legacy of Soviet ‘anti-Zionism’ in the Soviet Union that has left its greatest influence in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. While numerous critical studies have been undertaken by Western scholars about anti-Semitism and nationalism in Western Ukraine there are few scholarly studies of Soviet anti-Zionism. Nationalists in Western Ukraine are not necessarily anti-Semites and those who were incarcerated in the Gulag by the Soviet regime retained warm relations with Zionist prisoners. Yuriy Shukhevych was imprisoned with Zionist political prisoner Meylakh Sheykhet in the Gulag where Ukrainian and Zionist political prisoners closely worked together. Yuriy Shukhevych and Sheykhet, Director of the Union of Councils of Jews of the Former Soviet Union, together they protested against anti-Semitism in the city of Lviv prosecutor’s office. Yuriy Shukhevych pounded on the table and demanded ‘At long last will you behave like Ukrainians!’ My survey of Ukrainian nationalist organisations published in
1997 barely mentioned anti-Semitism and in Western Ukraine. Anti-Semitism was fanned by marginal nationalist groups and unpopular newspapers such as Za Vilnu Ukrayinu (For a Free Ukraine). Other anti-Semitic newspapers were equally marginal – Neskorena Natsiya (former political prisoner Ivan Kandyba, leader of OUN in Ukraine), Holos Natsii (UNA-UNSO), Vechirnyy Kyiv and Zvon Sevastopolya (neo-Soviet national Bolsheviks). In Kyiv, the main source of anti-Semitism through to 2008 was the private MAUP.

In the late Stalin era, ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ represented ‘thinly veiled, though unacknowledged, anti-Semitic overtones.’ Soviet anti-Semitic campaigns, disguised as anti-Zionism, have been promoted since the late 1940s by the Russophile, neo-Stalinist wing of the Soviet and Soviet Ukrainian Communist Parties which helps to explain why anti-Semitism has traditionally been part of Russian, Soviet and pan-Slavic nationalist discourse. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, one of the first anti-Zionist campaigns, the so-called ‘Doctors Plot,’ led to the closure of Yiddish theatre’s and Yiddish publications and arrest of Yiddish writers.

Jews and Zionists were attacked as agents of Western enemies of the Soviet Union in the same manner as were Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. Contemporary anti-Semitism in Eastern Ukraine, Belarus and Russia draws on Soviet campaigns against ‘Zionism.’ In 1963, the Soviet Ukrainian Academy of Sciences published Trofim Kichko’s book Judaism without embellishments and four years later a propaganda campaign against so-called ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘Talmudism’ linked Zionism with Nazism. Similar anti-Zionist campaigns were unfurled in Communist Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, whose regime’s ideology rests on a foundation of Soviet Belarusian nationalism, continues to propagate ‘Anti-Zionist’ propaganda. Eurasianism and anti-Zionism, in Per A. Rudling’s view, ‘has merged aspects of integral nationalism
with Stalinism into a new amalgamation, with many similarities with the Russian ‘New Right.’

The Soviet authorities also ignored and marginalised the Nazi genocide in order to not distract from their own narrative of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and three year Soviet collaboration with Nazi Germany. Administrative documents and maps erased Jewish culture and history ‘as if the Jewish people had never existed there although some cities had 50 per cent or 60 per cent Jewish populations before the war.’ Sheykhet, said ‘They wanted to destroy fully the understanding of the past, as if it had never existed. Jewish schools and synagogues were closed.’ Nazis and Stalinists used former Jewish tombstones to build roads. The Soviet regime ignored the Babi Yar massacres, as they did with the Jewish holocaust in general, and President Kravchuk became the first Ukrainian leader to visit Babi Yar to commemorate the 50th anniversary of this genocide. Jewish-Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Pinchuk and Stephen Spielberg are collaborating on the making of a movie on Babi Yar. In 2011, Pinchuk financially supported the excellent exhibition ‘Shoah by Bullets: Mass Shootings of Jews in Ukraine in 1941-1944’ in the Ukrainian Home.

Ukrainian surveys have shown higher levels of anti-Semitism in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and the Crimea than in Western Ukraine which is similar to higher levels of xenophobia found in these regions. Anti-Semitism has always existed in the senior echelons of Soviet power and Kuchma in this respect was little different. In the Soviet era, the Ukrainian SSR was ruled by Eastern Ukrainians from the Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk clans.

A January 2000 presidential decree called upon state institutions to ‘uproot anti-Semitism and put an end to any anti-Semitic actions in Ukraine.’ At the same time, the Mykola Melnychenko tapes made illicitly in the president’s office showed
President Kuchma to be an anti-Semite and xenophobe using anti-Semitic curses and rants against his political and business supporters and adversaries. Kuchma, discussing Jewish-Ukrainian oligarch Heorhiy Surkis and *Kievske Vedomosti* newspaper with State Tax Administration head (and current Prime Minister) Nikolai Azarov, says, ‘blya (fuck), why do we need a zhyd, blya.’ In another conversation, Kuchma describes opposition parliamentary deputy Oleksandr Yelyashkevych as a zhyd, ahead of ordering his police goons to physically attack him. In another taped episode, Azarov asked President Kuchma to approve an illegal scheme in which he could trade his 50 square meter apartment in Kyiv for one three times the size in a more desirable building. Playing on Kuchma’s anti-Semitism, Azarov said to him ‘Well, there the Jews would have to be taken out …’ The criminal scheme required the eviction of a Jewish family occupying the larger apartment to which President Kuchma gave his permission so that Azarov could take possession of the apartment. Kuchma and Azarov made anti-Semitic remarks when discussing the takeover of *Slovyansky Bank* owned by Director Boris Feldman and used anti-Semitic slurs against other Jewish directors.

The US State Departments 2011 report on human rights practices in Ukraine recorded anti-Semitic violence and vandalism in Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine (Kyiv, Pavlohrad, Sumy, Kirovochrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Melitopol, and Mykolayiv) and the Crimea (Sudak and Sevastopol). The US Embassy in Kyiv reported quite a lot of anti-Semitism in Odesa. US Embassy cables reported anti-Semitic attacks, vandalism and inflammatory articles in local newspapers in Odesa, particularly directed against former Mayor Hurvits. Former Odesa Jewish-Ukrainian Mayor Eduard Hurvits, who was politically aligned with Our Ukraine, was often subjected to anti-Semitic slurs by local members of the pro-
Kuchma political parties and the Party of Regions. These anti-Semitic campaigns usually appeared during election campaigns, such as that directed against Tymoshenko in 2010 alleging she was ‘Jewish.’\textsuperscript{40} In the 2002 elections, the NDP (People’s Democratic Party), which had emerged in the late 1980s from the Democratic Platform of the Soviet Ukrainian Communist Party and usually considered to be within the moderate wing of Ukrainian centrist parties, published many anti-Semitic cartoons and articles in its publications that I collected as an OSCE Long-Term Observer in Vynnytsya and Odesa oblasts. The Vynnytsya Jewish Religious Community wrote to the OSCE Election Mission complaining that the NDP newspaper \textit{Narodna Khvilya} (14 March 2002) ‘represents the views of the oblast head and therefore places under question the absence of anti-Semitism in state policies.’\textsuperscript{41}

The US State Departments 2011 report on human rights practices in Ukraine cited anti-Semitic programmes aired by the radio show \textit{Vik} on Kherson National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council and anti-Semitic articles in \textit{ZaZUBRina}, a newspaper published by the Russian and neo-Soviet nationalist party ZUBR (For the Union of Ukraine Belarus and Russia). The one anti-Semitic incident in Western Ukraine listed in the US State Departments report on human rights practices was against a Jewish cemetery in Ternopil.

**Ethnic Ukrainian Nationalists**

\textit{Émigré Nationalist OUNb: Failed Strategy towards Ukraine}

When Ukraine became an independent state in 1991, Ukrainian émigré groups continued with the policies they had pursued towards the USSR. ZP UHVR (external representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council)-OUNz (OUN
abroad) and OUNm (OUN-Andrei Melnyk wing) did not establish political parties in Ukraine and instead focused on civil society and educational work. In 1992, Prolog (New York) and Suchasnist (Munich) publishers transferred Suchasnist magazine to Kyiv where Ivan Dzyuba and Rutgers University historian Taras Hunczak became editors. OUNm registered as an NGO and moved the Olzhych Foundation to Kyiv where it publishes books. OUNm registered as an NGO and cooperated with the Ukrainian Republican Party which was a logical alliance of two centre-right statist (derzhavnyk) political forces. In 1992, OUNm weekly newspaper Ukrayinske Slovo (Ukrainian Word) began publication of a sister newspaper in Kyiv. In the early 1990s, Smoloskyp publishers moved its operations from Baltimore to Kyiv where it remains one of the few to publish books on Ukrainian politics. The OUNm policy of not seeking to export émigré political parties to Ukraine was evident in the decision of the UNR (Ukrainian Peoples Republic) government-in-exile, headed by OUNm leader Mykola Plavyuk, to transfer its legitimacy to the newly independent Ukrainian state on 22 August 1992 in a ceremony in the Ukrainian parliament. At the ceremony, Plavyuk, who passed his mantle to President Leonid Kravchuk, stated that the current Ukrainian state is the lawful successor to the UNR and a continuation of its authority and state traditions.

As in the Soviet era when OUNb attempted to build a nationalist underground in Soviet Ukraine, after 1991 the OUNb exported its political party to Ukraine. In 1991, the émigré OUNb aligned with the small DSU (State Independence of Ukraine) political party whose leaders had links to the underground National Front that had been active in Western Ukraine in the 1960s and 1970s. OUNb distanced itself from the largest, at that time, home grown nationalist group, the Inter-Party Assembly (MPA) that renamed itself the Ukrainian National Assembly
OUNb therefore did not support UNA leader Yuriy Shukhevych’s candidacy in Ukraine’s December 1991 presidential elections. Yuriy Shukhevych had spent thirty years in the Gulag for being the son of OUN leader and UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) commander Roman Shukhevych (nom de guerre Taras Chuprynka).

Instead of building up DSU in 1992, the OUNb founded the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) led by OUNb leader Yaroslava Stetsko from 1992 until she passed away in 2003. This step fractured the nationalist camp and suggested OUNb had dropped its support for DSU because its operating culture desired an organisation that it completely controlled. OUNb’s monopolistic and authoritarian tendencies had been very common in the Ukrainian diaspora and had led to splits in the British and American émigré communities. In 1995, Roman Zvarych, an OUNb activist from New York who had travelled to Ukraine with Yaroslava Stetsko to establish KUN, was expelled and established the small Demos think tank. Zvarych was elected to parliament by Rukh (1998), Our Ukraine (2002 and 2006) and Our Ukraine-Peoples Self Defense (NUNS) (2007).

Although KUN received support from the biggest and wealthiest Ukrainian émigré organization (covert OUNb operating through the overt World Liberation Front) it nevertheless proved to be a complete failure. Although OUNb had decades to prepare for their activities in independent Ukraine they failed to understand the local situation on the ground and, most importantly, the need for nationalist organisations to be led by charismatic and young leaders. Yaroslava Stetsko could never fit this bill whereas Svoboda party leader Oleh Tyahnybok could.
The problem of leadership was plainly evident in the 1998 parliamentary elections when KUN, Conservative Republican Party and Republican Party ‘Sobor’ campaigned for the Ukrainian parliament in the National Front bloc which received twelfth (out of 30) place and 2.71 per cent. The National Front advertisement on Ukrainian television was one of the weakest with three older generation Ukrainians (Yaroslava Stetsko, Stepan Khmara and Levko Lukyanenko) unable to mobilise young Ukrainians, something that Svoboda with its more charismatic and younger leaders was far more successful in undertaking.

By the 1998 elections the DSU had become an independent political force and joined with the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU, the future Svoboda party) in the Menshe Sliw (Fewer Words) bloc coming next to bottom with 0.16 per cent. From 1998, we hear nothing more of SU which goes de facto closes down whereas SNPU/Svoboda changes tactics and leader and within the fifteen years becomes Ukraine’s largest nationalist political force. Yaroslava Stetsko took KUN into Our Ukraine in the 2002 elections but passed away a year later when gas trader Oleksiy Ivchenko became KUN leader. KUN was a member of Our Ukraine in the 2006 elections but decided to not join NUNS in the 2007 pre-term elections.

After Ivchenko took over KUN the party’s earlier ties to the émigré OUNb declined and OUNb in effect retreated from Ukraine. Since 2003, OUNb and KUN have been different organisations with OUNb led by second generation Ukrainians from Germany (Andriy Haydamakha) and Australia (Stefan Romaniw). Worst still, KUN had been taken over by Galicians (such as Ivchenko) who were involved in the highly corrupt gas trade in Ukraine. OUNb and Svoboda have different supporters in the Ukrainian diaspora with the former based on the post-1945 Western Ukrainian diaspora and the latter on the fourth wave émigrés who grew up in Soviet Ukraine.
and have emigrated to the West since the 1990s. There is little contact between the two nationalist communities. The SNPU throughout the 1990s described UNA-UNSO, DSU and KUN/OUNb as ‘national-romantics’ and Rukh and national democratic parties as ‘national-collaborators.’

Creating paramilitaries also proved to be failure. In 1993, the Stepan Bandera Sports-Patriotic Association Tryzub (Trident) was established by KUN as its paramilitary arm, mimicking UNA, DSU and the SNPU who also established paramilitary formations.48 Tryzyb also followed in the tradition of a political organisation (KUN/OUN) having its military forces (Tryzub/UPA). Paramilitaries suffered from the same problem as KUN, that of infiltration by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) who undoubtedly drew upon KGB strategies that had been successfully developed since the 1940s against OUN and the émigré OUNb.49 Some of these ties between the Soviet security services and underground nationalists were used to infiltrate emerging nationalist groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s.50 In the post-Soviet world, long-standing KGB infiltration strategies continued to be pursued by its successor organisation, the SBU. Zvarych believes he was expelled from KUN through the work of SBU agents who had infiltrated the party. There was additionally the problem of corruption which could be used to corrupt and off buy political groups. KUN, for example, was purchased by Ivchenko to be the krysha (political roof) for his corrupt gas business interests that enabled him to be appointed by President Yushchenko the chairman of the state Naftohaz Ukrainy gas company.51

Tryzub split from KUN in the late 1990s and aligned with Bohdan Boyko who led Rukh for Unity which received financial support from the presidential administration.52 Rukh for Unity was one of two break away groups (the other being
the Ukrainian People’s party [UNP] led by Yuriy Kostenko) from Rukh led by Vyacheslav Chornovil until his car accident in March 1999. In March 2001, Tryzub members acted as *agent provocateurs* in provoking a riot in Kyiv leading to mass arrests of UNA-UNSO leaders and members who were imprisoned and sentenced. Boyko stood as one of a number of technical (i.e. virtual) nationalist presidential candidates in the 2004 elections to attract votes from Yushchenko, inflaming inter-ethnic tension and fanning nationalist stereotypes of Yushchenko. The relationship with the Kuchma regime ended in 2004 and from then Tryzub adopted a more independently nationalist position. In December 2010, Trzyzub members beheaded the Stalin monument in Zaporizhzhya and they were arrested on charges of ‘terrorism’ after the monument was mysteriously blown up a few days later.

The case of Tryzub shows, like that of KUN taken over in 2003 by a corrupt gas trader, that the OUNb émigré strategy in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras of establishing parties and movements in Ukraine was misplaced and led to infiltration by the security services. Overall, therefore, in the same way as in the Soviet era, the émigré strategy pursued by democratic nationalists of focusing on educational and civil society work was again the correct course of action to take, this time in independent Ukraine. The strategy adopted by OUNb of establishing an underground organisation in Soviet Ukraine and a political party in independent Ukraine were undermined by the KGB in the first instance and by the SBU and lingering influence of Soviet political culture in the second.

*Svoboda: The Successful Home-grown Nationalist Party*
New nationalist groups emerged in Soviet and independent Ukraine in the late 1980s and 1990s which included UNA-UNSO, DSU, KUN, and the SNPU/Svoboda. By the second decade of Ukrainian independence, most of these nationalist groups had become marginalised and had little influence, with the sole exception of Svoboda. The DSU had ceased to exist as a political party by the late 1990s and last participated in Ukrainian elections in 1998. By the late 1990s the UNA had split into different wings with one headed by the well-known UNA leader and television presenter Dmytro Korchynskyy establishing the Eurasianist Bratstvo (Brotherhood) party. Korchynsky’s bodyguard was a Russian Nazi. A competing UNA group led by Andriy Shkil formed the radical wing of the Ukraine without Kuchma movement and was decapitated by mass arrests of its members following the March 2001 riots when eighteen leading UNA members were convicted and sentenced, including Shkil who was elected to parliament in 2002 in the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT). By the election of Yushchenko in 2004 all of the nationalist groups active in the 1990s had become marginal.

In October 1991, in Lviv, the SNPU was established but not registered until five years later and its first participation in elections in 1998 in the Menshe Sliv bloc was a dismal failure. Tyahnybok had been a founding member of the SNPU when he led the Student Brotherhood (SB) in Lviv in 1991-1994, eighty per cent of whose members joined the new political party. In addition to student members, the SNPU attracted support from Varta Rukh (Rukh paramilitary] Guard), individuals who had acted as paramilitary stewards for Rukh in its early days and until 1998. Yaroslav Andrushkiv led the SNPU and Yuriy Kryvoruchko, a leading member of Varta Rukh, focused on ideology. In 1993, the SNPU, similar to KUN and UNA, established paramilitary ‘popular guard units’ that became the base for the creation of the
Society to Assist the Armed Forces and Navy of Ukraine, *Patriot Ukrayiny*. In 2004, after Tyahnybok became leader, the newly refurbished *Svoboda* cut its ties to *Patriot Ukrayiny*.

The SNPU chose to emulate Joerg Haider’s Austrian Freedom party by changing its name in 2004 from the Nazi-sounding Social-National Party of Ukraine to the *Freedom (Svoboda)* party. In the 1990s SNPU’s symbol was suspiciously similar to the *Hakenkreuz* (hook-cross or swastika) used by the Nazis – which perturbed émigré OUNb members. *Svoboda* leaders such as Tyahnybok have routinely used anti-Semitic slurs and the Our Ukraine faction expelled him after a racist and anti-Semitic speech in 2004. The SNPU has cooperated with France’s National Front (FN) party since 2000 when FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen visited Ukraine and the SNPU joined Euronet (bringing together European nationalist political parties since 1997). Again, this strategy of integrating the SNPU/Svoboda into the European nationalist milieu was very different to that of OUNb which has always been highly ghettoised. OUNb’s foreign affairs was organised through the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) that, with its ties to authoritarian and military regimes in Latin America and East Asia, had little credibility in Europe and North America.

Since the 1990s, UNA, KUN and *Svoboda* have propagated the cult of nationalist heroes in Galicia which has included torchlight marches by nationalists dressed in paramilitary fatigues and party attire, unveiling of monuments to nationalist leaders, billboards praising the Galicia SS Division and the mass renaming of streets in honour of Ukrainian nationalist leaders. The cult of Bandera was at first an understandable reaction to Soviet propaganda against Ukrainian nationalism and the labelling of nationally conscious Ukrainians as ‘Banderites.’ In
1991, the Lviv oblast council under Chairman Chornovil voted to rename the street where the KGB had its headquarters ‘Bandera street.’ Nevertheless, Bandera was an unusual cult hero; after all, he had lived for most of his life outside Ukraine in Poland and Germany. During World War II, he was under house arrest and, although espousing a ‘revolutionary’ ideology, never returned to Soviet Ukraine to join the armed underground in the 1940s where it had been led by Mykola Lebed, Roman Shukhevych, and Vasyl Kuk in 1941-1952. Indeed, why did Bandera, the alleged ‘revolutionary,’ not return to the revolution in his homeland?

The SNPU has always been well funded which has raised suspicions about the source of its financial base because of two factors. Firstly, these funds did not come from the émigré OUNb, the wealthiest émigré organisation, with whom relations have always been poor (OUNb invested in DSU and KUN and distrusted UNA-UNSO and Svoboda). Secondly, as mentioned earlier with corruption rife and people easily bought off in post-Soviet Ukraine it was not surprising that rumours abounded about the source of Svoboda’s financial resources. Similar rumours had existed in the 1990s about UNA-UNSO, many of which originating in KUN. Parties of Regions oligarchs reportedly financed Svoboda in a dual strategy to take votes from national democrats in Western Ukraine and mobilise Eastern Ukrainian voters against the threat from ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ (i.e. orange political forces and leaders). Svoboda’s nationalism is unpopular in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and therefore it would never become a threat to the Party of Regions in their home base. Wilson describes Svoboda as ‘scarecrow party’ to indirectly mobilise support for the authorities in the same manner as the loyal nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.57 These parties, together with the Communists, ‘have for years been in the business of losing elections.’58
The Ukrainian media have alleged that oligarch Igor Kolomoyskyy (with oil and gas interests in Western Ukraine) and more recently senior Party of Regions leaders Volodomyr Sivkovich, Borys Kolesnikov, and Andrei Kluyev have provided financial assistance to Svoboda. As party financing in Ukraine, where the shadow economy accounts for 40-50 per cent of GDP, is completely opaque it is not surprising there is no smoking gun.

As Seen in Table 2, the authorities support for virtual nationalists in Ukraine is long-standing.

**Table 2. Virtual Nationalists Financed by Eastern Ukrainian Oligarchs and the Presidential Administration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rukh-Statist Opposition (renamed Rukh for the Nation)</td>
<td>Donetsk clan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society for the Rebirth of the Ukrainian Nation</td>
<td>Donetsk clan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian Peoples Self Defence Forces ([IUNA-UNSO] Yurii Tyma wing)</td>
<td>Donetsk clan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian National Assembly (Eduard Kovalenko wing)</td>
<td>Social Democratic United Party of Ukraine (SDPUo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUN in Ukraine (Roman Kozak)</td>
<td>SDPUo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukh for Unity (Bohdan Boyko) and Tryzub paramilitary group</td>
<td>SDPUo and Presidential Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukh (Hennadyy Udovenko)</td>
<td>Presidential Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratstvo (Dmytro Korchynskyy)</td>
<td>Presidential Administration, SDPUo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUN (Oleksiy Ivchenko and Andriy Lopushansky)</td>
<td>High Level Ties to the Gas Lobby and Naftohaz Ukrainy (from 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svoboda (Oleh Tyahnybok)</td>
<td>Igor Kolomoyskyy, Donetsk clan (until 2010?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**


Although a smoking gun is near impossible to find in Ukraine’s opaque political world at the same time, there is evidence of the authorities indirectly
supporting Svoboda. BYuT boycotted the March 2009 Ternopil oblast council elections, called with the support of President Yushchenko, and the two beneficiaries were Svoboda and United Centre led by Chief of Staff Viktor Baloga. After Yanukovych came to power, the authorities indirectly assisted in increasing Svoboda’s popularity. In the October 2010 local elections, the blocking of Batkivshchina’s ability to run candidates in Lviv worked favourably for Svoboda. In 2010-2011, on the eve of parliamentary elections and when media censorship was growing and the opposition were not given airtime, Svoboda was disproportionately invited to participate in political television discussion shows. In 2011, Svoboda representatives, at a time when they were not present in parliament, participated in every second Shuster Live (State Channel 1) and Yevhen Kyslyiv’s Velyka Polityka (Big Politics) on Inter.60

The marginalization of Yushchenko and Our Ukraine after 2010 and imprisonment of Tymoshenko in 2011 opened up a vacuum in opposition politics. Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who had aligned with the anti-Tymoshenko ‘pragmatic’ wing of NUNS and formed Front for Change, failed to become prime minister after Yanukovych was elected and or negotiate a deal with Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov.61 In 2012, he merged the Front for Change political party with Batkivshchina (Fatherland) that Tymoshenko leads into a United Opposition.62 Our Ukraine’s place was taken by boxing champion Vitaliy Klitschko’s UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms).63 Yatsenyuk and Tyahnybok, whose Svoboda came fifth in the 2012 elections with over ten per cent support, have established a very close opposition alliance. Are they both faking their opposition or are they more likely merely part and parcel of Ukraine’s tumultuous and virtual politics where loyalties are never more than short-term marriages of convenience. Ideological
preferences remain fluid in Ukraine; for example, Yatsenyuk’s 2010 election campaign supported a pan-Slavic Kyiv Rus state first raised as an objective by UNA-UNSO in 1992 when their volunteers went to Trans-Dniester region to fight on the side of neo-Soviet separatists. A quarter of anti-Russian Svoboda voters support Ukraine’s membership in the CIS Customs Union.

Whereas it is possible that Svoboda accepted funding from oligarchs with ties to Yushchenko (Kolomoyskyy) or the Party of Regions (Kolesnikov, Kluyev) this may have subsided after Yanukoych came to power when Svoboda evolved from phantom into a real threat. Nevertheless, in the March 2015 elections the Svoboda nationalist bogeyman will again be useful to the Yanukovych election campaign if Yatsenyuk, rather than Klitschko, enters the second round.

**Russian and Soviet Nationalism in Ukraine**

In Ukraine, Soviet and Russian nationalism, routinely ignored by scholars and journalists alike, represents a graver threat to Ukraine’s democratic system and European integration. Intolerance and xenophobia to outsiders is far higher in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. In Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea a higher number of monuments and placards of historical figures and national tragedies have been defaced and vandalised by Russian nationalists than vandalism directed against Soviet monuments in Western and Central Ukraine. A Kyiv street plaque commemorating Ukrainian nationalist leader Symon Petlura was destroyed by the Slavic Party. The Eurasian Youth Union destroyed a monument to the UPA in Kharkiv and a Tryzub (Trident) monument at the top of Hoverla, a mountain on the border of Transcarpathian and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts. Monuments to World War
II Soviet soldiers (as opposed to statues of Lenin) are rarely defaced in Western Ukraine (in contrast to the few remaining Soviet Communist symbols).

Intolerance of alternative opinions is far higher in Eastern than Western Ukraine. Dominique Arel pointed out that, ‘political culture in Eastern Ukraine is based on intimidation. Kuchma in the late 1990s tried, and ultimately failed, to institute the ‘blackmail’ state. Yanukovych learned nothing from the Orange Revolution and everything from Putin that to stay in power, you have to bully your opponents.’ Arel believes, ‘Western commentators have often been suspicious of its (Ukrainian nationalism) intent and possible consequences. Nationalism is the desire to have one’s state or to make an existing state ‘national’ but how to define ‘national’ has been contested). It can have its ugly side, and the rise of Svoboda in Galicia is not pretty.’ Arel continues:

‘But let the record show that Ukrainian nationalism, in the empirically verifiable field of Ukrainian politics of the last twenty years, has been the driving force behind democracy, while Ukrainian anti-nationalism, for lack of a better word, a.k.a. the political forces grounded in Eastern Ukraine, have aimed at the dismantlement of democracy. Rukh in the 1990s, Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko Bloc in the 2000s had serious flaws (rule of law, historical memory), but they were, in their actions, not just in words, for free elections and a free media. Political culture in Central-Western Ukraine is rowdy, exasperating in its incomprehension of the law, but open.’

The Party of Regions, whether it has been in opposition or in power, has been the most aggressive and violent political force in Ukraine, evidence for which is
to be found inside and outside parliament. Two Ukrainian activists were murdered by Russian nationalists, composer Ihor Bilozir in Lviv on 8 May 2000 and Odesa State University student and member of the patriotic youth movement Sich Maksym Chayka in Odesa on 17 April 2009. Meanwhile, no Russian nationalist or activist has died at the hands of Ukrainian nationalists in independent Ukraine. In September 2012, thugs attacked Ukrainian language activists in Kharkiv with knives.

Violence has been especially prevalent during election campaigns. In the 2004 elections the Yanukovych campaign’s strategy of ‘directed chaos’ nearly brought the country to the brink of conflict. A leaked document laid out a strategy of pitting ‘nationalists’ (Yushchenko election campaign) against ‘criminal groupings’ (Yanukovych campaign). A terrorist attack in Kyiv in August 2004 that led to casualties was blamed on pro-Yushchenko nationalists but was part of this covert strategy by the authorities of ‘directed chaos.’ The Kyiv bombers had links to UNA-Kovalenko (see below) and Bratstvo. These two virtual nationalist groups and Boyko’s Rukh for Unity were allegedly financed by Medvedchuk’s SDPUo.

Violence returned to Ukrainian politics with the election of Yanukovych as president in February 2010. On 16 December 2010, Party of Regions deputies violently attacked opposition deputies sleeping overnight in parliament who were protesting against political repression of Tymoshenko, cabinet members in her 2007-2010 government and the Batkivshchina party. Ukrainian Catholic University Professor Yaroslav Hrytsak warned that the Yanukovych administration was ‘placing Ukraine on the verge of civil war.’

Skinheads
The use of the term ‘skinheads’ (бритоголови [literally heads shaved by cut throat razers]) has three meanings in Ukraine and the post-Soviet space.

The first meaning refers to athletic looking employees of security companies who are used in corporate raiding and business disputes. Corporate raiding has always been a major problem in Ukraine but is growing since 2010 and often appears in the form of the security forces operating together with sportsmen who work in private security firms. Many of these are often tied indirectly to, or have their origins in, organised crime going back to the 1990s when Donetsk, Crimea and Odesa were the most violent regions in Ukraine’s transition to a market economy. Donetsk and Crimea are two of the major strongholds of the Party of Regions. From the late 1990s onwards, Donetsk and Crimean organised crime autoritety (leaders) - vory v zakone (thieves in law) – were integrated into the Party of Regions. Yanukovych himself has three prison convictions for violent robbery and gang rape and was an autoritet in prison where he was reputedly a pakhan (an informal leader among the prisoners) who ruled prisons with the consent of prison guards and possessed a monopoly of informal power after dark when they exercised total dominance over their territory and subordinates. The Party of Economic Revival ([PEVK] which in 1998 was renamed the Party of Economic Revival) was closely linked to organised crime from the early 1990s even though its leaders included senior former Crimean Communists such as Mykola Bahrov. The Christian-Liberal party was a ‘straightforward mafia front’ where ‘only the words ‘of Crimea’ bore any relation to reality.’ Organised crime gang warfare in the first half of the 1990s destroyed the PEVK and Christian-Liberal parties. The closure of political kryshy for Crimean organised crime only took place when Hennadiy Moskal headed the autonomous republic’s police department and when Yuriy Lutsenko was Interior Minister. First
Deputy Head of the parliamentary committee on the Struggle against Organised
Crime and Corruption Hennadiy Moskal, who has a long professional career in the
Security Service and police, has intelligence on eight organised crime autoritety in
the Party of Regions.\textsuperscript{80} It is therefore not surprising that the political culture of the
Party of Regions is violent and criminal.

The 2004 Yanukovych election campaign drew on these criminals to
intimidate voters and vote by absentee ballot. Sportsmen with links to organised
crime and private security companies have been routinely drawn upon by the
SDPUo, Viktor Medvedchuk when he was Kuchma’s Chief of Staff, the Party of
Regions and the Yanukovych administration. In Transcarpathia, controlled by the
SDPUo from the late 1990s until 2004 organised crime, politics and business formed
a similar nexus to that in Donetsk, Crimea and Odesa.\textsuperscript{81} These bratky (prison slang
for bratstvo [criminal brotherhood or fraternity]) intimidate voters, support
election fraud, and beat up journalists and opposition activists.\textsuperscript{82} Korchynskyy
deliberately named his nationalist party Bratstvo to allude to these criminal
fraternities.

The standard uniform of these criminal thugs – very short hair, leather
jacket, sports trousers and strong physique – was common throughout the former
USSR. Their short hair was accompanied by ‘intimidating physical proportions ad
brand-name sportswear.’ \textsuperscript{83} The USSR placed great emphasis, in the manner of all
totalitarian states, upon public sport activities. Vadim Volkov writes that, ‘Sportsmen
naturally formed the core of the emerging racketeering groups.’\textsuperscript{84} Sports in the USSR
was intimately linked to the Interior Ministry and military and, in some cases, to
large factories and these ties facilitated close collaboration between sportsmen and
young, battle scarred, Afghan veterans who began returning home in 1989. Together
they provided the ‘muscle’ for an organised crime brigada because of their fighting skills, will power, discipline and team spirit.\(^{85}\) Afgantsi added a contemptuous attitude to death, resolute use of force and low value placed on life. With the disintegration of the USSR from the late 1980s and decline of state budgetary funding, sportsmen looked to the emerging private economic sector for employment. Volkov writes:

“Therefore, the crisis in the state budget and in enterprise finances, combined with the corrosion of the Soviet system of values disrupted the reproduction of the institution of sports and triggered various adaptive responses on the part of sportsmen.”\(^{86}\)

A **second meaning** is when they have been used by the authorities to violently attack the democratic opposition;\(^{87}\) for example, by the Party of Regions to secure desired election results in the 2004 and 2012 elections.\(^{88}\) Serhiy Tihipko, then head of the Yanukovych election campaign, threatened Polish negotiators during the first round-table that they would bring 20, 000 coalminers to Kyiv.\(^{89}\) Yanukovych told the Party of Regions congress “They simply awaited the signal to defend our choice. With regret I called upon them to return home but I told them we would soon return.”\(^{90}\) In the 2004 elections the Yanukovych election campaign paid for 20-40,000 (there are different estimates) supporters to travel to Kyiv with the purpose of unblocking government buildings (which would not have been possible without violence) and violently dispersing the Maydan.\(^{91}\) They ‘looked more characteristic of the 1990s and wore sports trousers and leather jackets with short cropped hair. They huddled close together and spoke quietly “as in the zona (prison camp)”.’\(^{92}\)
In the 2004 elections these skinheads included an unwieldy and undisciplined mix of coalminers, organised crime enforcers, and police cadets. The authorities had long used police cadets to attack pro-democracy protestors during the 2000-2001 Ukraine without Kuchma protests and outside the Central Election Commission in October 2004. During the violence outside the Central Election Commission the opposition found police identity cards on agents’ provocateurs. Tetyana Nikolayenko describes the Yanukovych administration as Влада бритоголових (skinhead-led authorities).

In February 2013, during a nation-wide ‘maydan’ with the President where citizens were supposedly permitted to submit questions those who attempted to submit critical questions were threatened by, ‘many people in jogging suits and black hats, and cadets. Later, one of the activists said that people in sports attire promised to break his legs because he tried to put forward a question.’

These skinheads are often guns for hire by the authorities. In the 2004 elections virtual nationalists, such as UNA led by Eduard Kovalenko, were used by the authorities to depict Yushchenko as a Nazi. UNA-Kovalenko marched in Kyiv in SS-style uniforms pretending to be Yushchenko supporters. In April 2013, in Cherkasy fake Svoboda supporters attacked an opposition rally holding anti-Semitic banners.

A third meaning refers to Nazi and skinhead political groups who integrate pan-Slavism and nationalism. It is quite possible that some skinheads belong to both groups in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and the Crimea where the overwhelming majority of instances of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism committed by Nazi, skinhead and Russian nationalist groups take place.
Traditional neo-Nazi skinheads emerged from the Mod culture in Britain in the late 1960s and spread to Europe and North America. These skinheads are more numerous and often receive funding from Russia to establish Ukrainian branches of Russian organisations which explains why they are more prominent in Eastern Ukraine where multiple identities exist. Police statistics showed that one third of skinheads arrested in Ukraine are actually Russian nationals. A US Embassy cable reported that skinheads ‘are present in a number of oblasts including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Sumy, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsya, Odesa, and Zhytomyr.’ In addition, ‘The Sevastopol Movement against Illegal Immigrants has a following among neo-Nazi skinheads.’ The Ukrainian Movement against Illegal Immigrants has two wings, pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian, and the US Embassy in Kyiv reported, ‘Some experts allege that both wings get financing and guidance from Russia.’ This was a product, a US Embassy cable explained, of ‘the nexus of Russian and Ukrainian skinhead movements to common cultural, linguistic, and historical ties. There is frequent contact between Ukrainian and Russian skinheads including attendance of demonstrations and concerts in their respective countries.’

Virtual (pan-Slavic) Ukrainian nationalist projects have included Bratstvo as one of a number of outgrowths from UNA-UNSO, and the national Bolshevik Progressive Socialist Party, who are both members of the Eurasian movement. Bratstvo joined the Highest Council of the Moscow-based International Eurasian Movement and the Highest Council of the Eurasian Youth Union. In the 2012 elections, the Party of Regions supported Bratstvo party leader Korchynskyy who ran in a Kyiv single mandate seat. The Eurasian Youth Union, whose ‘ideology favors Russian imperialism,’ is ‘extremist’ and anti-American’ and ‘controlled by the Kremlin is most active inside Ukraine in the Crimea, Sumy, Donetsk, Kyiv and
Pan-Slavic Eurasianism had always been part of UNA’s ideological arsenal, which has been visible when its paramilitary arm, UNSO fought with Transdniestrian separatist forces against the Moldovan state in 1992 and in the Kosovo conflict on the side of Serbs in the late 1990s. Transdniestrian, which had been the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) in inter-war Soviet Ukraine, has an ethnic Ukrainian majority and UNSO claimed to be fighting on the side of Ukrainians. In 1993, UNA leader Korchynskyy said: ‘Our people have become used to living in a big state. We will make Ukraine into a large state so that the people will have no need to change their habits.’

In 2005, the Ministry of Justice registered Patriot Ukrayiny (Patriot of Ukrayiny) as a civic organisation and it has branches in Kyiv, Poltava, and Chernihiv. Patriot of Ukraine was formerly the youth wing of the Svoboda party but they disbanded it in 2004. Patriot of Ukraine received public attention in August 2011 when the SBU arrested its leaders for allegedly planning to organise a terrorist attack on 24 August, Ukraine’s annual holiday to commemorate the 1991 Declaration of Independence. Patriot of Ukraine cooperates with the unregistered Ukrainian National-Labour Party and pro-Russian Crimean Cossack groups, most likely the reason why Svoboda, a party promoting ethnic Ukrainian nationalism, cut its ties.

Members of the Ukrainian National-Labour Party are primarily skinheads and neo-Nazis operating in the Crimea (Simferopol), Zaporizhzhya, Kharkiv and Kherson, all in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, Kyiv, Uman, Vynnytsia, and Kirovohrad in Central Ukraine and in Galician and Rivne in Western Ukraine. The National Socialist Party of Slavs has a similar regional distribution of supporters and has Russian and Ukrainian branches. In Sevastopol, skinheads have organised underground cells and with assistance from skinheads in Yalta, Kharkiv and St.
Petersburg have undertaken violent attacks, sometimes using explosives and weapons, against non-Slavic peoples. Russian and Soviet nationalism remains influential and popular in the Crimea where Party of Regions and Russian nationalist publications and groups fan Ukrainophobia and anti-Tatar xenophobia.

**Conclusions**

In Ukraine, Russian and Soviet nationalism is more popular than ethnic Ukrainian nationalism but there has not been extensive scholarly research into these twin and inter-related phenomenon.\(^{103}\) Russian and Soviet nationalism are also more aggressive forces and exhibit greater levels of intolerance than contemporary ethnic Ukrainian nationalism with the Crimea displaying far greater xenophobia than Western Ukraine. A similar number of Western and Eastern Ukrainians would protest against discrimination of racial or ethnic groups.\(^{104}\)

Although corruption and opaque funding exists among all Ukrainian political forces only the Party of Regions, Russian and Soviet nationalists also have ties to organised crime. Russian and Soviet nationalists have also been far more successful in elections than ethnic Ukrainian nationalists who until the breakthrough by the *Svoboda* party in 2012 had suffered numerous setbacks. Even taking into account the *Svoboda* breakthrough, Russian and Soviet nationalism is at least four times as popular as ethnic Ukrainian nationalism. US diplomatic cables from Kyiv show that many of these groups have extensive ties to skinhead movements in Russia. and ethnic nationalism, anti-Semitism and pan Eastern Slavism and Eurasianism.
References

17. Ibid. Dzhemilev’s remarks are cited by http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/03/14/6985569/
25. Vilnu Ukrainina (Free Ukraine), the Lviv oblast Communist Party newspaper, was renamed Za Vilnu Ukrainina following the March 1990 elections when democratic forces won majorities in Lviv and other Galician councils. Vyacheslav Chornovil became head of Lviv oblast council and Za Vilnu Ukrainina, edited by Vasyl Baziv, had a large circulation and espoused a democratic orientation. By
the mid-1990s, after Chornovil moved to Kyiv to lead Rukh, the newspaper became a marginal nationalist publication.


27 Typical of anti-Zionist (i.e. anti-Semitic) propaganda was Trofim K. Kichko, Judaism without Embellishment (Kyiv: Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, 1963) and T.K. Kichko, Judaism and Zionism (Kyiv: Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, 1968).


32 Interview with M. Sheykhet.


34 The decree was published in Uryadovyj Kuryer, 11 January 2000.


42 The video film of the event can be found at http://www.istpravda.com.ua/videos/2012/01/22/69657/


45 Yaroslava Stetsko was not even respected within her own émigré OUNb ranks. Personal information collected by the author.

46 In the 1998 elections, the first in which political parties began to use modern campaign techniques, I was a Long Term Observer (LTO) for the OSCE with responsibility for monitoring the Ukrainian media, a position which included long hours watching party political advertisements on television.

47 On the links between Western Ukrainian nationalists and the gas trade see T.Kuzio,’Ukraine Opposition Hurts Energy Independence,’ Moscow Times, 7 April 2013.
A scandal erupted after Oleksiy Ivenchenko purchased a quarter of a million dollar Mercedes with NaftohazUkrayini funds that forced Yushchenko to replace him. Andrew Wilson wrongly writes that Tryzub was established by the SBU to provide Boyko’s Rukh for Unity with a paramilitary force. Tryzub were a bona fide paramilitary force established by KUN and only later aligned with Boyko. See A. Wilson, Virtual politics: faking democracy in the post-Soviet world (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), p.156.


An in-depth analysis of Ukrainians who fought in the German armed forces during World War II can be found in Andriy Bolyanovskiy, Ukrayinski Viyiskovi Formuvannya v Zbroynykh Sylakh Nimechyny (1939-1945) (Lviv: Lviv State University and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2003).


and


This is analysed in T. Kuzio, ‘Yushchenko versus Tymoshenko: Why Ukraine’s National Democrats Are Divided,’ Demokratizatsiya, vol. 21, no. 2 (spring 2013), pp.215-240.

The election law used in that year’s parliamentary elections was changed and prevented blocs from running.


A quarter of Batiyukchina voters and 29 per cent of UDAR voters also support a CIS Customs Union. The figures for Party of Regions and Communist Party voters (69 and 79 per cent respectively) are far higher. Vybor-2012: politychnе struktuvannya susil’svita ta perspektivy bahatopartiynosti v Ukrayini, Democratic Initiatives and Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, Kyiv, 1 October 2012.
A taste of this anti-nationalism strategy can be found in the Party of Regions statement after the opposition protests in Kyiv on 2 April 2013.

Polish human rights activists called upon the Ukrainian authorities to ban Russian nationalist organisations in the Crimea for inflaming inter-ethnic tension.

Dominique Arel, ‘Five Thoughts on the Tymoshenko Verdict,’ The Ukraine List, no.454 (12 October 2011).


The secret plans were leaked by the presidential administration to Yuriy Lutsenko and published by Ukrayinska Pravda, 30 August 2004.

Dominique Arel, ‘Five Thoughts on the Tymoshenko Verdict,’ The Ukraine List, no.454 (12 October 2011).


The violent attack can be watched at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLfLT9xMVuo


A.Wilson, Virtual Politics, pp.69, 247.

Interview with Hennadiy Moskal in Ukrayinska Pravda, 21 March 2013.


Ibid., p.7.

Ibid., p.8.

Ibid.


http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ukraine_list/ukl354_11.html


92 Interview with Oleksandr Popov, one of the organiser of Nichna Varta (Night Watch) during the Orange Revolution, Ukrayinska Pravda, 27 January 2006.

http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2006/01/27/3057173/


94 T. Nikolayenko, ‘Vlada brytoholovykh,’ Ukrayinska Pravda, 7 February 2012.

http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/02/8/6983115/


96 See the video at http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/04/6/6987577/


100 Komentarii, 16 October 2010.


102 See the video of the National Socialist Movement – Slavic Union at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=593_1224001386

103 Oleksandr Mayboroda, Rosiyskyy Natsionalizm v Ukrayini (1991-1998 r.r.) (Kyiv: Kyiv Mohyla Academy, 1999) was funded by a German grant and only covers the 1990s.