The 2002 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine: Democratization or Authoritarianism?

TARAS KUZIO

The 2002 parliamentary elections, the third since Ukraine became an independent state in 1991, falling towards the end of President Leonid Kuchma’s second term of office, marked a new stage in Ukraine’s progress in democratization. Although the elections were conducted using the same election law as in 1998 (dividing parliament into equal groups elected by proportional and majoritarian representation), the context was radically different. The 2002 elections were the prelude to the 2004 presidential elections and Kuchma’s retirement from office and pitted for the first time the left and right opposition against the pro-presidential centre. Both sides were radicalized either by the ‘Kuchmagate’ scandal (the opposition) or in the search for immunity from prosecution (Kuchma and the ‘oligarchs’). The elections showed that Ukraine is the only CIS state with a large pro-Western reform movement, Viktor Yushchenko’s ‘Our Ukraine’ bloc, which came first in the proportional half of the election. The impact of ethno-cultural and regional factors continued to influence the outcome of the election by inhibiting the popularity of reformist forces such as Our Ukraine in eastern Ukraine.

This article surveys the 31 March 2002 parliamentary election in Ukraine by placing it within the context of the development of Ukraine’s political regime during the two terms of President Leonid Kuchma, first elected in July 1994 and re-elected in November 1999. The 2002 election was undertaken using a law similar to that used in the 1998 election, whereby 250 deputies are elected through proportional party lists with a four per cent threshold, and the remaining 250 deputies in first-past-the-post majoritarian constituencies. These two elections contrasted sharply with the 1994 election, when a fully majoritarian law was used.¹

The mixed electoral law favours different contestants in Ukraine’s elections. Parties and blocs that have clear ideological profiles exist only on

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the left or the right within Ukraine’s political spectrum. On the left these have evolved from the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), which was banned in August 1991. In September that year a Socialist Party (SPU) was created and in October 1993 a new KPU was legalized. On the right, parties have evolved from the Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh) created in September 1989. Two parties on the left (KPU and SPU) and two blocs on the right (Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc) obtained 57.68 per cent of votes on the proportional list.

Pro-presidential oligarchic clans have their origins in the top echelons of the pre-1991 KPU nomenklatura who moved into the ‘sovereign (national) communist’ camp in 1990–91. In the early post-Soviet era they were dubbed the unconstituted ‘party of power’. By 1998 they had taken over centrist political parties or created new ones in an attempt to carve out a ‘pragmatic centrist’ niche for themselves lying between the ideologically driven parties on left and right.

Although the pro-presidential oligarchic parties describe themselves as ‘centrist’, this is a misnomer as they are devoid of ideology and merely kryshy (roofs) for business and regional groups. In other words, they are top-heavy fake parties that are akin to business holdings. As is typical of such centrist parties, in Donetsk people were forcibly made to join the local ‘party of power’, Regions of Ukraine, which was one of five parties that made up the pro-presidential For a United Ukraine (ZUY) bloc.2

The ideological amorphousness of this group (‘sovereign’ or ‘national’ communists, ‘party of power’, oligarchs, centrists) has meant that since 1990 they have always had the lowest record of parliamentary attendance and are difficult to organize as a united group. After the 2002 elections repeated attempts to create a pro-presidential majority therefore were seen to have failed.

Pro-presidential centrist parties obtain better election results in the majoritarian half of the elections where state officials and businessmen can be elected as ‘independents’. In the 2002 elections the pro-presidential bloc ZUY and the Social Democratic united Party (SDPU-o)4 obtained only a combined 18.04 per cent in the proportional half of the elections. Only two of the six parties and blocs that surpassed the four per cent threshold were ‘centrist’. Viktor Medvedchuk, chairman of the SDPU-o, was made head of the presidential administration in May 2002.5

By the end of 2002 the Ukrainian parliament was roughly divided into two nearly equal camps, one pro-presidential and the other in opposition. Our Ukraine’s insistence that it had ‘won’ the elections was only partially correct because this was only the case in the proportional half of the elections. Pro-presidential forces obtained most of their deputies from
majoritarian districts which were bolstered after the elections by defections from the opposition, many of them under pressure.6

The outcome of the 2002 election was different from that in earlier elections. The rise of a new oligarchic ruling class in alliance with the executive in 1998–99 and the onset of the ‘Kuchmagate’ crisis in 2000–01 led to the first serious split between the ‘sovereign (national) communist’ or centrist–national democratic coalition that had run Ukraine since independence in 1991. By the 2002 elections national democrats had moved into the radical anti-presidential camp (the Tymoshenko bloc)7 or into moderate opposition (Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine). In the 2002 elections two left- and two right-wing blocs and parties therefore faced the pro-presidential camp.

In the 1990s Ukrainian statehood, sovereignty and territorial integrity had pushed the oligarchic centrists and national democrats into an uneasy alliance against domestic (communist) and foreign (Russian) threats. By the 2002 elections Ukraine was an established state with uncontested borders, and the primary issue facing the country had therefore changed to what kind of Ukraine was to be built. Ideologically driven parties on the left and right supported democratization (but were divided over economic reform) and were pitted against the executive and oligarchs who favoured an authoritarian electoral democracy.

The inability of national democratic parties to make headway in largely Russian-speaking East Ukraine has bedevilled Rukh since the March 1990 elections. The 2002 elections confirmed the inhibiting effect of ethnocultural and regional factors on Ukrainian politics. This influence of ethnocultural factors is discussed throughout this article with reference to the link between Ukrainian national identity, civic activism and support for reformist forces.8

Our Ukraine’s national democratic profile inhibited its performance in east Ukraine. In the Donbas, an area with approximately one-fifth of Ukraine’s population, Our Ukraine failed to cross the four per cent barrier. The only other location in Ukraine where this occurred was in the Crimean city of Sevastopol. The Tymoshenko bloc also obtained its strongest support in west-central Ukraine (see Table 1).

The use of ‘administrative resources’ to ensure support for ZYU was successful only in eastern Ukraine.9 In Kyiv, ZYU failed to cross the four per cent barrier and was decimated in western Ukraine. The SDPU-o scraped through in Kyiv city, its home base, with only 4.85 per cent. The worst election irregularities were reported from Donetsk, then led by governor Viktor Yanukyevych, who became prime minister in November 2002.10

Ethno-cultural factors also served to divide the opposition. Until the late 1990s some national democrats were willing to co-operate with the former
### Table I

**Election Results by Region for the Tymoshenko Bloc and SPU (Per Cent)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party or Bloc</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Result</th>
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*Source: [https://www.cvklk.ukrpack.net](https://www.cvkl.ukrpack.net).*
‘national communists’ and oligarchic centrists in the prioritization of statehood over democratization because of domestic and external threats. This alliance crumbled in 2000–01. In April 2001 the KPU voted together with the oligarchs to remove Ukraine’s only reformist government led by Prime Minister Yushchenko.¹¹

To some members of Our Ukraine, no opposition alliance with the KPU is possible because of its support for removing the Yushchenko government. In addition, the unreconstituted hard-line Soviet profile of the KPU – which has been unwilling to adopt a critical attitude to Soviet crimes against humanity (such as the artificial famine of 1933) – has made some national democrats continue to hold deep reservations about the KPU. Our Ukraine agreed to co-operate with the Tymoshenko bloc and SPU in the 2004 presidential elections but refused to work with the KPU. The communist factor is played upon by the authorities to maintain divisions in the opposition.

The article is divided into seven sections. The first section places the elections within the context of the type of regime that has developed in Ukraine under Kuchma. The second section investigates the link between national identity, support for reformist forces and civil society in Ukraine by looking at the reasons for the different levels of support for Our Ukraine’s popularity throughout Ukraine. This is followed by a third section which analyses the transformation of Rukh into Our Ukraine. Section IV surveys the Communist Party. Sections V surveys the ‘party of power’ ZYU bloc in comparison to ‘parties of power’ in Russia. Section VI looks at pro-executive clone parties aimed at niche voters – Women for the Future (women voters), the Green Party (environmentally conscious voters), and the Winter Crop Generation (young voters). The final section analyses the election results with two tables that provide a breakdown of the election results and the division of parliament into pro- and anti-Kuchma camps.

I. Regime Politics

The trend towards an authoritarian, corporatist state in Ukraine has been particularly evident since 1997 as Ukraine has regressed democratically.¹² Ukraine’s regime has been described as a ‘delegative democracy’¹³ where an inactive population participates in the political system only during elections. The executive attempts to organize and control society in order that the population remains passive between elections. The authorities fear an active civil society and prefer a controlled stability.

During the second half of the 1990s the presidential administration, an institution not defined in Ukrainian legislation or the Constitution, grew to become the strongest institution in the country.¹⁴ Progress in political and
business affairs became possible only with the blessing of the executive. *Kompromat* (compromising materials) are collected by the executive, the security forces and competing elite groups to ensure compliance and loyalty. When loyalty is no longer given, these materials are then used against the individuals to whom the material relates through ‘corruption’ charges. This has led to Ukraine being referred to as ‘blackmail state’.15

Political parties that go into outright opposition to the executive have their business partners destroyed. This happened to former prime minister, Pavlo Lazarenko, who led the Hromada party, and Tymoshenko, who leads the Fatherland party and the Tymoshenko bloc. Lazarenko fled Ukraine in 1999 after his parliamentary immunity was lifted. After seeking asylum in the USA he was arrested and his trial begins in August 2003 on charges of money laundering.

The executive’s method of dealing with civil society is to stunt its growth by ensuring that no party or institution (such as parliament) becomes strong and therefore a threat to the dominance of the all-powerful presidential administration. New artificial parties are created and existing ones taken over, while others are co-opted or crushed.

Leonid Kuchma’s victory in the October–November 1999 presidential election launched his second and final term. A strategic aim of the second term was to complete the process of increasing executive control over society to create a presidential system modelled on that of Russia.16 This aim had escaped Kuchma when parliament ratified a presidential–parliamentary Constitution in June 1996, making Ukraine one of only two (the other being Moldova) countries in the CIS where parliament still possesses power. Ukraine’s semi-presidentialism contrasts with that of the ‘super-presidential’ regimes common throughout the CIS.17

During the first year of his second term his strategic objective was in sight. In winter 1999–spring 2000, oligarch centrists and centre-right national democrats united for the first time to achieve a parliamentary majority. The national democrats were induced to join because Yushchenko, the former National Bank governor, had been made prime minister in December 1999. The non-left pro-executive majority undertook a ‘velvet revolution’ which removed the left-wing parliamentary leadership that had controlled the Rada (parliament) since the March 1994 elections.

Now in control of parliament, the executive initiated a referendum on 16 April 2000 to reduce the power of parliament and increase the influence of the executive over Ukraine’s nascent democracy. If implemented, the referendum would have granted Kuchma that which he had failed to achieve in the constitutional process of 1994–96. The referendum asked four questions: would the electorate agree to lift the immunity of deputies, create a bicameral parliament, reduce the number of deputies from 450 to 300, and
give the right of the executive to dissolve parliament if no majority was created after one month or a budget was not passed within three months?

The referendum received suspiciously high Soviet-style levels of endorsement of 89.7, 81.8, 89.06 and 84.78 per cent respectively for all four questions. The results were challenged by domestic observers and the Council of Europe and by evidence of malpractice by the executive on the Kuchmagate tapes released that same year.18

The oligarchic SDPU-o and its satellite party, Democratic Union, led by presidential adviser Oleksandr Volkov, had backed the collection of the three million signatures required to launch this ‘popular referendum’ of the ‘people’s will’. The national democrats may have also agreed to support the implementation of the referendum results because Kuchma was backing (at least on the surface) Ukraine’s first reformist government led by Yushchenko and was continuing the pro-Western rhetoric in Ukraine’s foreign policy that had been in place since 1995. The stumbling-block in achieving Kuchma’s strategic objective was that the non-left majority never possessed the necessary 300-plus votes to initiate constitutional changes that require a vote by a minimum of two-thirds of deputies.

By autumn 2000 Kuchma’s strategic objective was disintegrating. On the domestic front some of the oligarchs were becoming restless as the Yushchenko government’s energy reforms were beginning to bite into their illicit incomes. In early November 2000 Yevhen Marchuk, secretary of the national security and defence council and an ally of the SDPU-o, who were set to lose the most from energy reforms, unveiled a highly critical report on the government’s energy policies.

In the international arena, the contradiction between the foreign strategic objective of ‘re-joining Europe’ and a domestic policy that was leading to democratic regression led to a crisis.19 Ukraine began to reorientate its ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy from a pro-Western to a pro-Eastern neutrality.20 The first casualty of this was pro-Western foreign minister Borys Tarasiuk, who was dismissed in October 2000 and replaced by Anatoliy Zlenko. Since then Ukraine has progressively reoriented its foreign policy towards Russia, and in January 2003 Kuchma became the first non-Russian to be elected head of the CIS council of heads of state.

Throughout 2000 Yushchenko’s popularity was also soaring, reaching at one stage 50–60 per cent in a country where politicians rarely receive above ten per cent. This popularity became a threat to Kuchma, as it had with earlier prime ministers, because Yushchenko’s government was credited with bringing Ukraine’s first economic growth for a decade and paying off wage and pension arrears. Yushchenko’s reforms were beginning to hurt entrenched interests and the oligarch-controlled press began to initiate a critical campaign against him.
Three months (September–November 2000) sealed the fate of the executive’s strategy to transform Ukraine into a presidential republic. On 16 September an opposition journalist, Heorhiy Gongadze, went missing and his decapitated body was found two months later near Kyiv. Two weeks afterwards the SPU leader and former Rada speaker Oleksandr Moroz stunned parliament when he revealed the existence of many hours of tapes illegally made in the president’s office over the course of 1999–2000 by Mykola Melnychenco, a presidential guard (the equivalent of the US Secret Service) and counter-intelligence specialist. Melnychenco had already fled to Europe and in April 2001 requested asylum in the USA.

The Kuchmagate scandal had begun galvanizing the largest opposition movement since the late Soviet era, ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ and the Forum for National Salvation. The non-left majority in parliament slowly disintegrated. Deputy Prime Minister Tymoshenko, architect of the energy reforms, was arrested, released, arrested and again finally released in February 2002. Her husband had earlier been arrested (in August 2000) in an unsuccessful attempt to pressurize her into complying with the wishes of the executive, but was released just after the March 2002 elections.

The Yushchenko government hung on until 26 April 2001 when the oligarchs initiated a vote of no confidence in his government that was backed by the KPU. In summer 2001 Yushchenko and Tymoshenko began to organize separate moderate and radical blocs, respectively, in preparation for the March 2002 parliamentary elections.

Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine was built on two wings of Rukh, Reforms and Order, and the Liberal and other parties. The Tymoshenko bloc drew on her own Fatherland party, the Sobor, Social Democratic, Republican (URP), Christian Democratic and Conservative Republican Parties (CRPU). After the elections Fatherland and the radical anti-oligarch CRPU, led by Stepan Khmara, merged into a single party. Lukianenko’s URP and Anatoliy Matvienko’s Sobor also merged (Matvienko was a former leading member of the pro-presidential member of the pro-presidential People’s Democratic Party – NDP).

The executive also forced two regional clans, from Donetsk (Regions of Ukraine) and Dnipropetrovsk (Labour Ukraine), and three parties (Agrarians, Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the NDP) to create Ukraine’s first openly pro-presidential bloc to fight the elections – For a United Ukraine (ZYU). The creation of ZYU was a gamble because of the low popularity of Kuchma since the Kuchmagate crisis and the near failure of the NDP as the ‘party of power’ in the 1998 elections, when it obtained only 5.01 per cent in the proportional lists. In the 1998 elections the NDP came fifth in the proportional lists. The artificiality of ZYU was obvious after it disintegrated into seven factions only three months after the elections.
II. National Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Explaining the Viktor Yushchenko Phenomenon

Yushchenko entered Ukrainian politics at the national level when he moved from being chairman of the national bank to become prime minister in December 1999. His ratings have remained steady at 25–30 per cent ever since. Why was this popularity not translated into a nation-wide mass movement in the 2002 elections? In other words, why has Yushchenko not become a Ukrainian equivalent of Vojislav Kostunica, head of the victorious Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), who was able to mobilize both democratic and nationalist anti-communist mass opposition to Slobodan Miloševic in October 2000? President Kuchma is as unpopular as Miloševic was.

In Ukraine, the creation of a similar mass movement is made more difficult because of ethno-cultural and regional factors which prevent Yushchenko and Our Ukraine from capturing the same levels of high support they receive in western and central Ukraine in the remainder of the country. A poll conducted in November–December 2000 by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems found that approximately the same number of ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians were hurt by a decade of social change. Nevertheless, only 26 per cent of Russians trusted Yushchenko compared with 45 per cent of Ukrainians.\(^{25}\)

In the late Soviet era the national democrats in Ukraine were sufficiently strong to propel the country to independence but not to take power in the 1990 elections or in elections in independent Ukraine. Ukraine is different from the remainder of the CIS, however, in that it alone has a large, pro-Western, reformist movement. The national democrats are Ukraine’s main opposition to executive and oligarchy-backed authoritarianism, which has gained ground throughout the CIS.\(^{26}\) The opposition movement that grew up during the ‘Kuchmagate’ scandal was based in the same regions as the anti-Soviet, nationalist movement in the late Soviet era – western and central Ukraine – the stronghold of Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko bloc and the SPU. The only opposition group with a base outside western and central Ukraine is the KPU.

If the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ movement had been able to mobilize cross-country support, as Kostunica did in Serbia, it is likely that Kuchma would not have survived ‘Kuchmagate’ in winter 2000–01. But, as in the late Soviet era, eastern and southern Ukraine remained passive.

Two Russophile activists, Mykhailo Pogrebinsky and Vladimir Malynkowitch, bemoaned in a round-table discussion held at the newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta that civil society is closely tied to national identity in Ukraine.\(^{27}\) Eastern and southern Ukrainians are involved in politics only during election time, when their more numerous votes are sought after by
election blocs. In other words, the applicability of the term ‘delegative democracy’ is applicable only to eastern and southern Ukraine, the stronghold of centrist oligarchs and KPU.

The link between national identity and civil society which makes Ukraine different from Yugoslavia and other central and east European states was reflected in a January 2002 poll by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Research (UCEPD). Unsurprisingly, Our Ukraine was strongest in western and central Ukraine where it commanded 51.9 and 20 per cent support respectively. These were the only two regions where Our Ukraine pushed the KPU into second place. In the north, east and south of Ukraine, Our Ukraine’s popularity dropped to second place after the KPU, with 9.5, 7.9 and 11.6 respectively. These polling results were reflected in voting during the 2002 elections.

Similarly, in the 2002 elections, popularity for the radical anti-presidential Tymoshenko bloc and the SPU was also primarily confined to western and central Ukraine. The Tymoshenko bloc, although led by a party with its origins in the eastern Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk, proved to be popular mainly in western and central Ukraine. The SPU was confined to central Ukraine, with the exception of Poltava oblast where it came first in the proportional list.

Western and central Ukraine are therefore the strongholds of the opposition movement against Kuchma and the centrist oligarchs. Only the SDPU-o of the three main oligarchic clans is unpopular in its home base of Kyiv, where that party only just managed to cross the four per cent barrier in Kyiv city. In Donetsk oblast the Party of the Regions secured the ZYU’s only first place on the proportional lists of any region of Ukraine. In Dnipropetrovsk oblast the ZYU also did very well and came in second (see Table 1).

III. Rukh to Our Ukraine

Rukh was established in 1988–89 as the Popular Movement for Restructuring by former prisoners of conscience from the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and members of the cultural intelligentsia. Rukh became a catalyst for other opposition parties and civic groups that appeared in the late Soviet era.

After Ukraine became an independent state in 1991 Rukh became progressively marginalized within Ukraine’s evolving multiparty political system. At its February 1992 congress Rukh divided into a wing led by Vyacheslav Chornovil, which stood in ‘constructive opposition’ to President Leonid Kravchuk, and derzhavnyky (statists) who supported Kravchuk and Ukrainian statehood and created the Congress of National Democratic Forces (KNDS).
In the second half of the 1990s, Chornovil’s Rukh had better relations with President Kuchma because of his support for reform in 1994–96 and his pro-Western orientation during 1995–99. However, by 1998–99 relations were beginning to sour as Rukh became disillusioned with the authoritarian regime emerging in Ukraine, corruption, and the gap between rhetoric and policies. Rukh split into two wings just prior to the death of Chornovil in a suspicious car accident in March 1999.\(^{34}\)

Rukh’s wing led by the former foreign minister Hennadiy Udovenko maintained good relations with the executive and continued in the traditions of the derzhavnyk (statist) wing of KNDS.\(^{35}\) This statist wing of Rukh and two other statist parties, Reforms and Order and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), had already pledged to unite into a bloc in December 2000. All three joined Our Ukraine the following year. The anti-oligarchic and anti-Kuchma wing led by Yurii Kostenko leaned towards the radical opposition and maintained close relations with Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Party. Kostenko’s wing of Rukh followed more closely in the traditions of Chornovil, but it also joined Our Ukraine.

These two tendencies within Rukh – statist versus anti-oligarch/anti-Kuchma – remain a feature of Our Ukraine and partly explain its reluctance to join the radical opposition to Kuchma. This has led to accusations that Yushchenko is a waffler: ‘Yushchenko has been consistent in his inconsistency’.\(^{36}\) Our Ukraine has positioned itself as a moderate, pragmatic opposition lying between the executive and centrist oligarchs and the radical opposition, holding out the possibility of negotiating compromises.

Our Ukraine proved to be more popular than Rukh thanks to a number of factors.\(^{37}\) Unlike Rukh, Our Ukraine has a socio-economic programme and during the 2002 elections this aspect of the programme took up two-thirds of Yushchenko’s speeches. Our Ukraine has a charismatic leader who is able to bridge the gap between citizens and rulers that was already large in the Soviet era and has grown in the 1990s. Our Ukraine brought together the two wings of Rukh and the successors to the KNDS, the Christian Republican Party (KhRP), and other parties that spanned the liberal, patriotic and Christian democratic arenas. Contact with trade unionists was provided through the Federation of Trade Unions. Our Ukraine also broadened the social base of Rukh by incorporating pragmatic bankers, businessmen and state officials. Roman Bezsmertnyi, political coordinator of Our Ukraine, was formerly the president’s representative in parliament and was a member of the NDP, from which he resigned after it joined ZYU.

Pragmatists have been attracted to Our Ukraine because it defines itself as an alternative, not an opposition, an attempt to paper over the division within its ranks between statists and anti-oligarch factions. Unlike Rukh,
Our Ukraine’s more pragmatic programme gave it some support in eastern and southern Ukraine, albeit far less than in the west.

Our Ukraine seeks to take back ‘Our Ukraine’ from those oligarchs who took over the country after it was propelled to independence by Rukh in 1989-91. ‘This is your Ukraine. This is our Ukraine!’ Yushchenko told his supporters at rallies in the 2002 elections. In other words, the national revolution successfully launched by Rukh should be now completed by a democratic revolution. One of the priorities for Ukraine, Yushchenko believes, is to overcome the ‘crisis of power’ and change a ‘momentocracy’, where everybody lives for the short term, into a medium- to long-term vision and strategy. ‘In the last ten years a system has not been created that would guarantee Ukrainian democracy,’ Yushchenko wrote on the eve of elections.\(^{38}\)

IV. The Communist Party

Two decisions by the Constitutional Court and the executive in Ukraine showed the cosy relationship between the KPU and the executive. The timing of those decisions during the run-up to the 2002 elections was in itself suspicious. First, on 29 December 2001 the Constitutional Court rejected as unconstitutional a decade-old ban on the KPU and stated that only the courts have the power to declare political parties illegal. The Constitutional Court’s December 2001 ruling was the result of a motion submitted by 139 left-wing deputies as far back as 23 January 1997.

The KPU was suspended and then banned by two resolutions of the parliamentary presidium on 26 and 30 August 1991. All KPU property and other assets were nationalized by the Ukrainian SSR. The Constitutional Court rejected calls for these assets to be returned to the post-Soviet KPU. With 3.5 million members the KPU was the largest republican communist party in the USSR until the Russian SFSR created its own republican branch in 1990. The KPU had been fortuitously registered as a party independent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union only on 22 July 1991, a month before Ukraine declared independence and the KPU was banned. Allowed to re-establish itself in October 1993, the current KPU claims to be the direct descendant of the Soviet-era KPU. Nevertheless, it has managed to attract only 150,000 members, or less than five per cent of its Soviet-era membership.\(^{39}\)

The relative weight of the KPU within Ukraine’s multi-party system is therefore less due to its size than to the fact that Ukraine is still an unconsolidated democracy, to the weakness and diffusion of Ukraine’s 123 political parties and to the ideological amorphousness of the oligarchic centre. Support for the KPU during the 1990s has declined from approximately 30 to 20 per cent of the electorate and is drawn mainly from
pensioners and military veterans. Ukraine’s ethno-cultural divisions have prevented the evolution of the KPU into a post-communist or national communist party (the ‘sovereign [national] communists’ left the KPU in 1990–91). The SPU is Ukraine’s pro-statehood and post-communist leftist party.

At its height, the combined left bloc had 170–80 deputies in the 1998–2002 parliament, still less than a majority but more united than the fractious non-left. This unity of the left ended in November 2000 with the ‘Kuchmagate’ scandal, which opened a wide gulf between the KPU and the SPU. The SPU played a central role in the crisis and remains one of the two wings of the radical anti-Kuchma opposition. Melnychenko attempted to run for election on the SPU list but was debarred.

The KPU, on the other hand, refused to support the anti-Kuchma opposition in 2000–2001 and supported the vote of no confidence in the Yushchenko government initiated by Kuchma and oligarchic centrists. The KPU joined the radical opposition only after the 2002 elections. Prior to the 2002 elections President Kuchma had repeatedly reiterated that ‘there is only one real opposition in Ukraine’, the KPU, and he had refused to recognize any non-KPU opposition. This was because Kuchma identified ‘opposition’ to himself in the Soviet sense as opposition to the state which he supposedly personifies. Consequently, by definition only the KPU could be in ‘opposition’ as it, alone of Ukraine’s major parties, is opposed to Ukraine’s independence.

The KPU had shielded Kuchma from blame during the height of the ‘Kuchmagate’ crisis by not supporting parliamentary votes of no confidence in Prosecutor-General Mykhailo Potebenko. This was despite Potebenko’s inept and unsympathetic investigation of the murder of the opposition journalist Gongadze in September–November 2000. Symonenko claimed that ‘Potebenko is an excellent organizer, an honest and principled person’. Nevertheless, Potebenko was expelled from the KPU faction in May 2002 after he supported the election of Volodymyr Lytvyn as Rada speaker. The number of KPU deputies was halved in the newly elected parliament when they received 19.98 per cent of the vote and very few seats in the majoritarian half of the election. This was due to four factors.

First, the KPU were punished by voters for their cosy relationship with the executive. As one newspaper wrote, ‘the only leftist party whose opposition is beyond doubt is the Socialist Party of Ukraine headed by Oleksandr Moroz’.

Second, the decline in Ukraine’s population by over three million since the late Soviet era has reduced the cohort of pensioners from whom the KPU draws its voters. In addition, the population decline has hit the communist heartland of eastern Ukraine worse than the more rural west.
Third, competition from other opposition forces dented the KPU vote. Some of the protest votes the KPU traditionally received went to pro-executive clones (the KPUo and Progressive Socialists) and to the new opposition (SPU and Tymoshenko bloc).

Fourth, the authorities organized two fake communist parties – KPUo (renewed), which obtained 1.39 per cent, and the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants, which obtained 0.41 per cent. The KPU potentially therefore lost 1.8 per cent of the vote to these two bogus communist parties.

The same tactic was used by the authorities against the SPU. Three left-centre parties – All-Ukrainian Union of the Left ‘Justice’, the Peasant Party and the Progressive Socialists (PSP) – obtained 0.08, 0.37 and 3.22 per cent respectively. Thus, the SPU lost potentially more – 3.67 per cent – than the KPU from fake parties backed by the authorities or those co-opted by them.

After the elections Ivan Czyzh, head of the All-Ukrainian Union of the Left ‘Justice’, was appointed to the executive-controlled State Committee for Information Policy, Television and Radio Broadcasting. Czyzh and Natalia Vitrenko, head of the PSP, were once part of the SPU but had split from it or been expelled.

The Peasant Party had fought the 1998 elections in a bloc together with the SPU, under the title ‘For the Truth, For the People, For Ukraine!’, which won 8.56 per cent of the vote on the proportional lists, coming third after the KPU and Rukh. The For the Truth, For the People, For Ukraine! bloc fared better than the 6.87 per cent obtained by the SPU in 2002. The Peasant Party left the bloc in the 1998–2002 Rada and attempted to create its own faction, but had fewer than the requisite minimum of 14 deputies.

Accusations that the leadership of the Peasant Party was involved in a corruption scandal with the Land and People Fund was used by the executive to apply pressure on it to subdue its opposition and thereby neutralize it as an oppositional force. Oleksandr Tkachenko, a leading member of the Peasant Party, was elected to be Rada speaker in early 1999 with the help of centrist factions but was then removed a year later in Ukraine’s ‘velvet revolution’ by the centrist–national democratic alliance.

V. For a United Ukraine: A Comparison of ‘Parties of Power’ in Russia and Ukraine

In mid-1999 the Russian authorities were concerned that Our Home is Russia (NDR) had a popularity of only several per cent and therefore set about creating a completely new ‘party of power’, the Interregional Movement of Unity (Yedinstvo). In the Russian parliamentary elections on 19 December 1999 Yedinstvo captured 23.3 per cent of the vote and 82
seats, only one per cent and eight seats less than the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF).

ZYU was also created four months prior to the 2002 parliamentary elections. President Kuchma instructed state officials from the rayon (district) level upwards to support ZYU. ZYU’s links to the executive were open and included the provision of ‘administrative resources’.

On the eve of the elections an internal document from the presidential administration on how to rig the elections was circulated by opposition deputies. Ukrainian state television Channel One provided air-time to ZYU which was as much as that given to all other election blocs and parties combined. ZYU was led by Lytvyn, head of the presidential administration, and also included in its top five candidates on the proportional lists Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh, the head of the union of industrialists and entrepreneurs, a body led by Kuchma himself in 1993–94.

Why then did Yedinstvo do well in 1999 and ZYU fare badly in the 2002 elections where it received only 11.77 per cent of the vote? Yedinstvo was created as a completely new political formation backed by Acting President Vladimir Putin as his vehicle to help him secure election as president in March 2000. ZYU, by contrast, was a union of five regionally based small versions of ‘parties of power’, some of which had to be cajoled into supporting ZYU. This was seen when ZYU split into seven factions after the elections.

Yedinstvo had carefully chosen leaders, Sergei Shoigu, acting minister for emergency situations, and Aleksandr Karelin, a Greco-Roman wrestler of international fame. Shoigu was constantly on television because of his ministry’s involvement in the Chechen conflict. Both of Yedinstvo’s leaders stressed their ability to act decisively. Putin, who endorsed Yedinstvo, was seen in a similar light.

ZYU’s leader was Lytvyn, the uncharismatic head of the presidential administration, who is not a confident public speaker, an academic rather than a ‘man of action’. Yedintovo was able to attract young voters, something ZYU was not. Lytvyn was elected parliamentary speaker after the election, with the use of bribery and blackmail of independent deputies, and his election was secured by only one vote (226), thanks to former Prosecutor-General Potebenko.

Another difference between Yedinstvo and ZYU was the high popularity of Putin and the low popularity of Kuchma, which averaged five per cent; 43.5 per cent of Ukrainians had a negative view of Kuchma, according to a February 2002 poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Polls later that year gave upwards of 70 per cent in support of Kuchma stepping down early.

The proposal that Kuchma would be ready to head ZYU after it transformed itself into a party was an attempt to revive ZYU’s fortunes
(according to article 103 of the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution the president may not be a member of any party). In Ukraine Kuchma was coming to the end of his presidency in 2004, whereas in Russia Putin was just launching his presidency; Putin also never stated his intention to lead Yedinstvo.

Kuchma’s suggestion that he might head ZYU contradicted his well-known negative views about the role of parties. The proposal can therefore be seen more as a product of internal problems and panic in the presidential administration at the low popularity of ZYU. This was especially so after a January 2002 poll by the UCEPD gave it only 3.9 per cent, meaning that it might not get through the four per cent threshold in the proportional half of the elections.

A major difference between Russia and Ukraine is that in Ukraine there is a strong alternative to ZYU. Our Ukraine occupies the same political space as both the Russian liberal Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS), which includes Russia’s Choice, Russia’s first ‘party of power’.

Yedinstvo and ZYU both had unrivalled access to ‘administrative resources’, privileged access to the media and the support of regional state administrations controlled by the executive. Both had vague centrist programmes that emphasized ‘stability’ and stood for a corporatist, politically authoritarian but economically liberal, presidential state.

This similarity in ideology ends there. Appealing to Russia as a ‘great power’ Yedinstvo lamented the demise of the USSR, something ZYU or any Ukrainian oligarch group would never do. The largest group of voters to switch to Yedinstvo were therefore from the KPRF, a party whose ideology embraces Russian nationalism and Marxism. Yedinstvo manipulated Russian state and ethnic nationalism at a time when Russia felt affronted by NATO’s unilateral military action in Yugoslavia and when a new Chechen conflict had begun. In contrast to Yedinstvo’s nationalism in Russia, ZYU fanned an anti-nationalist campaign during the 2002 elections in a desperate attempt to take votes from Our Ukraine in eastern Ukraine.53

ZYU more closely resembled an earlier Russian ‘party of power’, Our Home is Russia (NDR), rather than Yedinstvo. NDR received only 10.3 per cent in the 1995 Russian elections, a similar result to ZYU’s achievement in 2002. Nevertheless, this was still far less than the 30 per cent which ZYU leaders optimistically predicted the bloc would obtain when it was formed.

VI. Pro-Executive ‘Virtual’ Clones

Women for the Future

The executive initially had a policy to allow only one women’s and one green party in the March 2002 elections, both of them linked to the ‘party of power’. Both the Green Party of Ukraine (ZPU) and Women for the
Future were financed by Vasyl Khmelnytskyi, number three on the ZPU election list and director of the Zaporizhstal plant, who has close ties to Lyudmyla Kuchma, wife of the president.

In February 2002 the Central Election Commission annulled its decision to register the alternative Women of Ukraine party and the Rayduha (Rainbow) green election bloc; it also forced Larysa Skoryk’s Women for the Future of Children party to re-register as the All-Ukrainian Party of Inter-Ethnic Understanding.

In the late Soviet era, fixed quotas ensured that one-half of seats in local councils and a third of the seats in Ukraine’s Supreme Soviet were allocated to women. In Ukraine’s three parliaments elected in 1990, 1994, and 1998, women’s representation initially declined and then slightly increased, from 2.9 to 4.6 to 8 per cent, but it still lags far behind that of the Soviet era. Women’s issues continue to remain marginal to the concerns of mainstream politicians in Ukraine. In the March 1998 parliamentary elections, only one party – the All-Ukrainian Party Women’s Initiative (VPZhi) – campaigned on a gender platform. Its result of 0.58 per cent of the vote placed it twenty-second on the list of 30 blocs and parties that competed in that election. Of Ukraine’s 129 registered political parties, five are devoted to women’s issues. The VPZhi, registered in October 1997, is the oldest of these and it is also the only party based outside Kyiv, in Kharkiv. Three others are also small parties: the Women’s Party of Ukraine (registered in March 1997), the Women’s People Party United (registered in September 1998), and the Solidarity with Women Party (registered in December 1999).

Women for the Future’s rise to third place in popularity in pre-election polls was meteoric. Its registration on 30 March 2001 occurred suspiciously only one day before the deadline for parties to be registered to ensure they could compete in the 31 March 2002 parliamentary elections. Within less than a year, Women for the Future managed to attract 360,000 members in 500 branches, an impressive figure when compared with the KPU’s 150,000 members. As with many centrist parties, however, such high membership figures must be approached with caution. Women for the Future is led by individuals with ties to the former Soviet Ukrainian nomenklatura and to Kuchma when he was prime minister in 1992–93. The ideology of Women for the Future is Soviet and not in tune with gender issues and the women’s rights movement in the West. Women for the Future does not oppose the Soviet-era stereotype of women’s role in politics being confined to areas such as maternal and child-welfare issues. Women for the Future ‘has no new ideology behind it either’.34

Valentyna Dovzhenko, the head of Women for the Future, also heads the All-Ukrainian Voluntary Fund of Hope and Good (VDFND) and the State Committee of Family and Youth Affairs, which was formerly a ministry.
She was the head of the parliamentary committee on family and youth in the 1998–2002 Rada. The head of the controlling committee of VDFND and the president of another NGO, the National Fund for the Social Defence of Mothers and Children, is Lyudmyla Kuchma. The VDFND was established by the Soviet-era Union of Ukrainian Women led by Maria Orlyk, a leading member of the Women for the Future.

Women for the Future had managed to become so popular so quickly because of access to ‘administrative resources’. Independent and thereby genuine women’s parties, such as the four women’s parties other than the Women for the Future, stand little chance in elections when Women for the Future has executive support and – more importantly – the backing of the president’s wife, Lyudmyla Kuchma. Women for the Future’s closeness to Ukraine’s ‘first lady’ also drew comparisons by Ukrainian commentators to the Yugoslav United Party of the Left led by Milošević’s wife, Mira Markovich. The party was created in the hope that another pro-presidential faction would exist in the next parliament. It was therefore supposed to play the same role as the Greens in the 1998 elections, who managed to win 5.43 per cent of the vote by targeting floating voters, the undecided and those disillusioned with party politics. In this sense, Women for the Future – like the Greens in 1998 – also campaigned on a platform of hostility to the very idea of the usefulness of political parties. The platform of Women for the Future and its traditional campaigning style appealed to women aged over 30–40 and centred on such issues as women’s rights, health (for example, breast cancer) and domestic violence.

Women for the Future were defined as ‘Albinos’ because they were devoid of any ideological platform. Their popularity had not grown because of advertising or rousing speeches in defence of women’s rights: on the contrary, they instead travelled around Ukraine distributing material assistance at schools, military bases and factories. ‘Photos for Mother’ actions were undertaken in schools, kindergartens, libraries, and cultural clubs: free photos were made of children standing next to Women for the Future party symbols, and afterwards presents were distributed free of charge to poor and needy families. According to the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, an independent election NGO, a third of the distribution of free assistance by election blocs in the 2002 elections was undertaken by Women for the Future. Grand concerts by Ukrainian and Russian pop stars in towns and villages throughout Ukraine organized by the party cost approximately $100,000. Yet the party was vague about the sources of its funds to finance the high cost of running such a brazen campaign.

Women for the Future did not enter the Ukrainian parliament as it did not pass the four per cent threshold, receiving only 2.11 per cent. Two factors may have accounted for this. First, ZYU panicked and needed the
votes of ‘clone’ parties, such as Women for the Future. Second, voters became more sophisticated in relation to the 1998 elections in choosing which parties were genuine and which were oligarch and executive clones.

**Greens**

Of Ukraine’s 129 registered parties, seven claim to be ‘green’. These include the Green Party of Ukraine (registered in 1991), the All-Ukrainian Chornobyl People’s Party (registered in 1998), the Green Ecological Party, the Ecological Party, the Ecological Party—‘Defence’ and the Green Party—XXI century (all registered in 2001 just prior to the deadline of 31 March 2001 to be able to compete in the 2002 elections). Six of Ukraine’s seven ‘green’ parties have little influence in comparison with the oldest, the Party of Greens of Ukraine (PZU), which was registered far ahead of the others on 24 May 1991. Until its electoral success in 1998 the ZPU therefore had little competition from other ‘greens’.

During the 1990s similar process has taken place within the ‘Greens’ to that which took place within other Ukrainian political parties. In 1994–98, unimportant centrist parties were gradually taken over by oligarchs who needed to convert their newly found economic clout back into political influence in the 1998 elections. Of the 33 parties and blocs registered for the 2002 elections only two were ‘green’ and both were supported by competing oligarchs.

The ‘Rainbow’ (Rayduha) election bloc included the Ecological Party of Ukraine—‘Defence’ and was financed by oligarch Vadym Rabinovych. Rabinovych has dual Israeli and Ukrainian citizenship, is head of one of two competing Jewish organizations in Ukraine and is *persona non grata* in the USA. The title of this bloc was also meant to appeal to the gay community, whose international flag is made up of the colours of the rainbow. Rabinovich’s party’s registration was disqualified to ensure that only one ‘green’ pro-executive party took part in the elections (ZPU). Rabinovych went ahead and created his own election bloc after falling out with the ZPU which he helped to finance in its successful return to Ukrainian politics in the 1998 parliamentary election. The Ukrainian ambassador to Canada, Yuriy Shcherbak, initially toyed with the idea of heading the Rainbow coalition as an alternative ‘green’ bloc to the ZPU. Shcherbak founded the Green World Association in 1986 and was the first head of the ZPU, which he now accuses of having betrayed ‘green’ ideology. Rabinovych and Shcherbak have known each other since the early 1990s when the latter was Ukraine’s first ambassador to Israel.

Genuine ‘green’ parties, in the same manner as genuine women’s parties, find it impossible to be successful in Ukraine’s political system. Only parties that have been captured by oligarchs (such as the ZPU) or
created especially by them for the elections (Women for the Future) have the potential for success because they have oligarch financing and, being pro-presidential, they also have access to ‘administrative resources’.

Ukraine’s largest ‘green’ party, the ZPU, grew out of the Green World Association, and was an ally of Rukh in the late Soviet era. It is Ukraine’s third oldest political party and its inaugural congress was held in September 1990 when it championed both ‘eco-socialism’ and state independence. Its main base of support was then western and central Ukraine, the same as Rukh’s. After Ukraine became an independent state in 1991, the ZPU began a long period of decline. In the eyes of Ukraine’s elites, environmental problems became less important than ensuring sufficient energy supplies in the face of Russia’s use of energy to put pressure on Ukraine, mounting energy debts and a shift to world prices for Russian oil. During the ZPU’s stagnation in October 1993 it elected a new leader, Vitaliy Kononov, who remains in that position. In 1994, before the ZPU was taken over by oligarchs, it joined the European Federation of Green Parties.

The ZPU re-entered the Ukrainian political scene only in the March 1998 elections when it won 5.44 per cent of the vote. But the new ZPU was very different from that created in 1990–91. It had become a krysha (roof) for business interests. The ZPU initially had 25 deputies in the 1998–2002 parliament, which declined to 15. It claims to have 52,000 members, which is small by the standards of other oligarch parties. The party’s 1998 success was due to a very effective Western-style advertising campaign and a huge injection of new oligarch finances. As with the Women for the Future party in the 2002 elections, the ZPU campaigned in 1998 on an ‘anti-party’ platform with the slogan ‘Politicians Utilize Demagoguery’. This targeted disaffected young people (the ZPU was one of the factions with the youngest deputies) and those turned off by politics.

The main financier of the ZPU from 1998, as well as the Women for the Future whose campaign built on the earlier success of the ZPU, was Khmelnytskyi. He was successful in recruiting other businessmen who needed a krysha to protect their business interests in telecommunications, banking, insurance, hotels and – more surprisingly – energy.

Throughout the 1998–2002 parliament the ZPU remained loyal to the president without going overboard in its support, presumably so as not to turn off potential young voters. Only two minor government positions were granted to the party, whose lack of legislative initiative in 1998–2002 was heavily criticized by Ukrainian commentators and may have worked against a repeat of its 1998 success in the 2002 elections.

In pre-election polls the ZPU had support ranging 9.9 to seven per cent in southern and eastern Ukraine, respectively, and its two strongest bases were Zaporizhzhia and Odesa. Ironically, in western and central Ukraine,
where the ZPU began over a decade ago, its support was only 5.1 and three per cent, according to a January 2002 poll by UCEPD. But, as with Women for the Future, the ZPU failed to cross the four per cent threshold in the 2002 elections, obtaining only 1.3 per cent.

Winter Crop Generation

The centre-right has traditionally been dominated in Ukraine, as it has in other non-Russian republics of the former USSR, by parties such as Rukh that combine national and democratic issues. The reasons cosmopolitan (that is, pure reformist) centre-right parties have traditionally failed to obtain popularity are fourfold.

First, Ukraine has not gone far enough in democratization and market reform to create a large enough middle class that could underpin purely reformist or centre-right parties. Ukraine’s newly emerging ruling oligarchic class is hostile to market reform and prefers a hybrid, corporatist political and economic system.

Second, mobilization by civil society in Ukraine has taken place only when the national and democratic questions have been united. Cosmopolitan reformist movements have not been able to mobilize the population either in Ukraine or elsewhere in the former USSR. In Ukraine reformist movements have been mainly successful when combined with national issues, such as Rukh and Our Ukraine. In the 1998 elections Rukh came second and in 2002 Our Ukraine came first in the proportional half of elections.

Third, the centrist (potentially reformist) spectrum of Ukraine’s party system has been captured by pro-executive oligarchs. The Liberals were one of Ukraine’s first post-communist ‘parties of power’ in the Donbas and today are members of Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc. The Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR), an ally of Leonid Kuchma in the 1994 presidential election, merged with the NDP, Ukraine’s first ‘party of power’, in 2001. The MRBR was therefore de facto a member of ZYu in the 2002 elections through the NDP.

Fourth, cosmopolitan centre-right parties have not been successful in developed democracies and therefore Ukraine is unlikely to be an exception. North American and West European centre-right parties, such as the Republicans in the US or the Conservatives in the UK, are also traditionally ‘national-democratic’ in that their ideology combines patriotism, opposition to multiculturalism and support for a market economy.

Attempts to create cosmopolitan (that is, non-national democratic) reformist parties in Ukraine were first attempted in the 1998 parliamentary elections. The Social–Liberal Alliance (SLON) was created by the MRBR and the Constitutional Democrats (KDP), and as a cosmopolitan reformist bloc it campaigned in defence of ‘Russian language and culture’.
This attempt by SLON to appeal to Russophones reformist voters, in a manner similar to Rukh and Our Ukraine with Ukrainophones, failed miserably and the bloc won only 0.9 per cent of votes on the party list. This was far less than national democratic parties such as Rukh, which came second with 9.40 per cent in the 1998 elections. The combination of a reformist and national programme has attracted voters only in predominantly Ukrainophone regions. Rukh and Our Ukraine have therefore been successful where SLON failed.

In the 2002 elections another attempt was made to create a centre-right cosmopolitan alternative, called the Winter Crop Generation (KOP), which included four parties: the KDP, the Liberal Democrats, the Party of Private Property, and the Peasant Democrats. Of these, only the national democratic Peasant Democrats has a long background in Ukraine and a real social base. The other three parties within KOP have little support or are fake and unknown.

The KOP used the same public relations specialists from Moscow who moulded Russia’s SPS. In the 1999 Russian parliamentary elections the SPS, led by the former prime minister Sergei Kirienko, Yegor Gaidar (leader of Russia’s Choice), and Boris Nemtsov, obtained the high vote of 8.5 per cent. Nemtsov, leader of the SPS, sent a statement of support to the KOP on the eve of the 2002 Ukrainian elections.

Another problem for the KOP that dented its popularity was that it was seen, like the ZPU and Women for the Future, as a fake party. KOP was funded by Kuchma’s son-in-law, the oligarch Viktor Pinchuk, a member of the Dnipropetrovsk-based Labour Ukraine oligarch party and parliamentary faction. In a live television discussion on Channel 1+1 on 8 March 2002, Inna Bohoslovska, second on KOP’s electoral list, and Vitrenko, the Progressive Socialist leader, simultaneously attacked Tymoshenko, the third participant in the discussion, in a coordinated fashion. Viewers understood that this was a joint attack by two representatives of pro-executive clone parties against the radical oppositionist Tymoshenko.

In an attempt to woo voters away from Our Ukraine, the oligarchs funded both the KOP (and the extreme right ‘Rukh for Unity’ splinter group which obtained even less with 0.16 per cent). Unlike opposition blocs, which were either refused air time or constantly exposed to criticism, the KOP was suspiciously given blanket coverage on television stations that are mainly controlled by oligarchs or the executive, especially on ICTV, a station controlled by Pinchuk.

The links between KOP and the executive became public after the elections when KOP’s leader, Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy, was appointed deputy head of the presidential administration and head of its domestic affairs department. He was then transferred to the post of minister of the

KOP's association with Pinchuk and, by default, the executive, reduced its support among pro-business, younger generation supporters who had non-oligarch business alternatives, such as Our Ukraine and Yabluko. Other younger generation business interests preferred to use the ZPU as their krysha. The KOP was therefore squeezed by Yabluko and the ZPU on its liberal left and Our Ukraine on its centre-right. In the same manner as the ZPU, the KOP refused to describe itself as an opposition party, unlike Yabluko or Our Ukraine. KOP remained critical of 'social populists' and 'oligarch-socialists' (SPU) on its left and 'conservative nationalists' (Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc) on its right.

KOP billed itself as a pro-market alternative of the younger generation, and its members and election candidates were all in their thirties and forties. Nevertheless, KOP was unsuccessful in targeting the youth vote. A February 2002 poll by Democratic Initiatives found that 70 per cent of 18–29-year-olds planned to vote in the 2002 elections, a ten per cent increase over the 1998 elections. Of those polled, 20 per cent said they would vote for Our Ukraine, 12 per cent for the Greens, eight per cent for the SDPU-o, six per cent for Women of the Future, and five per cent for Yabluko; support for KOP was too low to record.

Despite the support of its Russian colleagues, the KOP did not win the same support in Ukraine as the SPS obtained in Russia. Unlike the SPS, or centre-right parties in the West and elsewhere, the KOP does not combine traditional centre-right patriotism with support for a free market. As with SLO in 1998, the KOP therefore obtained an average of only one per cent support in Ukrainian polls conducted prior to the elections. Not surprisingly, KOP did not make it over the four per cent threshold in the 1998 elections: it obtained 2.02 per cent.

VII. Analysing the Election Results

Ukraine's third parliamentary elections were an important milestone in the confirmation of Ukrainian statehood, but not necessarily in democratic progress. ZYU and Our Ukraine both strongly campaigned on statist platforms. The poor result obtained by the main anti-state force, the KPU, coupled with the good result that the pro-statehood SPU achieved, confirms that Ukraine's independent statehood is no longer a central issue in Ukrainian politics. The election results are summarized in Table 2, with a presentation of the pro- and anti-Kuchma factions in February 2003 in Table 3.
### Table 2

**Election Results and Rada Factions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Proportion of Vote (%)</th>
<th>Number of Deputies</th>
<th>Factions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Our Ukraine</td>
<td>23.57</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party (KPU)</td>
<td>19.98</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For a United Ukraine (ZYU)</td>
<td>11.77</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>191:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Labour Ukraine and Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regions of Ukraine (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Initiatives (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People's Power (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>European Choice (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agrarians (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People's Democratic Party (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People's Choice (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yulia Tymoshenko bloc</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU)</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party united (SDPU-o)</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Aligned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3

**Pro- and Anti-Kuchma Factions in the Rada (February 2003)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro-Kuchma Factions</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For a United Ukraine (8 factions)</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party united</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Pro-Kuchma</strong></td>
<td><strong>229</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Kuchma Factions</strong></td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Ukraine</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Anti-Kuchma</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Support for the KPU ranges from its highest concentration of voters and members in the industrialized east and the Crimea to very low support in western Ukraine. The KPU entered the top three in only one western Ukrainian oblast (Chernivtsi) and was eclipsed by the SPU in many central oblasts. The KPU managed to come first only in every eastern and southern oblast (with the exception of Donetsk) and achieved its highest support in Luhansk (39.69 per cent) and the Crimea (33.95 per cent). In the 1998 elections the highest support for the KPU was also in Luhansk, where it obtained 49 per cent. These results confirm a pattern of the left being unpopular in the west, the SPU dominating the left vote in the Ukrainophone centre and the KPU in the Russophone east and south.

ZYU did well only in eastern and southern Ukraine, with 11.81 per cent, yet even here it failed to enter into the top three places in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and the Crimea. Its worst result was in the three Galician oblasts where it managed a paltry 1.8–3.4 per cent, compared with its best performance in Donetsk where it came first with 36.83. Other regions where ZYU obtained better than average results were in Kirovohrad, Odesa, Luhansk, Mykolaiv and Kharkiv. ZYU’s landslide in Donetsk was achieved only because of the worst recorded election violations in the country.

Our Ukraine came first in 14 western, central and north-eastern oblasts and the city of Kyiv, with 23.57 per cent. It also did surprisingly well in Poltava, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and the Crimea in the east and south. Together with the 7.26 per cent obtained by the Tymoshenko bloc, national democrats obtained a combined vote of 30.77 per cent in the 2002 elections.

Was this, though, a breakthrough for national democrats? Not necessarily.

In the December 1991 presidential elections three national democratic candidates (Chornovil, Levko Lukianenko and Ihor Yukhnoivsky) obtained a combined total of 29.48 per cent, 23.3 per cent of which went to Chornovil. In the 1998 parliamentary elections the national democratic Rukh, the Forward Ukraine! bloc, Reforms and Order and the Republican Christian parties garnered a combined vote of 14.8 per cent. The 2002 vote for national democrats (30.77 per cent) therefore merely returned them to their high point in December 1991 (29.48 per cent) by reversing their decline in the 1994 and 1998 elections.

The Tymoshenko bloc built on two parties and blocs from the 1998 elections – the radical right National Front and Hromada. However, it managed to achieve impressive results only in western and (less so) in central Ukraine where it came second or third, usually following Our Ukraine. In Kyiv city it attracted a large protest vote and came second with 12.83 per cent. The Hromada legacy proved less useful in its former home
base of Dnipropetrovsk, where it obtained 4.32 per cent and came last in the eight parties and blocs that managed to cross the four per cent threshold.

The oligarchic SDPU-o, with 6.25 per cent, fared poorly considering their access to resources and control of media outlets. This represented only a slight improvement on their 1998 performance, when they suspiciously just surpassed the four per cent threshold, with 4.01 per cent. The SDPU-o were the lowest of the six parties and blocs that passed the four per cent threshold, coming lower even than the SPU and the Tymoshenko bloc which control no major media outlets.53

In western and central Ukraine, the SDPU-o reached the top three only in Transcarpathia, one of the party’s strongholds. Its main success was usually to come in third place after ZYU and the KPU in the east and south of the country. Squeezed out of western and central Ukraine, the SDPU-o has become de facto an eastern Ukrainian party even though it is the party of the Kyiv oligarchic clan: alone of the oligarchic clans the SDPU-o remains unpopular in its home base of the capital.

The main competition in the 250 seats elected in majoritarian districts was between Our Ukraine and ZYU. In majoritarian voting the KPU, SPU, Tymoshenko bloc and SDPU-o all did poorly. The victory of Our Ukraine and ZYU in majoritarian voting in western, central and eastern–southern Ukraine, respectively, reflected the same regional distribution of voting in the seats elected on proportional party lists. Our Ukraine took six out 12 Kyiv seats and ZYU swept Donetsk. In areas where ZYU wished to camouflage itself and hide its members’ true loyalties from voters, the party’s candidates were defined as ‘self-promoted’.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s 2002 election results point to a country that combines a pro-reformist and anti-oligarchic west and centre with an east and south dominated by the Sovietophile KPU and authoritarian corporatist oligarchs (SDPU-o and ZYU). With the decline of the KPU as an alternative project, Ukraine is a country divided by two competing visions of its future (pro-Western Our Ukraine and Eurasianist, authoritarian ZYU).

The area of the west and centre is hostile to the executive and oligarchs, orientated towards integration into Europe, and prepared to back this goal with the necessary domestic reforms. These regions always provide the highest support in Ukrainian opinion polls for integration into NATO and the EU.

The region of the east and south is pro-Kuchma, prefers integration into Europe ‘Together with Russia’,64 and its commitment to the necessary
domestic reforms required to facilitate Euro-Atlantic integration is usually merely at the level of rhetoric. Oligarchs and political forces allied to the executive are also prepared to use authoritarian methods to remain in power and thwart the rise of alternative reformist and opposition groups. This is most visibly seen in the Donbas, the only oblast where ZPU managed to come first in the proportional lists. After the elections the Donbas was described by Ukrainian analysts as Ukraine’s ‘Belarusian enclave’.

The elections showed that the executive seriously misjudged the electorate’s mood that had undergone a psychological revolution since 2000. Faced for the first time with a real alternative to the oligarchs that was non-communist, many voters backed Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko bloc and the SPU. These three political groups have now become identified in the public eye as oppositionist. The ‘opposition’ spectrum in Ukraine is no longer dominated by the KPU. In addition, the executive misjudged the sophistication of the voters. Pro-executive ‘virtual’ clones (Women for the Future, Winter Crop Generation, Greens, Rukh for Unity) all miserably failed.

A final conclusion to be reached from this study of the 2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine is that without bringing in the national question we will fail to understand the mechanics and dynamics of Ukrainian politics. Ukraine’s ethno-cultural and regional divisions and different historical experiences thwarted a country-wide victory for Our Ukraine.

Ukraine’s ethno-cultural divisions and different historical experiences have maintained the popularity of the KPU in the most Sovietized regions of Ukraine, such as the Donbas and the Crimea. In addition, they have facilitated the manipulation of the more passive population found in the east and south by pro-executive and oligarchic political forces. Ukraine is therefore only partially a ‘delegative democracy’ in eastern and southern Ukraine where the population is traditionally passive and the authorities have been successful in utilizing ‘administrative resources’ to manipulate elections in their favour.

NOTES

1. Election legislation can be found at <http://www.cv.k.ukrpack.net/laws/indexLaw.htm>. See also the presidential decree ‘On ensuring rights of citizens, principles of democratic society, openness and transparency in the process of preparing and conducting the elections of 2002’, Uriadovy Kurier, 1 Nov. 2001.
5. Medvedchuk was voted out as first deputy speaker of the Rada in December 2001: see Ukrayinska Pravda, 22 Nov. and 13 Dec. 2001, and Taras Kuzio, ‘Ukraine’s Oligarchic
Social Democrats Suffer Setback’, *RFE–RL Newsline*, Vol.5, No.236 (14 Dec. 2001). Medvedchuk is disliked by Our Ukraine leader Viktor Yushchenko, Rada speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, former Rada speaker Ivan Plushch and Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko; SDPU-o posters were conspicuously absent from Kyiv, the home base of the SDPU-o, during the 2002 elections.


9. This is taken from my personal observations as a Long Term Observer (LTO) for the OSCE in the 2002 elections. On 2 April the LTOs from throughout Ukraine held a meeting in Kyiv to study how voting had taken place on election day in their regions. The LTOs from regions such as Lviv produced no complaints of the use of ‘administrative resources’, unlike the large number of irregularities reported from Donetsk.


18. ‘Kuchmagate’ refers to the crisis in Ukraine after it was revealed that Melnychenko, a presidential guard, had illicitly taped hundreds of hours of conversations in President Kuchma’s office; see Taras Kuzio, ‘Ukraine One Year After “Kuchmagate”’, *RFE–RL Newsline*, 28 Nov. 2001.


22. Taras Kuzio, ‘Ukraine One Year After “Kuchmagate”’,


24. After the 2002 elections Lytvyn, leader of ZYU, criticized the creation of ZYU as a wrong step. The former Rada speaker and centrist, Pliuschh, agreed and believes that ZYU was created purely to try and inhibit the popularity of Our Ukraine: Ukrayinska Pravda, 3 Feb. 2003. Pliuschh refused to stand in the elections as a ZYU candidate; see his interview in Stolichnye novosti, 22 Jan. 2002. By December 2002 Lytvyn was on poor terms with the SDPU-o faction because of his willingness, like Pliuschh, to strike compromises with the more moderate opposition Our Ukraine; see the interview with SDPU-o faction leader and former president, Leonid Kravchuk, in Zerkalo Nedeli/Zerkalo Tyzhnia, 18–24 Jan. 2003.


28. Copy of poll in the possession of the author. Pogrebinsky is head of the Centre for Political and Conflict Studies, a Kyiv-based think-tank linked to the SDPU-o and with good ties to the executive.


32. The election programme of the SDPU-o can be found in Holos Ukrainy, 16 March 2002; for an analysis of the SDPU-o see Zerkalo Nedeli/Zerkalo Tyzhnia, 16 March 2002.


35. The statis supporters of KNDS had been primarily based in the Republican Party (URP). As the URP evolved into an anti-Kuchma party in the late 1990s, supporters of the KNDS statist line withdrew and created the Christian Republican Party (KhRP); the KhRP is a member of Our Ukraine. URP is a member of the Tymoshenko bloc.


42. The KPU manifesto can be found in *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 14 Feb. 2002.


44. See the interview with Czyzh in *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 21 Dec. 2002.

45. The leftist Peasant (*Selianska*) Party should not be confused with the Agrarian (*Ahrarna*) Party which is pro-executive and the ‘party of power’ in Galicia. The Agrarians were one of five parties making up the ZYU in the 2002 elections.


50. The presidential administration claimed it was a fake: most observers and opposition groups believed it was genuine: conversation with Mykola Zhulinsky, Our Ukraine deputy, Fribourg, 18 April 2002.

51. *Ukrayina moloda*, 28 March 2002. Monitoring was undertaken by the Equal Opportunities Committee and the Open Space Association NGOs.

52. Our Ukraine claimed that amounts of $100,000 to one million were offered to deputies to support Lytvyn’s election as Rada speaker. See <http://www.razom.org.ua/details/?news_id=5068> and *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 28 May 2002.


60. KOP was established to attract young voters from Our Ukraine: *Zerkalo Nedeli/Zerkalo Tyzhnia*, 23 March 2002.

61. Copy of poll in the possession of the author.


63. For an elaboration of why the SDPU-o did badly see the interview with Kravchuk, head of the SDPU-o faction in the Rada, in The Day, 17 Sept. 2002.


